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Beliefs Unworthy of Respect in a Democratic Society: A View from the Employment Tribunal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2020

Andrew Hambler
Andrew Hambler*
Affiliation:
Associate Professor, Birmingham City University
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Extract

There have been a number of tribunal decisions on the admissibility of discrimination claims concerning ‘belief’ as a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010. Some have favoured the claimant, establishing, inter alia, that opposition to fox hunting and hare-coursing, a belief in the ‘higher purpose’ of public service broadcasting and a commitment to vegetarianism constitute ‘philosophical beliefs’ for the purposes of the Equality Act. Others do not, such that a belief in wearing a poppy or, in contrast with an earlier decision, a commitment to vegetarianism do not qualify. The admissibility of these claims tended to turn on the extent to which the belief in question was considered cogent or was sufficiently weighty and substantial. In Forstater v CGD Europe & Anor, whether or not a belief fell into the protected category focused on the rather different issue of whether or not it was worthy of respect because of its compatibility (or otherwise) with the dignity and rights of others.

Keywords

philosophical belieftransgenderEquality Act
Type
Comment
Information
Ecclesiastical Law Journal , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , May 2020 , pp. 234 - 241
Copyright
Copyright © Ecclesiastical Law Society 2020

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References

1 Before 2010, under the Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations 2003 SI No 1660.

2 Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Limited t/a Orchard Park (2011) ET 3105555/09.

3 Maistry v BBC (2011) ET 1313142/10.

4 Alexander v Farmtastic Valley Ltd and others (2011) ET 2513832/10.

5 Lisk v Shield Guardian Co and others (2011) ET 3300873/11.

6 Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd & Ors [2019] ET 3335357/2018. For a discussion of this case, see F Cranmer and R Sandberg, ‘A critique of the decision in Conisbee that vegetarianism is not a belief’, (2020) 22 Ecc LJ 36–48.

7 See discussion of the ‘Grainger criteria’ below.

8 UKET 2200909/2019 (18 December 2019).

9 Ibid, para 23.

10 Ibid, para 25.

11 Ibid, para 31.

12 Ibid, para 77 (Tayler EJ).

13 Ibid, para 6.

14 [2010] ICR 360 at para 24 (Burton J).

15 Forstater, paras 52–55.

16 Ibid, para 56. This issue was considered in some detail by Judge Tayler, but ultimately found not to assist Ms Forstater (para 93).

17 Ibid, para 82.

18 Ibid, para 83.

19 Ibid, para 84.

20 Ibid, para 54.

21 (2019) ET Case 1304602/2018.

22 ‘So God created man in his own image; in the image of God he created him; male and female, he created them.’

23 Mackereth, para 197 (Perry EJ). The tribunal, while not disputing that Christian belief in general was protected in law, chose to apply the Grainger criteria to ‘sub-sets’ of Christian belief, thus choosing to treat religious beliefs and philosophical beliefs in the same way (para 194).

24 Ibid, paras 262–263 (Perry EJ).

25 Forstater, para 76.

26 Ibid.

27 [2017] EWHC 2669 (Admin).

28 The claimant, a student of social work, was ultimately successful in his attempt to overturn a decision to exclude him from his MA course.

29 Forstater, para 88 (Tayler EJ).

30 The same approach also appears, more opaquely, in the reasoning in Mackereth, paras 201–202.

31 Ibid, para 90 (Tayler EJ).

32 Ibid, para 91.

33 Ibid, para 84, emphasis added.

34 Ibid, paras 79–80.

35 Ibid, para 86.

36 [2005] 2 AC 246.

37 Ibid, para 23 (per Lord Nicholls).

38 Forstater, at para 87.

39 Equality Act 2010, s 26.

40 With the aid of his oft-quoted manual, The Equal Treatment Bench Book, first referred to at paragraph 11 of the judgment.