This article analyses recent trends in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerned with the right to freedom of thought, belief and religion (Article 9, European Convention on Human Rights) and the right of parents to respect by the state for their religious and philosophical views in the education of their children (Article 2, Protocol 1).1 These developments include notable decisions concerned with protection from religious persecution in Georgia, with religious education in Norway and Turkey and with the display of crucifixes in state schools in Italy. It is apparent that the European Convention religious liberty jurisprudence increasingly stresses the role of the state as a neutral protector of religious freedom. For individuals religious freedom is now also recognised to include not only the right to manifest their religious belief but also freedom from having to declare their religious affiliation. As the religious liberty jurisprudence comes of age, other significant developments, for example in relation to conscientious objection to military service, can be anticipated.

This article considers some of the more high profile cases decided under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, to assess whether courts are developing case law which adequately protects religion and belief at work. First, it considers the meaning of religion with particular reference to Nicholson v Grainger PLC and suggests that this may represent a step in the wrong direction in defining ‘belief’. It then looks at cases which have involved religious individuals seeking to manifest religion at work in terms of religious dress. It critically examines the way the concept of proportionality has been used to decide these cases, and suggests that at times courts are stepping beyond their usual boundaries in determining religious issues, with particular reference to comments by the courts on issues such whether particular beliefs are ‘core beliefs’. The third area of discussion is the question of whether discrimination by religious individuals on grounds of sexual orientation should be tolerated. The case law (Ladele v Islington Borough Council) is considered in detail. In conclusion, the article assesses whether a hierarchy is developing between different grounds of discrimination protection.

The Apostolic Constitution Anglicanorum Coetibus represents the latest, and perhaps one of the most controversial, developments in Anglican and Roman Catholic relations. The Apostolic Constitution is the juridical means by which Anglicans dissatisfied with recent initiatives in the Anglican Communion may enter as groups into full communion with Rome. It provides for the erection of ordinariates, a category equivalent to dioceses but one which is not elaborated in the Latin Code of Canon Law 1983. This article describes responses to the Apostolic Constitution, from the hostile to the welcoming, evaluates the provisions of the Apostolic Constitution, particularly those which effect integration of the faithful into the Latin church and those which allow for the continuation of elements of their former traditions, and evaluates the ways in which the laws of Anglican churches may be employed either to hinder or to help the departure of those seeking entry to an ordinariate.

Rastafari cannabis use presents a challenge in reconciling the doctrines of freedom of religion and the criminal law. Hitherto, the domestic courts have not resolved this clash in favour of religion, displaying reluctance to explore the doctrinal limits of religious freedom. This has occurred at a time of increasing Rastafari numbers across the United Kingdom, forcing some followers to choose between adherence to either their religion or generally applicable criminal laws. Such ‘choice’ inhibits the development of domestic religious freedoms where they conflict with criminal laws protecting wider societal and communitarian interests. This dilemma could be addressed through a statutory exemption in England and Wales from domestic anti-drugs legislation for purposes of religious manifestation. This paper examines the difficult balance between the criminal law and Rastafari cannabis claims in the relevant jurisprudence. A comparative analysis highlights that treatment of religious freedom in Rastafari cannabis case law outlines not only doctrinal scope for a domestic religious drug-use exemption, but also some ways in which regulation could be practically framed. Other jurisdictions' attitudes to non-religious recreational drug use are also instructive in this task.1

This article considers the Church Buildings Council (CBC) and its role within the faculty system, emphasising that the whole system, and the CBC in particular, works best through effective and meaningful collaboration. Pivotal to this collaboration are the 42 Diocesan Advisory Committees on the Care of Churches (DACs). Specifically, it is argued that greater clarity about the CBC, its expectations and what it aims to deliver will benefit all concerned in the great collective enterprise of maintaining sacred heritage buildings mindful of their continuing purpose to serve the mission of the Church.1

The Revd Allan Macdonald was inducted as Free Presbyterian Minister at Daviot, Tomatin and Stratherrick in 2001. He received neither a written contract of employment nor a statement of terms and conditions. In 2006 he wrote book, Veritatem Eme, that was highly critical of some aspects of the life of the Church and was ordered to apologise. He refused to comply, was temporarily suspended in January 2007 and suspended from the ministry sine die – in effect, dismissed – in May 2008.

The Labour Government (1997–2010) created a large number of new laws affecting religion. The Blair and Brown years saw the incorporation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, the creation of religiously-aggravated offences, the recognition of civil partnerships, and a tide of legislation affecting education, charities and equality law, which saw the extension of the law to cover discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. And all this legislation has resulted in an abundance of case law. There is more ‘religion law’ – national and international law affecting religion – than ever before. And, for some time, there has been an implicit tension in English law between this new religion law and older laws protecting religion. These old laws, many still on the statute books, were based upon a different premise. They often sought to protect Christianity in general (or the Church of England in particular) as the norm, while providing some degree of toleration for other faiths. Moreover, the legal regulation of religion was characterised by a lightness of touch. The new religion law, by contrast, is facilitative, seeking to protect religious freedom mainly as an individual right which needs to be balanced against other rights. No special protection is afforded to any one religion and protection is often afforded to non-religious beliefs. The new legal framework affords utmost importance to the concept of religious neutrality as the State takes on the role of facilitating the religious market place. The tension between the old laws on religion and the new ‘religion law’ can be seen, for example, in the abolition of the offence of blasphemy (which favoured the Church of England in particular) and its replacement by offences concerning religious hatred (which covers all religions). This tension has recently come to the fore in the Court of Appeal ruling in the application for leave to appeal in McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited.

The European Court of Human Rights has adopted a narrow and restrictive approach to the protection of religious freedoms which is inconsistent with some of its own judgments about the importance of religious freedoms. This narrow and restrictive approach has necessarily influenced the approach of the Courts in England and Wales, and the approach is not supportable on any principled grounds. This article examines what has gone wrong, and makes some suggestions for the future.