1 As to this definition of qian xun in modern Chinese, see the entry in the Contemporary Chinese Usage Dictionary, ed. Feng Zhichun (Chengdu: Sichuan cishu, 2010). This definition is applied to the equivalent of qian xun in Korean, namely gyeom son. For instance, see the entry in the Korean Unabridged Dictionary, ed. Lee Hui-seung (Seoul: Min jung Seo lim, 1982). This definition can be traced back to the neo-Confucian Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 understanding: 謙者, 自卑而尊人, 又爲禮者之所當執持而不可失者也 (Qian is lowering oneself and elevating others, and it is what the practician of li 禮 should maintain and not lose). Xi, Zhu, Zhuzi quanshu 朱子全書, vol. 2 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2002), 42Google Scholar. Zhu Xi seems to borrow the above sentence from the early Chinese text Liji 禮記 where the same sentence is used in explaining li: 夫禮者, 自卑而尊人 (Ingeneral, li is lowering oneself and elevating others).

2 The relationship between qian xun in contemporary East Asian cultures and qian in early China is a question that warrants careful and detailed explanation. Also, the difference between qian xun or qian on the one hand and the contemporary Western virtue modesty on the other is a subject worthy of careful inquiry. Nevertheless, the investigation of qian in this article will proceed in a way that does not engage or require either of these issues.

3 In this article I use the title Yi jing 易經 to refer to the complete canonical text that includes the original text Zhouyi 周易, namely the hexagram and the statements, and the Ten Wings (Shi yi 十翼), namely the ten commentaries on the Zhouyi. Even though each of the ten commentaries remains to be dated more accurately, it should be safe to regard most of them as considerably reflecting the thoughts of the Warring states period. See Shaughnessy, Edward L., “I Ching [Yi jing] 易經,” in Early Chinese Texts: ABibliographical Guide, ed. Loewe, Michael (Berkeley: The Society for the Study of Early China and the Institute of East Asian Studies, 1993), 216–28Google Scholar.

4 In the Yi jing, qian is once defined as a kind of de 德, which is usually translated as the character trait or the virtue in English. 謙, 德之柄也 (Qian is the handle of de). See Heng, Gao 高亨, Zhouyi Dazhuan Jinzhu 周易大傳今注 (Qinan: Qilu shushe, 1979), 582Google Scholar. Throughout the relevant sentences in early Chinese texts that I examine later in this article, however, qian is more often used to describe certain kinds of attitude or behavior.

5 Among many others in the aforementioned two groups of terms, qian can serve as the umbrella term because, first, it was used as the entry term for the qian hexagram of the Yi jing from the outset, and, second, the idea of qian that this article explores has traditionally been expressed in terms of its later derivatives, such as qian xun, qian rang 謙讓, and qian xu 謙虛, all of which includes the term qian.

6 Below, in Section 8, I revisit the division between ideas and concepts and explicate the sharing of the idea of qian and different conceptualizations by the thinkers in early China. Note, though, that this article does not delve in detail into the issue of how the idea of qian was differently conceptualized by different early Chinese thinkers. Rather, the focus of this article is on the reconstruction of the idea of qian that was shared by the different thinkers.

7 Kwong-loi Shun points out that the process of approximating ethical experiences of premodern Chinese thinkers in a way that makes the experiences understandable from our perspective without distorting their own perspective is an essential process that the researcher in Chinese philosophy consciously goes through in interpreting premodern thought. The methodology that I attempt to develop to reconstruct the idea of qian in this article is intended to demonstrate an example of such a process that Shun tries to articulate. See Kwong-loi Shun, Section 2, “On the Idea of ‘No Self,’” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 92 (November 2018), 78–107. See also Shun, Kwong-loi, “Studying Confucian Ethics from the Inside Out,” Dao 15.4 (December 2016), 511–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In these studies, Shun appeals to the kind of experiences that are mutually comprehensible for premodern Chinese thinkers and us as the common ground on the basis of which the approximation of premodern thought without distortion is feasible. Martha Nussbaum also suggests a similar kind of common experience in a different context, namely in discussing the possibility of cross-cultural comparison of virtues. She labels it as “grounding experience.” See Nussbaum, Martha C., “Non-relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13.1 (1987), 32–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 See Liji Zhengyi 禮記正義 (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 2000), 1337.

