1. The Zhuangzi is traditionally divided into three sections: the “Inner Chapters,” the “Outer Chapters” (waipian 外篇, chapters eight to twenty-two), and the “Miscellaneous Chapters” (zapian 雜篇, chapters twenty-three to thirty-three). Presumably this division was the work of the commentator Guo Xiang 郭象 (d. 312 c.e.), but it may also predate his exegesis. More recently, scholars such as A. C. Graham and Liu Xiaogan have suggested further subdivisions to delineate different intellectual strands within the compilation of the Zhuangzi. This article discusses only the “Inner Chapters” and argues that, though they may not be written by the same author or even at exactly the same time, the received version of these seven chapters demonstrates a coherent, self-contained argument. For helpful discussions of the Zhuangzi’s textual history, including possible subdivisions, see Graham, A. C., Chuang-tzu: The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book Chuang-tzu (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981)Google Scholar; and Xiaogan, Liu, Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1994)Google Scholar.

2. Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋, ed. Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1961; rep. Beijing: Zhonghua, 2008), 45. All citations refer to this edition and all translations are my own. However, I have benefited greatly from the following: Watson, Burton, trans., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968)Google Scholar and Graham, Chuang-tzu: Seven Inner Chapters.

3. For other scholars who favor the “true self” interpretation, see Siguang, Lao 勞思光, Xinbian Zhongguo zhexueshi 新編中國哲學史 (Taipei: Sanmin, 1981)Google Scholar; Yi, Wu 吳怡, Xiaoyao de Zhuangzi 逍遙的莊子 (Taipei: Dongda tushu, 1984)Google Scholar; Kuang-ming, Wu, The Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the First Three Chapters of the Chuang Tzu (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990)Google Scholar; and Ivanhoe, Philip J., “Zhuangzi’s Conversion Experience,” Journal of Chinese Religions 19.1 (1991), 13–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Chris Jochim also provides a helpful survey of some studies related to the ideas of “true self” and “no self” within the Zhuangzi. See Jochim, Chris, “Just Say No to ‘No Self’ in Zhuangzi,” in Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed. Ames, Roger T. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 35–74Google Scholar.

4. Slingerland, Edward G., Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 186Google Scholar. In emphasizing the metaphorical dimensions of this line, Slingerland is careful to distinguish his argument from the more metaphysical arguments of scholars like Wu Kuang-ming, which postulate different types of selves. For a full discussion of this point, see ibid. 184 n. 29. For a representative example of the metaphysical arguments themselves see Wu, Butterfly as Companion, 183–85.

5. Slingerland, Effortless Action, 185–88, 199.

6. For other scholars who explicitly hold the “no self” view or otherwise seem to suggest a similar interpretation through their descriptions of the Way acting through the practitioner, see Graham, Chuang-tzu: Seven Inner Chapters; Yearley, Lee, “Zhuangzi’s Understanding of Skillfulness and the Ultimate Spiritual State,” in Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Kjellberg, Paul and Ivanhoe, Philip J. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 152–82Google Scholar; and Brindley, Erica, Individualism in Early China: Human Agency and the Self in Thought and Politics (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2010), 54–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7. Loy, David, “Zhuangzi and Nagarjuna on the Truth of No Truth,” in Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Kjellberg, Paul and Ivanhoe, Philip J. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 53Google Scholar.

8. Loy, “Truth of No Truth,” 52–53. As will be seen below, I agree with a number of Loy’s points and also use similar terminology to articulate the text’s claims. However, I argue that the “Inner Chapters” is not concerned with the ontological issue of whether or not the self is an illusion but, instead, with the problems that humans generate through their tendency toward self-definition.

