The laws regulating how and where couples can get married – as opposed to who they can marry – are widely recognised as being in need of reform. The basic structure of the current law dates back to the Marriage Act 1836, and many elements – the requirements for Anglican weddings and differential treatment of Jewish and Quaker weddings – have a still longer history. Despite the law's longevity, many of the current requirements have their origins in past panics, tactical compromises or quick fixes. While the laws enacted in 1836 were shaped by their historical context, even then the legal framework did not fit how couples wanted to marry. This paper traces the history of marriage law reform to explain how we ended up with a set of laws that are highly restrictive, inconsistent and complex, and why reform is needed.

Human remains interred in parish churchyards or in consecrated portions of local authority cemeteries are within the faculty jurisdiction of the consistory courts of the Church of England. A faculty is required for the disturbance of human remains lying within the faculty jurisdiction. This article will examine the law surrounding consecrated burial grounds in England and the disinterment of human remains therefrom and what this demonstrates about the principles of the ecclesiastical law of England relating to their protection. If ecclesiastical law provides for the protection of human remains, what is the justification for that and how adequate is the protection? The article will compare the consistory courts’ treatment of human remains with the regulation of remains outside the faculty jurisdiction, and attempt to relate canonical principles towards human remains with the legal character of consecrated ground. It will investigate whether the modern treatment of human remains is different from the treatment of remains in the past. By these comparisons I hope to better explore what justifications exist for the approach the consistory courts have taken in regulating disturbance of human remains.

The conflict between Henry II and Thomas Becket was often seen in the past as a collision between the first stirrings of real legal universalism (the same law for all) and claims to exemptions and immunities. Recent scholarship has seriously qualified this picture, recognising the degree to which Henry sought an unfettered authority for the Crown, overriding traditional patterns of obligation and mutuality. Becket's resistance to this was intelligible, but he was increasingly driven to oppose to it a controversial account of clerical immunity, in which the person of the cleric was sacrosanct and all punishment meted out to the cleric must be essentially reformatory in purpose. The origins of this are explored, and contemporary implications in regard to conscientious religious liberties and also to persisting high-risk cultures of clerical immunity are discussed.

This article explores the Law Commission's proposals on how and where people can get married in England and Wales as found in their ‘Getting Married’ Consultation Paper. It examines the extent to which the Commission's proposals will deal with or mitigate concerns expressed about two types of non-qualifying wedding ceremonies: ‘unregistered religious marriages’ where the couple undergo a religious ceremony that does not comply with the requirements of the Marriage Act 1949, and ‘non-religious marriages’ where the ceremony is conducted by celebrants representing a belief organisation (such as Humanists UK) or by independent celebrants and so is also outside the Marriage Act 1949 and not currently legally binding. The article largely welcomes the Commission's proposals but expresses concern about the proposed officiant system and how it defines belief organisation; the proposed changes to the law on validity; and the creation of a new criminal offence. The article develops these three points further and contends that, while a transformed weddings law could recognise non-religious marriages and reduce the number of unregistered religious marriages, the introduction of statutory cohabitation rights upon separation is needed to truly deal with concerns over unregistered religious marriages.

The Law Commission has consulted on provisional proposals for reform of the law governing how and where couples can get married in England and Wales. This article gives an overview of those proposals, with particular focus on religious weddings, including Anglican weddings. It examines proposed changes to each aspect of the process of getting married, from the preliminaries to the people required to officiate at the wedding, the permitted locations and the rules governing the content of the ceremony. The article argues that the legal status of marriage itself is highly flexible, recognising a range of unions. The proposed reforms aim to reflect the diverse range of views about the meaning of marriage, and ensure that the way in which the law recognises a legally binding wedding fits with the many different traditions according to which religious groups celebrate the formation of marriage.