9 關尹老聃 … 以濡弱謙下爲表 (Guan Yin and Lao Dan made weakness and qian xia 謙下 their mark of distinction). See Guying, Chen 陳鼓應, Zhuangzi jinzhu jinyi 莊子今注今譯 (Beijing: Shangwu, 1989), 900Google Scholar. It is worth noting that it has been historically controversial whether this person called Lao Dan 老聃 is the author of the currently received text, the Dao de jing, namely Laozi 老子. As to the controversy surrounding the authorship, see William G. Boltz, “Lao tzu Tao te ching [Laozi Dao de jing]” 老子道德經, in Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide, 269–71.

10 See the entry of qian in the Kangxi zidian 康熙字典 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1958).

11 See Liji Zhengyi, 1859–1860.

12 See Bojun, Yang, Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu 春秋左傳注 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1981), 1265Google Scholar.

13 In addition, an etymological investigation of the relation between qian and its possible cognate lian (廉, angular or purity) might help in expanding our knowledge of the semantic aspect of qian. See Schuessler, Axel, ABC Etymological Dictionary of Old Chinese (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 424CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, I do not take this possibility into account in this article. The main meanings of the two terms are quite disconnected to the extent that lian may refer to another human quality, as it is usually translated as “honesty” or “purity.” Even though the two terms can be etymologically close, this does not necessarily mean that the use of lian is directly connected to the use of qian, especially, in relation to the idea that early Chinese thinkers tried to convey in terms of qian.

14 人道惡盈而好謙 (It is the way of human beings to dislike the full and love the modest). Heng, Gao 高亨, Zhouyi Dazhuan jinzhu 周易大傳今注 (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1979), 179Google Scholar.

15 See Gong Yingda’s 孔潁達 commentary: 盈溢驕慢, 皆以惡之. 謙退恭巽, 悉皆好之. (Everyone dislikes the full and arrogant and likes the modest and polite). Zhouyi Zhengyi 周易正義 (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 2000), 96.

16 Bojun, Yang 楊伯峻, Lunyu yizhu 論語譯注 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980), 143Google Scholar.

17 Disheng, Li 李滌生, Xunzi jishi 荀子集釋 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng, 1979), 118–19Google Scholar.

18 “The petty person … is filled with an overweening pride around other people” (jiao yi ren 驕溢人). Xunzi jishi, 41. I consulted John Knoblock’s translation. See his Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 175.

19 勞而不伐. Zhouyi Dazhuan jinzhu, 521.

20 This word, “downplay,” is chosen to translate a group of early Chinese terms including bei 卑 (lowering) and xia 下 (putting down). As compared to the two terms just mentioned, “downplaying” has an additional connotation, namely representing something seem less important, thereby making people think that it is less important than it really is. With this connotation in mind, I choose “downplaying” as the representative translation for the second feature of qian. Qian has to do not just with lowering oneself or putting oneself in a low position but with representing oneself or certain aspects of one’s own seem less important. This can be fully explained when the second feature is understood in relation to the third feature that I explain in the below.

21 卑而不可踰. Zhouyi Dazhuan jinzhu, 179.

22 卑以自牧也. Zhouyi Dazhuan jinzhu, 180.

23 富有四海, 守之以謙. Xunzi jishi, 639.

24 Zhouyi Dazhuan jinzhu, 582. See n. 4.

25 德言盛, 禮言恭, 謙也者, 致恭以存其位者也. ([The gentleman’s] virtue is more and more flourishing, and his behavior in accordance with li is more and more courteous. The humble who carries out his courtesy to the utmost will preserve himself in his position). Zhouyi Dazhuan jinzhu, 521–22.