9. Slingerland, Effortless Action, 201.

10. Slingerland, Effortless Action, 191, 186.

11. Slingerland, Effortless Action, 210.

12. Loy, “Truth of No Truth,” 54.

13. Loy, “Truth of No Truth,” 57.

14. Loy, “Truth of No Truth,” 58.

15. The text of the “Inner Chapters” does at times use the term dao in a clearly normative sense, most notably in the middle sections of the “Qiwulun” and in various passages throughout the “Dazongshi” 大宗師 (Zhuangzi jishi, 63–91, 224–87). However, the larger arguments of each chapter clarify that these normative usages are actually objects of critique and not injunctions by the text to treat the Way as a normative order. See below for a fuller discussion of these types of critiques in the context of the “Dazongshi.”

16. Jochim, “Just Say No,” 56. In pursuing this argument, Jochim suggests that the text uses nominalized terms for the self (such as ji 己) to designate the habits that inhibit one’s ability to move through the world naturally, but does not “hypostatize these habits” as a false self or “hypostatize other ideal habits” as a true self (Jochim, “Just Say No,” 56). For a somewhat similar discussion on how exemplary modes of behavior in the Zhuangzi do not necessarily imply a true self, see Moeller, Hans-Georg and D’Ambrosio, Paul J., Genuine Pretending: On the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017)Google Scholar. Although my argument diverges from the works of both Jochim, and Moeller and D’Ambrosio, I agree that focusing on patterns and habits of self is crucial to understanding the argument of the “Inner Chapters.”

17. Zhuangzi jishi, 112. For a fuller discussion of the passage in which this phrase occurs, see below. The most prominent of the text’s early cosmological passages are the opening section of the “Xiaoyaoyou,” and the opening section of the “Qiwulun” discussed in n. 42 below (Zhuangzi jishi, 2–22, 43–55). Other important passages include those in the “Dazongshi” that liken the ceaseless transformation of things to a cosmic smith reshaping metal into different forms (Zhuangzi jishi, 262–64).

18. Zhuangzi jishi, 63–65.

19. An alternative interpretation of this line would be that the Way is a natural order whose loss is tied to the development of human “artifice” (wei 偽). However, such an interpretation runs contrary to the rejection of hierarchical dualisms within the “Inner Chapters”—articulated most clearly in the “Qiwulun”—as its overall argument rests upon a fundamental dualism between nature and artifice (Zhuangzi jishi, 63–91). For a fascinating example of this interpretation, see Chong, Kim-chong, “The Concept of Zhen 真 in the Zhuangzi,” Philosophy East and West 61.2 (2011), 324–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For further discussion on the Way as a comprehensive concept, see pages 22–23.

20. Zhuangzi jishi, 83–89.

21. Zhuangzi jishi, 246–51. I follow Cheng Xuanying 成玄英 in reading xian 先 (“before”) as shang 上 (“above”) based on the parallel with xia 下 (“below”).

22. For an extensive discussion of “no action” or “effortless action” (wuwei 無為) in the Zhuangzi, see Slingerland, Effortless Action, 175–215.

23. My rendering of qing as “tendencies” follows the work of Michael Puett who, in contrast to scholars who argue for a single definition of the term such as Chad Hansen and A. C. Graham, suggests that early texts exploited qing’s broad semantic range by emphasizing different definitions in order to defend their argumentative positions. Of those definitions, Puett focuses on the meaning of “dispositional responsiveness,” which is articulated most explicitly in the Xing zi ming chu 性自命出 and refers to the habitual ways that humans respond to the world. Importantly, these dispositional tendencies can be both learned and altered. My translation as “tendencies” is meant to capture the larger argument in the “Inner Chapters” that both humans and the Way possess mutable patterns of movement and activity. As will be discussed below, the text also uses other meanings of the term in order to emphasize that larger argument. For a complete discussion of Puett’s argument see Puett, Michael, “The Ethics of Responding Properly: The Notion of Qing in Early Chinese Thought,” in Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature, ed. Eifring, Halvor (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 37–68Google Scholar.

24. I read “dawn and dusk” (danmu 旦暮) as the object of this clause based on the presence of “we” (wo 我) in the subsequent clauses. However, the text is ambiguous, and it is possible that the two characters are actually the subject of the clause. In that case, the passage would read as follows: “dawn and dusk obtain this [stopping, which is] the source by which they live.” It is possible that the ambiguity of the subject is a deliberate device to reinforce the text’s argument regarding the ambiguity of a controlling agent. I am indebted to Wayne Kreger and Chris Foster for drawing my attention to these points.

