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Establishing Sincerity in Religion and Belief Claims: A Question of Consistency
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 April 2011
Abstract
In this article it is argued that individual sincerity has become the most significant determinant of whether or not a religious or philosophical belief is to be recognised as such for the purposes of accessing putative legal protections for individuals. However, a clear test of individual sincerity has not been fully articulated by the courts in the UK or indeed elsewhere. In this context, the possibility of developing a test based in large part on consistency of individual behaviour is considered in this article, and some objections noted. The article concludes that such a test is both useful and desirable in principle, and should be developed; however, it must be applied with great care in order to remain inclusive of those who may be driven to apparent inconsistency by fear or as a result of other factors.
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- Copyright © Ecclesiastical Law Society 2011
References
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18 [2010] IRLR 4 (EAT).
19 App No 7050/75, 19 ECHR Dec & Rep 57 (1993).
20 [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin).
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29 Ogilvy, for example, argues that reliance on subjective sincerity can reduce religious convictions to individual ‘whimsy’ in the eyes of others; and this is an insufficient basis to retain meaningful legal protection for religion in the longer term in what she sees as an increasingly hostile secular world. See, M Ogilvy, ‘And then there was one: freedom of religion in Canada – the incredible shrinking concept’, (2008) 10 Ecc LJ 197–204. This argument has most force where sincerity is the only test to be employed.
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