26 For instance, in the “Shao yi” 少儀 chapter of the Liji, gong is defined as the kind of posture required for treating guests properly. The annotator of the Han Dynasty Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 understands gong in the relevant sentence as having to do especially with mao 貌 referring literally to outer appearance. This kind of outer appearance can be understood as postures to be taken in the polite treatment of guests or honored guests. See Liji zhengyi, 1210.

27 Lunyu yizhu, 125. Liji zhengyi, 17. Also see Bojun, Yang 楊伯峻, Mengzi yizhu 孟子譯註 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1962), 259Google Scholar.

28 君子恭敬, 撙節退讓以明禮. Liji zhengyi, 17. In interpreting zun* 撙 as “lowering,” I do not follow the annotation of Zheng Xuan and Kong Yingda 孔穎達. As to the same interpretation of mine, also see the Liji zhengyi, 17n3. The term zun* can be regarded as belonging to the group of terms related to “downplaying,” the second feature of qian. I revisit this term used in the same sense in the Xunzi later in Section 6.

29 謙以制禮. Zhouyi Dazhuan jinzhu, 585. As to the above translation, see Gao’s commentary. He understands the connotation of zhi 制 as cong 從 (observance).

30 語以其功下人者也. ([This] speaks of the man with great achievements lowers himself to other people.) Zhouyi Dazhuan Jinzhu, 512–22. The term xia 下 (lowering) can also be regarded as belonging to the group of terms relevant to the second feature of qian. In the following section, I show that this term is intensively used in the Dao de jing.

31 謙者, 屈躬下物, 先人後己, 以此待物. Zhouyi zhengyi, 94.

32 To deal with this issue fully, I have been writing another independent paper on the comparison between qian xun, the contemporary version of qian, and modesty as a contemporary Western virtue.

33 Julia Driver understands modesty in terms of the tendency to underestimate one’s own achievements or oneself and explains that it is based upon an epistemic defect of not knowing the accurate value of self-worth. See Driver, Julia, “The Virtues of Ignorance,” Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989), 373–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also see her Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chap. 2 and 4.

34 For instance, Owen Flanagan understands modesty in terms of the disposition or desire not to have any overestimated belief. See Flanagan, Owen, “Virtue and Ignorance,” Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990), 420–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Similarly, Thomas Hurka understands modesty in terms of the tendency to take too much pleasure in one’s own accomplishments, compared to pleasure in those of others. See Hurka, Thomas, Virtue, Vice, and Value (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), chap. 1 and 4Google Scholar.

35 An extensive discussion would be needed in order distinguish qian from modesty fully. However, that goes beyond the scope of this study. It suffices to say for now that modesty in contemporary discussions is arguably the kind of virtue based primarily on self-regarding considerations, for example, that regarding an accurate assessment of one’s accomplishment or oneself by avoiding any excessive and therefore wrong assessment. By contrast, qian does not simply aim at accuracy in one’s own evaluation of something related to oneself, rather it fundamentally has to do with the proper treatment of other people in interactions. In this sense, qian can be differentiated from modesty in terms of its being fundamentally related to other-regarding considerations.

36 慮以下人. Lunyu yizhu, 130.

37 Moreover, Kongzi disapproves of jiao, as mentioned before. See n. 16.

38 See Liuzi (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1985), 44.

39 However, it is worth noting that this second indirect ground may be controversial because the authorship of the Dao de jing is questionable. See n. 9. With this controversy in mind, in this section, I use “Laozi” as a convenient label that refers to the person or persons to whom the authorship of the Dao de jing is ascribed.

40 以道佐人主者 [, … ] 果而勿矜, 果而勿伐, 果而勿驕. Dao de jing, chapter 30. See Guying, Chen 陳鼓應, Laozi jinzhu jinyi 老子今注今譯 (Beijing: Shangmuyin, 2006), 192Google Scholar.

41 物壯則老. Laozi Jinzhu Jinyi, 192.

42 是以聖人後其身而身先. Dao de jing, chapter 7. See Laozi jinzhu jinyi, 100.

43 天地所以能長且久者, 以其不自生, 故能長生. Laozi jinzhu jinyi, 100.