25. Zhuangzi jishi, 51–57.

26. Because the “Inner Chapters” does not discuss many of these terms in great detail, my renderings follow conventional translations. In many cases, however, translations such as “spirit” or “soul,” may imply a greater degree of dualism than the text’s vision of a composite physical form suggests. Chris Jochim refers to this composite vision of human beings as the text’s “pluralistic conception of the person” (Jochim, “Just Say No,” 68). For more on the role of physical difference in the text, see Perkins, Franklin “Of Fish and Men: Species Difference and the Strangeness of Being Human in Zhuangzi,” The Harvard Review of Philosophy 17.1 (2010), 126CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27. Although these elements make up the self, they are not fixed within it. Certain components, such as the hun, can exit and enter the shen (Zhuangzi jishi, 51). As such, the shen exists as a permeable entity engaged in constant exchange with the larger cosmos, but is nevertheless still defined by those permeable boundaries. See n. 42 below for further discussion of this point. For an illuminating discussion of notions of the body as a permeable entity in early China, see Geaney, Jane, “Self As Container? Metaphors We Lose By in Understanding Early China,” Antiquorum Philosophia 5 (2011), 11–30Google Scholar.

28. For examples, see Zhuangzi jishi, 221, 155.

29. Other appropriate translations might be “being” or “organism.”

30. Zhuangzi jishi, 244. The precise subject of this phrase is actually the “form” (xing 形), but there appears to be enough overlap between the terms shen and xing to justify applying this interpretation to the shen as well. For an insightful discussion of the text’s different terms for the body and self, see Sommer, Deborah A., “Concepts of the Body in the Zhuangzi,” in Experimental Essays on Zhuangzi, ed. Mair, Victor H. (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1983; rep. Dunedin: Three Pines Press, 2010), 212–27Google Scholar.

31. Zhuangzi jishi, 55–62. I follow Burton Watson’s translation of gai er cun yan 賅而存焉 (Watson, Chuang Tzu, 38).

32. This is only one of many such tendencies that human beings exhibit. For example, in the “Renjianshi” 人間世, Confucius (Kongzi 孔子) describes a number of different human tendencies that he has observed (ranging from patterns of behavior in drinking ceremonies and games to how humans respond when employing messengers) in order to illustrate how one might navigate those tendencies (Zhuangzi jishi, 156–60).

33. Kim-chong Chong also notes the ambiguity in the text’s description of the “True Lord,” but agrees with Feng Youlan that such an entity does not exist and that the passage as a whole is a refutation of the idea that the heart-mind is the true ruler of the body as argued by Xunzi 荀子 (Chong, “Concept of Zhen,” 324 n. 2).

34. Unlike the other terms that this paper discusses (such as “self” and “identity”), the text does not provide an explicit name for this concept.

35. As Brook Ziporyn notes, this passage exhibits a “both/and equivocation on the question of the existence of the self,” which, I argue, becomes sensible when it is read according to the distinction between identity, self, and sense of self. See Ziporyn, Brook, “How Many Are the Ten Thousand Things and I? Relativism, Mysticism, and the Privileging of Oneness in the ‘Inner Chapters’,” in Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi, ed. Cook, Scott (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 41Google Scholar.

36. Although I do not read it in terms of a true or natural self, my interpretation of this passage thus runs closer to Edward Slingerland’s metaphorical reading discussed in n. 4 above. The line as a whole seems to emphasize the slippage that occurs between sense of self and identity as wu and wo are used relatively interchangeably in the “Inner Chapters” as first-person pronouns. For a fuller discussion on the grammatical structure of this line see Kjellberg, Paul, “Review of Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the First Three Chapters of the Chuang Tzu by Kuang-ming Wu,” Philosophy East and West 43.1 (1993), 127–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a more recent, and very nuanced, discussion of the grammatical function of these terms and their potential philosophical implications see Ming, Thomas, “Who Does the Sounding? The Metaphysics of the First-Person Pronoun in the Zhuangzi,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 15.1 (2016), 57–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also the incisive responses to Ming’s article in volume 17.4 (2018) of Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy.

