METHODS

The 2003 CSTE chemical and radiologic terrorism assessment was used as the starting point for the current survey, and questions were added to broaden the scope to include details about preparedness activities for all radiation emergencies, not just terrorism. The 2010 assessment instrument was changed enough from the 2003 instrument to make direct comparisons difficult.

The new draft assessment was created by a CSTE workgroup composed of epidemiologists from 4 state health departments, CSTE staff, and a consultant epidemiologist. It was further developed after review by other agencies and organizations of NARR. The instrument was pilot tested in 3 state health departments, and suggestions were incorporated into the final version. The assessment was adapted for electronic completion using SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, Palo Alto, CA).

The questionnaire was divided into 4 categories: radiation emergency preparedness and response capability (planning and resources); radiation emergency staffing levels in state health departments; local relationships; and interagency/intra-agency coordination on radiation emergency preparedness and response activities. This article focuses on findings related to preparedness and response capability, staffing, and interagency coordination.

Within the first category, preparedness and response capability (planning and resources), there were 4 discrete groups: planning, available resources internally, available resources in other state agencies, and relationships with federal agencies. Within each group, questions addressed epidemiology and surveillance, exposure assessment, handling of environmental and biological samples, radiological health assessment, and other public health functions (including communications, potassium iodide, and worker health and safety consultations). Following this, questions addressed overall radiological emergency plans and exercises and the extent of planning for specific radiological release scenarios: the release type (unintentional vs intentional) and the environmental situation in which the release occurs (transportation, medical facility, mass gathering, major location, others).

For the category radiation emergency staffing levels in state health departments, states were asked to estimate the number of staff members available for response in an event and to categorize them by funding source.

Findings for the third category of the survey, local relationships, were not substantially different from findings related to other relationships presented (agency level, federal level), and are not detailed in this article.

For the fourth category, interagency/intra-agency coordination on radiation emergency preparedness and response activities, states were asked to report on the level of coordination for radiation emergency preparedness and response activities between their agency and a variety of other agencies and institutions, with the level of coordination ranging from noncontact to exercise conducted within the last 2 years. States were asked to note whether they had written memoranda of understanding with any of the listed partner agencies or organizations. State public health agencies also were asked to report whether their radiation response team meets with other public health divisions (eg, laboratory, epidemiology) to coordinate responses to radiation emergency incidents. States were asked whether they had developed planning and response protocols for gathering epidemiologic and exposure data and for providing coordinated guidance for large-scale radiation emergency incidents that would involve more than 1 county in the state.

State epidemiologists in all 50 states were asked to complete the assessment electronically using the best information they could obtain from their health agency, including seeking input of the most qualified and involved agency staff from radiation, epidemiology, and laboratory services. They were asked to note whether their state's official radiation control program director participated in preparing their responses. All of the questions, unless otherwise noted, explicitly excluded capabilities directly related to nuclear power plant emergency response. Most of the questions asked states to rate their planning, resources, and relationships using a 4- or 5-choice rating system that ranged from none to sufficient number and level. Finally, each state was asked to provide an overall rating of their public health agency's preparedness to respond to a major radiation emergency incident, choosing a number on a scale of 0 (not prepared at all) to 10 (fully prepared).

Data were analyzed by CSTE using SAS (SAS Institute, Cary, NC); calculated frequencies and descriptive statistics are provided as aggregated data so that responses for individual states or territories are not identifiable. (The survey instrument is available at the CSTE Web site: http://www.cste.org/webpdfs/2010raditionreport.pdf.)

RESULTS

Thirty-eight (76%) states responded to the questionnaire, but not all responding states answered all of the questions. Responding states varied by size, population, region, and presence of an operating nuclear power plant within their borders. Of the 31 states with nuclear power plants, 26 (84%) responded to the assessment. Twelve (63%) of the 19 states without nuclear power plants completed the assessment.

Planning and Resources Assessment

Planning

The extent of planning for epidemiology and surveillance for the human health effects of radiation was assessed for 5 types: syndromic surveillance, clinician reporting, crisis-phase epidemiology, recovery-phase epidemiology, and other types of statistical surveillance (Table 1). A range between 70% and 84% of states reported minimal to no planning completed on the potential human effects of radiation among any of these 5 types of surveillance.

TABLE 1 Extent of Planning in State Health Departments for Radiation Emergencies

States reported only slightly better planning for providing advice on exposure assessment and environmental sampling combined (42%–50% reporting none to minimal planning) and little planning to provide advice for biological sampling (14% have none and 60% have minimal). Seventy-four percent of states reported having minimal (53%) or no (21%) plans to conduct population-based exposure monitoring.