44 Laozi jinzhu jinyi, 100.

45 善用人者, 爲之下. Laozi calls this the de (virtue) of not contending (bu zheng zhi de 不爭之德). Dao de jing, chapter 68. See Laozi jinzhu jinyi, 313.

46 Quite similar a reading can apply to chapter 61 wherein Laozi says that both a major state and a minor state should abase themselves (xia) before each other, then they each can get what they want from each other.

47 According to a traditional commentary, hou is the leader’s attitudes or behavior. See Laozi jinzhu jinyi, 74.

48 See n 45.

49 是以聖人欲上民, 必以言下之. 欲先民, 必以身後之. See Laozi jinzhu jinyi, 308.

50 As a matter of fact, according to a traditional interpretation of the text, it is full of suggestions about how the ruler can resort to political trickery to take over the reins of the government and the people. For instance, Zhang Shunhui 張舜徽 claims that the Dao in the Dao de jing is not a metaphysical principle on the basis of which all things and beings in the universe operate, but the political way by which the ruler should abide. See his Zhou Qin daolun fawei 周秦道論發微 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1982), 67. In this line of thought, Fu Sinian 傅斯年 takes a further step to claim that the text is full of political trickery to retain political power and understands such an attitude or code of behavior as abasing oneself as an example of such trickery. See his Zhanguo shijia xulun 戰國史家敍論 in Fu Mengzhen xiansheng ji 傅孟眞先生集 (Taipei: Taiwan National University Press, 1952). In addition, the contemporary Korean scholar Lee Seung-ryul also makes the claim that the attitude or code of behavior in question should be understood as a political tactic rather than as a moral virtue. See his “A Study of the Thought of qian xun in Tang yu zhi dao 唐虞之道 of the Guodian Bamboo Slips,” Dongyang cheolhak yeongu 東洋哲學硏究 28 (2002), 235–63. To focus on the main topic of this article, I shall sidestep the question of whether the interpretation of the Dao de jing merely as a textbook on political trickery is reasonable.

51 有道之士固驕人主, 人主之不肖者亦驕有道之士, 日以相驕, 奚時相得. (Scholar-knights who possess the Way are consistently rude to rulers. Unworthy rulers respond in kind by being rude to such scholar-knights. Each day they are rude to one another; when will they cooperate?) See Qiyou, Chen 陳奇猷, Lüshi chunqiu xin jiaoshi 呂氏春秋新校釋 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2002), 886Google Scholar. The translation is Knoblock and Riegal’s. Knoblock, John and Riegel, Jeffrey K., The Annals of Lü Buwei: A Complete Translation and Study (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 347Google Scholar.

52 賢主則不然, 士雖驕之, 而己愈禮之, 士安得不歸之. 士所歸, 天下從之. (Worthy rulers are not like this. Even when scholar-knights are rude to them, such rulers are even more polite to the scholar-knights; Why, then, would the scholar-knights not turn to them. Those to whom scholar-knights turn, the world follows.) Lüshi chunqiu xin jiaoshi, 886; The Annals of Lü Buwei: A Complete Translation and Study, 347.

53 士有若此者, 五帝弗得而友, 三王弗得而師, 去其帝王之色, 則近可得之矣. (Such scholar-knights could not be obtained as friends even by the Five Sovereigns or as teachers by the Three Kings. Rid yourselves of the attitude of a Sovereign or King. Then perhaps you can obtain them.) Lüshi chunqiu xin jiaoshi, 886; The Annals of Lü Buwei: A Complete Translation and Study, 349.

54 As to the understanding of the second piece of advice, see Chen Qiyou’s comment on the relevant sentence. Lüshi chunqiu Xin Jiaoshi, 894.

55 不唯以身下士邪. ([Did King Cheng] not put himself below scholar-knights?) Lüshi chunqiu xin jiaoshi, 887.

56 See nn 17, 18, and 23.

57 持寵處位終身不厭之術. Xunzi jishi, 246.