37. Zhuangzi jishi, 2–4.

38. Zhuangzi jishi, 24–26.

39. Zhuangzi jishi, 112–14. I follow Guo Xiang and Li Yi 李頤 in reading yu 喻 (“analogy”) as meaning kuai 快 (“happy”). For fascinating studies on this passage, see Moeller, Hans-Georg, “Zhuangzi’s ‘Dream of the Butterfly’: A Daoist Interpretation,” Philosophy East and West 49.4 (1999), 439–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roth, Harold David, “Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun Chapter 齊物論’ of the Zhuangzi 莊子,” in Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi, ed. Cook, Scott (Albany: State University of New Press, 2003), 28–29Google Scholar; Lee, Jung H., “What is it Like to be a Butterfly? A Philosophical Interpretation of Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream,” Asian Philosophy 17.2 (2007), 185–202CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Han, Xiaoqiang, “Interpreting the Butterfly Dream,” Asian Philosophy 19.1 (2009), 1–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Allinson, Robert, “The Butterfly, the Mole and the Sage,” Asian Philosophy 19.3 (2009), 213–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40. It is also possible that the use of Zhuangzi’s name in this passage has a temporal function that situates the narrative prior to Zhuangzi’s other appearances in the “Inner Chapters” and indicates that he has not yet mastered the practices that the text advocates. If so the passage could be read as depicting both the beginning and end points of the text’s self-cultivation program.

41. Using Chris Jochim’s terminology, ming can thus be understood as a mental habit of definition (Jochim, “Just Say No,” 56).

42. The larger context of the former passage, which serves as the first section of the “Qiwulun,” explains that Ziqi is able to let go of his identity by reflecting on the fact that he and all things are not singular entities, but rather on-going interactions between physical multiplicity and the unifying lifeforce bestowed by Heaven. He refers to this phenomenon as the “panpipes of Heaven” (tianlai 天籟) (Zhuangzi jishi, 43–50). For a somewhat similar reading see Geisz, Steven, “Anscombe’s ‘I’, Zhuangzi’s Pipings of Heaven, and the Self That Plays the Ten Thousand Things: Remarks on Thomas Ming’s ‘Who Does the Sounding?’” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 17.4 (2018), 583CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For helpful alternative readings of this passage see Cook, Scott, “Harmony and Cacophony in the Panpipes of Heaven,” in Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi, ed. Cook, Scott (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 75Google Scholar; Yu-lan, Fung [Feng Youlan], A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Bodde, Derk (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 110Google Scholar; and Chad Hansen, “A Dao of ‘Dao’ in Zhuangzi,” in Experimental Essays on Zhuangzi, ed. Victor H. Mair, 39.

43. For a fascinating discussion of the role of imagination in the Zhuangzi see D’Ambrosio, Paul J., “Imagination in the Zhuangzi: The Madman of Chu’s Alternative to Confucian Cultivation,” Asian Philosophy 27.1 (2017), 30–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar. D’Ambrosio bases his argument on the discussion of imagination by Michael Puett. See, for example, Puett, Michael and Gross-Loh, Christine, The Path: What Chinese Philosophers Can Teach Us About The Good Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 150–52Google Scholar.

44. The entirety of this dialogue can be found in Zhuangzi jishi, 131–52.

45. As Edward Slingerland notes, Confucius’ critique likely has a double meaning, as it implies that Yan Hui is attempting to use the trip as an opportunity to enhance his reputation (thereby cementing his identity as a moral person) (Slingerland, Effortless Action, 183).

46. Zhuangzi jishi, 145.

47. Zhuangzi jishi, 147–48. Although it is not uncommon in Classical Chinese to refer to oneself in the third person I have rendered the first part of this sentence as “I, Hui,” because the use of Yan Hui’s ming seems to parallel that of Zhuangzi’s ming (Zhou) in the butterfly dream as a means to emphasize the construct of identity.