In 2008 and 2020, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published two responses to questions posed regarding the validity of modified baptismal formulas. When administering baptism, some Catholic ministers had altered the prescribed formula with regard to the naming of the Trinity and with regard to the declarative introduction of the formula (ie ‘We baptise you …’ instead of ‘I baptise you …’). The Congregation dismissed all of these formulas as invalidating baptism and demanded that individuals baptised with these formulas be baptised again. In explaining its 2020 response the Congregation referred to Thomas Aquinas, who addressed these and similar issues in his sacramental theology. This reference is evidently due to Aquinas’ pioneering thoughts on the issue. However, in studying Aquinas’ work on the subject it is surprising to find that they reveal a far less literalist approach than the Congregation suggests. In fact, his considerations point at an alternative reading, namely that sacramental formulas should be understood as acts of communication which, based on the ministers’ intention of doing what the Church does, aim at communicating God's grace to the receivers in an understandable way.

Habits and institutions gradually emerged in earliest Christianity. They were soon enrolled in the Roman empire and subsequently into various forms of Christendom. The English Christendom lasted many centuries and in the period of empire planted the Anglican Church in Australia. This Christendom model was fractured decisively in New South Wales in the first half of the nineteenth century. The recent Royal Commission into abuse in institutions has brought to light serious abuse in the Church and associated it with a form of clericalism. The Commission identifies this issue but does not offer any analysis of its character or causes, which has the effect of diminishing the contribution that the Commission might have made to addressing the problem. A preliminary attempt is offered in this article.

South African Christian churches have been widely recognised as major civil institutions that play a role in the provision of social services to complement the state effort. But the concern is there has been an increase in the number of disputes involving leadership succession in these churches that have had to be adjudicated by the civil courts in the last decade. These disputes impact on the governance, growth, reputation and sustainability of churches. The South African Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CRL Rights Commission) identifies weak or lack of effective succession planning in the governing policies of churches as the major cause of these disputes. Against this backdrop, this article analyses some specific cases to explore how church policies influence succession disputes in South African churches. It further explores how the courts engage and interpret the governance policies of churches in the resolution of these disputes. The article reveals that the findings of the CRL Rights Commission are justified. It observes that, among other issues, some churches lack effective and workable succession planning in their governing policies. The policies on leadership succession of these churches are poorly drafted, thereby creating significant lacunae and vacuums leading to conflicts. The article concludes by identifying some lessons that churches can learn from the judicial approach in the resolution of disputes in order to enhance the quality of church policies, thereby reducing their exposure to succession disputes.

The Terrorism Act 2000 recognises that religion may be a force for bad in its definition of ‘terrorism’: ‘The use or threat of action … designed to influence a government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public … for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.’ ‘Radicalisation’ is the process by which an individual becomes involved in terrorism, and it is the statutory Prevent Duty, introduced under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, that is the UK's current means of tackling radicalisation. Under the duty, specified authorities (such as schools, police, etc) must have due regard to preventing people from being ‘drawn into terrorism’. This article addresses an often-neglected area in the ongoing legal debate surrounding the statutory Prevent Duty: the religious dimension. It suggests that religion is at the centre of the Prevent Duty and that the formulation of the duty was stimulated by religion – namely, Islamist extremism and radicalisation. It will discuss the ways in which the Prevent Duty can be criticised; that it has an impact on human rights that it is potentially discriminatory towards Muslims; and that it does not clearly distinguish between permissible radical religion and impermissible harmful religion. The article concludes by suggesting that religion plays an important part in the understanding of extremism and radicalisation.

I embark on this subject tentatively. With trepidation, because I am neither a missiologist nor an ecclesiologist. Nor did I know, when I agreed to the invitation which Mark Hill put so persuasively over a year ago, what would be happening in the Church in the autumn of 2020. Yet it is in many ways a good time to be having a discussion about mission and structure. As I am sure you know, there is work under way on both these questions within the House of Bishops and beyond. Archbishop Stephen Cottrell is leading some work on a vision and strategy for the Church of England for the 2020s. Bishop Nick Baines is leading a group looking at the governance of the national church institutions, in support of that work.