58 Xunzi jishi, 246. As to the above translation, I partly consult John Knoblock’s. See his Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 59.

59 This interpretation was presented for the first time by Yang Liang 楊倞, the first annotator of the Xunzi. See Xianqian, Wang 王先謙, Xunzi jijie 荀子集解 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1988), 109Google Scholar. Also see Xunzi jishi, 118. Thus understood, the sentence “be respectful and courteous to him and restrain yourself” (恭敬而僔), is almost equivalent to the aforementioned sentence in the Liji, in which it is said that the gentleman manifests li 禮 by means of gong and zun* understood as a qian-related term. See n. 28.

60 This is also Yang Liang’s interpretation. See Xunzi jijie, 109. It is worth noting that Kim Hak-ju’s translation of bei tui in Korean is something like the demeanor of lowering oneself. See his Soonja (Seoul: Eulyu Munhwasa, 2001), 166.

61 Eric L. Hutton translates zun simply as modest, which is the usual translation of qian in English. See his Xunzi The Complete Text (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), 49.

62 This is Yang Liang’s interpretation. See Xunzi jijie, 109. Yang reads qian* 嗛 as qian** 歉 and takes a further step to interpret it as not being imprudently conceited (zi man 自滿). See the part of Section 2 concerning the homonyms of qian.

63 Xunzi jijie, 109; Jue, Zhang 張覺, Xunzi yizhu 荀子譯註 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2015), 68Google Scholar.

64 Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 2, 278n21. In this regard, Knoblock translates the term as “humble” in English. Ibid., 59.

65 This is Yang Liang’s annotation. See Xunzi jijie, 110. See also Xunzi yizhu, 68.

66 In this respect, Knoblock translates kua 夸 as “boast.” See Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 2, p. 59. Hutton’s English translation is also the same. See Xunzi The Complete Text, p. 49. Also see Tianhai, Wang 王天海, Xunzi jiaoshi 荀子校釋 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2005), 248Google Scholar.

67 For instance, see Xunzi Jijie, 110.

68 For such annotations, see Xunzi jiaoshi, 248.

69 I deal with the second and third tactics in less detail than the first one, for I focus specifically on the parts associated potentially with the idea of qian. The analysis in the above is only intended to show that the tactics reflect the idea in question to a more considerable extent than one may initially expect.

70 求善處大重, 理任大事, 擅寵於萬乘之國, 必無後患之術. Xunzi jishi, 119.

71 故知者之擧事也, 滿則慮嗛. Xunzi jishi, 119. Kim Hak-ju translates this sentence literally just as I translate it. See Sunja, 167. Zhang Jue interprets it as meaning that the wise person considers being deficient, when he is perfect (yuan man 圓滿). See Xunzi yizhu, 106. The issue of inconsistency in his interpretation of the same term qian* can arise: He understands the qian* in the first tactic by changing it to qian, whereas he understands the same term in the second tactic literally, that is, as being deficient. See Footnote n. 65. Instead, if it is possible to interpret the qian* of both tactics equally as having the connotation of qian, it helps with maintaining consistency in interpreting the same term that appears twice in the closely connected passages in the same chapter. Thus, I suggest that the qian* in the first and second tactics should be understood equally in relation to qian.

72 Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 2, 60.

73 As to annotations that interpret the qian* in the above context simply as qian, see Xunzi jiaoshi, 253; Xunzi The Complete Text, 110.

74 知而好謙, 必賢. Xunzi jishi, 119–120.

75 Xunzi jishi, 120.

76 天下之行術. See Xunzi jishi, 121.

77 以事君則必通, 以爲仁則必聖. In interpreting this sentence, I follow Zhang Jue’s Chinese translation. See Xunzi yizhu, 107. As to a similar interpretation, see Xiong Gongzhe, 110. In contrast, Knoblock’s interpretation of the sentence is somewhat different. See Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 2, 61.

78 功雖甚大, 無伐德之色. See Xunzi jishi, 121.