48. Zhuangzi jishi, 56.

49. Zhuangzi jishi, 221.

50. This point is similar to Loy’s argument regarding the construction of the self discussed above. However, I diverge from Loy by suggesting that the text does not presume that the cosmos is undifferentiated (the human self is a distinct, physical entity despite its changes) and that the text emphasizes the conflation of a specific identity with sense of self rather than the more general notion of constructing an illusory self.

51. Zhuangzi jishi, 56.

52. Zhuangzi jishi, 74–75. The three masters in question are the qin 琴 player, Zhao Wen 照文, the Music Master Kuang (Shi Kuang 師曠), and the logician Huizi 惠子.

53. Zhuangzi jishi, 220–23, 37. Huizi’s claim regarding “human essence” in his debate with Zhuangzi at the end of the “Dechongfu” 德充符 is an example of the text using different definitions of qing to advance its argument. In this case, Huizi exhibits the ultimate expression of the human tendency toward identity by reifying that tendency into the definitional essence of what it means to be human and thus constructing a species-level identity of humanity.

54. Zhuangzi jishi, 56.

55. Zhuangzi jishi, 56, 51. Another example of this tendency is the endless debate between the followers of Confucius and Mozi 墨子 over what is good (ibid., 63).

56. Zhuangzi jishi, 66–67.

57. Zhuangzi jishi, 66–67.

58. The text emphasizes the ambiguity of life and death as a normative dualism by repeatedly questioning the view that the former is necessarily better than the latter (Zhuangzi jishi, 103–4, 127–30, 241–51, 264–273).

59. Zhuangzi jishi, 147.

60. Fu 符 literally refers to a tally that is broken in half and used for contracts, an apt image for expressing the manner in which the completed heart-mind only affirms those behaviors and frameworks that match its own. For a helpful discussion of this point see Perkins, Franklin, Heaven and Earth Are Not Humane: The Problem of Evil in Classical Chinese Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 169Google Scholar.

61. Zhuangzi jishi, 14–16. I follow Cheng Xuanying in reading fuyao 扶搖 as a compound meaning “whirlwind.”

62. Accordingly, I would argue that the chief object of critique in this passage is the attitude of the scolding quail and that the sizes of the creatures involved are not meant to invoke either a normative hierarchy or an argument for perspectival equality. For fascinating discussions of the former position see Allinson, Robert, Chuang-tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 42–44Google Scholar; and Van Norden, Bryan W. “Competing Interpretations of the Inner Chapters of the ‘Zhuangzi’,” Philosophy East and West 46.2 (1996), 257–61Google Scholar. For an equally intriguing argument for the latter position see Hansen, Chad, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 273Google Scholar. Feng Yu-lan and Karyn Lai also provide illuminating arguments that attempt to strike a balance between the two extremes. See Fung [Feng], A Short History, 105–10; and Lai, Karyn, “Philosophy and Philosophical Reasoning in the Zhuangzi: Dealing with Plurality,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33.3 (2006), 369–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63. The “Qiwulun” notes this point by stating that even “the foolish” (yuzhe 愚者) have such an authority due to their completed heart-minds (Zhuangzi jishi, 56).

64. This point is stated explicitly in the “Qiwulun” by the character Wang Ni 王倪, who contrasts the species-level preferences regarding habitation and taste in animals like deer, monkeys, and fish with the chaotic and confused debates over right and wrong among human beings and the subsequent impossibility of determining what is “universally right” (tongshi 同是) (Zhuangzi jishi, 91–97). For excellent discussions of other epistemological concerns in the Wang Ni passage and their relationship to issues of perspectivism and skepticism see Kjellberg, Paul, “Sextus Empiricus, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi on ‘Why Be Skeptical?’” in Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Kjellberg, Paul and Ivanhoe, Philip J. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 8–10Google Scholar; and Eric Schwitzgebel, “Zhuangzi’s Attitude Toward Language and His Skepticism,” in Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe, 77–79.