Humanity's challenges have become more acute in recent decades. The international environment has been characterised by rapid change, uncertainty, increased complexity and new trends. Despite the seeming unanimity of the international community in accepting human dignity and human rights as the foundation of a just society, the gap between systems and reality is widening around the world, exacerbated at the same time by globalisation and a liberal, individualistic and consumerist model of democracy. This article seeks to identify a new humanism that can be seen in UNESCO's work in the multifaceted field of culture, with culture as an enabler of sustainable development, peace and economic progress. On the one hand, it examines the confrontation between the politics of recognition and the politics of resentment in dealing with the management of diversity in increasingly complex societies. On the other hand, it analyses the relevance of religion, and particularly the work of the Holy See and successive popes, in culture, public ethics and social cohesion.

The Church of England has committed itself to achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2030. An important element required for success in this aim will be to amend the legislation around the management of church buildings and in particular the operation of the faculty jurisdiction. While aspects of the present system can and do facilitate some necessary change, to achieve the swift and widespread changes required within the timescale envisaged a more radical overhaul is required because the present faculty system favours the status quo, however bad that is from a carbon emissions perspective.

In May 2019 ARCIC III, the current phase of the Anglican–Roman Catholic International Commission met at St George's Cathedral, Jerusalem. The commission members (and staff) were entertained to lunch in the Latin Patriarchate by the Apostolic Administrator (now the Latin Patriarch), Archbishop Pierbattista Pizzaballa OFM. On the wall was a photograph which, it was explained, was a picture of the dozen or so bishops in Jerusalem who were in communion with the See of Rome. There were among them Latins or Roman Catholics, Greek Melkite Catholics, Maronites, Syrian Catholics and Armenian Catholics. All were present in Jerusalem and its environs and exercising episcopal ministry and jurisdiction. And all were in communion with each other.

The historical evolution of tribunals in South Africa is important in understanding the stratagem of present-day tribunals. This article attempts to take the reader on a journey from before colonisation to during and after that era. The aim is to address the historical journey of tribunals from a South African perspective, and to analyse Church tribunals regarding their functions, characteristics and daily operations through certain profound cases.

The Arches Court, the court of appeal of the Province of Canterbury in the Church of England, has existed for more than 700 years. Its evolution – driven by principle, politics and pragmatism – is a fascinating reflection of a key tribunal in the court system of the English Church, and the site of major historical and often contentious developments within the Church. Its appellate status has not changed; it still has jurisdiction over faculties and clergy discipline; its judge is still appointed by the archbishop; and its jurisprudence has contributed much to the development of English ecclesiastical law. However, over the centuries its jurisdiction has contracted; the courts to which appeals against its decisions lie have changed; its historical lawyers of civilian advocates and proctors have been replaced by common law barristers and solicitors; the title for its judge, Dean of Arches, has survived by accident; its procedure has been simplified; and its decisions have throughout its history been respected but today have the authority of binding precedents. The article takes the story up to 2018, when the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and Care of Churches Measure provided that a decision of the Arches and of the provincial Chancery Court of York is today to be followed as if it were a decision of the other court.

The impact of COVID-19 on the capacity to hold face-to-face meetings meant that the normal pattern of synods and assemblies in 2020 was almost totally disrupted. The Church of England's General Synod met in the normal way from 10 to 13 February, but the July group of sessions, which is normally held in York, was reduced to an ‘informal virtual meeting’ on 11 July. A socially distanced special session was held on 24 September at Church House and the November group of sessions was held remotely from 23 to 25 November.

Personally, I am feeling both buoyed up, and also a bit deflated, as a result of Norman's lecture (and the accompanying Ecclesiastical Law Journal article, to which the lecture is just an hors d'oeuvre). Buoyed up that, according to Oughton's treatise of 1728, in the seat of justice the dean should be addressed as Domine Judex or more frequently Domine Decane. Either will do excellently for the future! Deflated because, while Dean Phillimore's letters patent as Dean of the Arches recognised his ‘sound doctrine, good morals, purity of conscience’, my own were, probably rightly, considerably less effusive.