79 In relation to these two criteria, it is worth paying attention to a particular part of the Mengzi, in which Mengzi explains very similar criteria, rank (jue 爵) and virtue (de德), along with the third one, age (chi 齒). He says, “There are three things which are acknowledged by the world to be exalted: rank, age and virtue.” Moreover, he points out different sociopolitical domains in which each of the three is viewed more importantly than the other two: “At court, rank is supreme; in the village, age; but for giving help to the world and ruling over the people it is virtue.” According to these statements, rank is the criterion for judging who should be more respected in the hierarchical status system where people have power because of their inherited wealth or social position, whereas age is the criterion in the domain of ordinary life where one interacts with relatives, friends, and acquaintances. In addition, Mencius presents the third criterion adopted in the domain of “giving help to the world and ruling over the people.” This independent domain is related to the meritocratic social system where people can have power because of their abilities. See Mengzi yizhu, 89. The above translation is D. C. Lau’s. See his Mencius (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003), 83.

80 In the case of the Lüshi chunqiu, it has widely been regarded as a repository of thought derived from early Confucians, Mohists, and Daoists. See Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide, 324.

81 For instance, see Dao de jing, chapter 38: 故失道而後德, 失德而後仁, 失仁而後義, 失義而後禮 (Thus, after the Dao had been lost, de appeared; after de had been lost, ren appeared; after ren had been lost, yi appeared; after yi had been lost, li appeared). Laozi jinzhu jinyi, 215.

82 This distinction is first introduced by Gilbert Ryle. See his “Thinking and Reflecting” and “The Thinking of Thoughts: What Is ‘Le Penseur’ Doing?” in Collected Papers, vol. 2 (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1971). Also, this distinction is used by Nussbaum in the context of the cross-cultural comparison of virtues. See n. 7. Recently, Bryan Van Norden pays attention to this distinction in order to explain the legitimacy of his adopting the Western theoretical framework, such as virtue ethics and consequentialism, to analyze early Chinese philosophy. See his Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 15–23.

83 This example of the three boys is Clifford Geertz’s. He also borrows this example from Ryle. See Geertz, Clifford, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973)Google Scholar.

84 In this article, I do not explore different conceptualizations of the idea of qian in detail. In the above, I only explain one possible theoretical element that makes difference in conceptualization, namely the justification of qian. Instead, here, though briefly, I provide another example that can show different concepts based on the same idea. Among such examples is the early Chinese idea of de 德, which is widely translated as virtue in English. De is understood basically as the inner power that enables one to attract other people. This idea was shared among many early Chinese thinkers, such as Kongzi and Laozi. However, they conceptualize it differently. For Kongzi, de is “moral charisma that allows [virtuous political leaders] to attract and retain the support of others.” On the other hand, for Laozi, de is the inner power that affects other people in a way that “helps them at ease and enables them to become aware of their inauthentic behavior and attitudes.” If this understanding of Kongzi and Laozi is acceptable, it clearly shows different concepts based on the same idea. I borrow the above understanding of the difference between Kongzi and Laozi from Philip J. Ivanhoe’s discussion of it. See his “The concept of de (‘virtue’) in the Laozi,” in Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi, ed. Mark Csikszentmihalyi and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).

85 In addition, it is worth explaining how the study of qian in this article differs from Edward Slingerland’s study of wu-wei 無爲 in his Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Slingerland similarly pays attention to a cluster of terms related to wu-wei in order to grasp this early Chinese concept, which he translates as “effortless action.” However, the cluster of terms he discusses covers a broad range of ideas, such as ziran 自然, xu 虛, and jing 靜, which I understand as conceptualized differently by different early Chinese thinkers. In this respect, it can be said that Slingerland ultimately seeks to subsume various early Chinese ideas and even concepts under the unifying concept wu-wei. In other words, for him, wu-wei is a higher-level of concept that unifies various other ideas and concepts under the same spiritual ideal, what he calls effortless action. If this understanding of Slingerland is correct, his study differs from the study of qian in this article, in that the latter is less ambitious and focuses on a single idea by paying attention to its relevant linguistic expressions that do not measure up to ideas or concepts.