65. Zhuangzi jishi, 104–6.

66. Zhuangzi jishi, 202–6. In the narrative, Confucius’ failing becomes apparent when, even after being admonished by No-Toes, he tells his disciples that No-Toes is seeking instruction to make up for his past transgressions. In other words, he continues to think of No-Toes as a criminal and does not learn from him.

67. Zhuangzi jishi, 196–201.

68. As a result, the text states that the “Perfect Person has no stable self, the Spirit Person has no meritorious actions and the sage has no identity” (zhiren wu ji, shenren wu gong, shengren wu ming 至人無己, 神人無功, 聖人無名) (Zhuangzi jishi, 22). This process is at work in the dialogue between Yao and Xu You and explains that the latter refuses the throne because accepting it would entail his entrapment within identity-based, social frameworks.

69. Zhuangzi jishi, 115.

70. Zhuangzi jishi, 242.

71. This definition is supplied by a later passage that depicts three friends who are able to create a community of peace and equality that is separate from the greater social world. Picking up on the imagery of the above passage, the text states that “fish fashion each other in water and humans fashion each other in the Way” (yu xiang zao hu shui, ren xiang zao hu dao 魚相造乎水, 人相造乎道) and presents the community as a metaphorical “pond” (chi 池) that is all that remains of the great Way that has long since dried up (Zhuangzi jishi, 264–73). The passage ties in with the larger argument of the chapter because the community of friends is still insufficient compared to a more encompassing understanding of the Way. In other words, if the Way includes both the (metaphorical) water and dry land, then it can never be lost.

72. Zhuangzi jishi, 309–10. For discussions of the translation of di 帝 as “thearch” see Major, John S., Heaven and Earth in Early Han Thought: Chapters Three, Four, and Five of the Huainanzi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 18Google Scholar; and Puett, Michael, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 225–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73. For the former example see Zhuangzi jishi, 287–89. For the latter, see ibid. 268. In both examples, the characters are depicted as imaginatively taking on other identities to the point that they do not even think of themselves as human.

74. Zhuangzi jishi, 155.

75. This definition of virtue is reiterated in the dialogue between Shentu Jia and Zichan discussed above and the importance of acceptance more generally is a running theme in the text, as in the discussion of the death of Lao Dan 老聃 (Zhuangzi jishi, 196–201, 127–29).

76. Zhuangzi jishi, 193.

77. As Jane Geaney has noted, it is not unusual for early Chinese texts to describe substances or components of the self (such as the spirit) entering and leaving the body. Nevertheless, this passage is distinctive because it depicts the entirety of Wang Tai’s being as existing as a separate entity within his greater, physical self (Geaney, “Self As Container?” 16).

78. Confucius, for example, offers a lengthy description of virtue’s primacy over the body and refers to it as what “causes form” (shi qi xing 使其形) (Zhuangzi jishi, 206–16). Commenting on these and other passages, Paul Goldin has interpreted their imagery more literally, arguing that the Zhuangzi as a whole presumes the existence of a disembodied, immortal self. For a full discussion of this point, see Goldin, Paul Rakita, “A Mind-Body Problem in the Zhuangzi?,” in Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi, ed. Cook, Scott (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 226–47Google Scholar.

79. For example, in his discussion of Ai Taituo 哀駘它, Confucius explains that a virtuous person is able to continuously harmonize and connect with things so as to “generate timeliness within the heart-mind” (sheng shi yu xin 生時於心) (Zhuangzi jishi, 212).

80. Zhuangzi jishi, 191. That Confucius’ description of Wang Tai both explains the position of the “Inner Chapters” while also misunderstanding portions of it is characteristic of the text’s portrayal of Confucius as a tragically flawed spokesperson for its ideas. A particularly salient example of this portrayal occurs in the “Dazongshi” wherein Confucius describes himself as “one who wanders within the realm” (you fang zhi nei zhe 游方之內者), and considers that position as inferior to “those who wander beyond the realm” (you fang zhi wai zhe 遊方之外者) (ibid. 267). This portrayal suggests that Confucius is aware of the limitations in his understanding but is, nevertheless, unable to escape them. For a helpful discussion of the text’s presentation of Confucius see Ronnie Littlejohn, “Kongzi in the Zhuangzi,” Experimental Essays on Zhuangzi, ed. Victor H. Mair, 175–94.

81. Zhuangzi jishi, 160, 294. Although written with the water radical in the Wang Tai passage, the text generally writes “wandering” with the character you 遊 as the two characters were synonyms for one another in this period. For a discussion of this point see Moeller, Hans-Georg, “Rambling Without Destination: On Daoist ‘You-ing’ in the World,” in Zhuangzi and the Happy Fish, ed. Ames, Roger T. and Nakajima, Takahiro (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2015), 248CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Particularly clear illustrations of “wandering” as an imaginative act can be found in the “Xiaoyaoyou” (Zhuangzi jishi, 39–42), the “Qiwulun” (ibid. 96–97), the “Dazongshi” (ibid. 243–46), and the “Yingdiwang” 應帝王 (ibid. 292–95). Many scholars have also noted the importance of “wandering” for the text. For particularly helpful discussions see Slingerland, Effortless Action, 175–215; Michael M. Crandell, “On Walking Without Touching the Ground: ‘Play’ in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi,” in Experimental Essays on Zhuangzi, ed. Victor H. Mair, 99–121; Moeller, “Rambling without Destination”; and Levinovitz, Alan, “The Zhuangzi and You 遊: Defining an Ideal Without Contradiction,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11.4 (2012), 479–96Google Scholar.

82. Zhuangzi jishi, 307–9. A common interpretation of this passage is to read it as describing the constant inner state of the sage by which he flawlessly reflects, and responds to, objective reality. For representative examples, see A. C. Graham, “Daoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’,” in Experimental Essays on Zhuangzi, ed. Victor H. Mair, 9–11; Harold H. Oshima, “A Metaphorical Analysis of the Concept of Mind in the Zhuangzi,” in Experimental Essays on Zhuangzi, ed. Victor H. Mair, 74–80; Yearley, “Ultimate Spiritual State”; Cook, Scott, “Zhuang Zi and His Carving of the Confucian Ox.” Philosophy East and West 47.4 (1997), 535–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Cline, Erin M., “Mirrors, Minds, and Metaphors.” Philosophy East and West 58.3 (2008), 338–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

83. For fascinating studies that also link virtue (and the philosophy of the “Inner Chapters” more broadly) to mental and emotional health, see Moeller and D’Ambrosio, Genuine Pretending, 171–79; Fraser, Chris, “Emotion and Agency in the Zhuangzi,” Asian Philosophy 21.1 (2011), 97–121CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Fraser, Chris, “Wandering the Way: A Eudaimonistic Approach to the Zhuangzi,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 13.4 (2014), 541–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

84. Zhuangzi jishi, 135.

85. Zhuangzi jishi, 220–23.

86. Commenting specifically on the issue of social role, Hans-Georg Moeller and Paul J. D’Ambrosio have advanced a somewhat similar argument concerning what they term “genuine pretending.” Moeller and D’Ambrosio argue that the Zhuangzi was written in response to Confucian claims that individuals should conform themselves to their social roles. By contrast, the Zhuangzi argues that cultivated individuals are able to use their empty selves to skillfully perform social roles without allowing their identities to be conditioned by them. At the same time, they do not attempt to locate a true or authentic self but maintain that inner emptiness for the adaptability that it offers (Moeller and D’Ambrosio, Genuine Pretending). Despite this article’s differences—such as the claim that identity is a broader concept than social role and that the text presents its formation as a common human tendency—I very much agree with Moeller and D’Ambrosio that the text claims great efficacy for its practices, particularly with respect to social frameworks, and that it demonstrates a lack of concern with locating an authentic self.