Thirty-one (82%) states reported no or minimal plans to collect biological or clinical samples, and 28 (74%) indicated no or minimal plans for processing and shipping samples for radioactivity analysis. Only 5 (13%) states reported having any written or detailed operations plan for radiologic analyses of biological or clinical samples. More states reported having a written plan or detailed operations plan for addressing collection (20 states [54%]), processing (17 [46%]), shipping (14 [38%]) of environmental samples and conducting (14 [38%]) radioactivity analysis than they did plans addressing biological/clinical samples.

No or minimal health physics interpretation, predictions planning, and planning for medicine consultations were reported by 63% to 70% of states. Sixteen (42%) states reported minimal or no planning to detect radiation contamination in first responders. Likewise, 25 states (66%) reported minimal to no planning to provide health physics predictions on the long-term health effects of radiation. Eight (21%) states reported planning for information technology/geographic information systems integration of radiation exposure data.

A total of 58% to 68% of states reported having written plans or detailed operations plans for health alerts, risk communication, and public communication. Seventy-three percent reported written or detailed operations plans for potassium iodide or other radiation drug–dispensing activity. Half of the states reported having written or detailed operations plans for worker safety/safety consultations.

Resources Within the Agency

A substantial number of states reported having inadequate resources within their state health department to maintain radiation emergency preparedness (responses include none, none dedicated, some dedicated [Table 2]). No more than 4 (11%) states reported having sufficient resources for any of the epidemiologic functions associated with a radiation incident.

TABLE 2 Resources Available for Radiation Emergencies in State Health Departments

A total of 76% to 86% of states reported having few resources to provide advice for radiation exposure assessments, environmental sampling, and biological/clinical sampling. Only 3 (8%) states reported adequate resources to conduct population-based exposure monitoring.

A total of 83% to 89% reported insufficient resources to collect, process, and ship samples for and conduct radioactivity analyses of environmental samples. States reported similarly for biological/clinical samples, with 86% to 92% reporting insufficient resources to collect, process, and ship samples for, and conduct, radiation analyses.

No more than 4 (11%) state health departments reported having sufficient resources to provide health physics interpretations, consultations upon reentry, predictions on long-term health effects, and medical consultations on radiation effects. Seven (19%) states reported sufficient resources for early detection of radiation contamination in first responders. A total of 74% to 84% of states reported insufficient resources for any of the following: worker health/safety consultations, health alerts, potassium iodide plans, risk communication, and community relations.

Resources Available From Other State Agencies

As shown in Table 3, a total of 67% to 86% of states reported that agencies other than health departments had less than sufficient resources for epidemiology/surveillance, exposure assessments, environmental samples handling, biological/clinical samples handling, health assessments, and other public health functions. Notably, up to 9 (24%) states in each functional category were uncertain about the resources that existed in other state agencies for radiation emergency preparedness.

TABLE 3 Resources Available for Radiation Emergencies in Other State Agencies

Relationships With Federal Agencies for Radiation Emergencies

Substantial resources and capacity for radiation emergency preparedness are located within a variety of federal agencies and are potentially available to states that have established relationships with these agencies (Table 4). Relationships regarding the functions of epidemiology and surveillance varied by specific function but were assessed as sufficient in 16% to 27% of states. Relationships with federal partners regarding exposure assessments, handling of environmental samples, health assessments, and other public health functions were reported as sufficient by 42% to 65% of states. These responses were among the strongest reported in this part of the assessment. Relationships with federal partners to handle biological/clinical samples were weaker (33%–35%) for all 4 capabilities in this category.

TABLE 4 State Health Department Relationships Established With Federal Agencies for Radiation Emergencies

Overall Radiation Written Plan and Exercises

Twenty (53%) states reported having a finalized radiation-specific written response plan (Table 5). Four (20%) of the 20 states did not have a nuclear power plant (data not shown). For unintentional releases, half of the states had written or detailed operations plans for all scenarios except for a waterways incident, for which only 6 (15%) states reported having a written or detailed operations plan.

TABLE 5 Extent of State Health Department Planning for a Radiation Emergency, 2010 (n = 38 States)

Half of the states reported having detailed operation plans for a radiologic contamination dispersal device, a so-called dirty bomb. For the intentional scenarios, approximately one-third of states (31%–35%) reported having detailed operations plans.

Sixteen (80%) of the 20 states with a written plan reported having conducted a drill or an exercise of the radiation plan. The most recent drill or exercise for these states (data not shown) occurred across the 4 time frames: within 6 months (6 [38%] states), longer than 6 months ago but less than 12 months ago (3 [19%]), 1 to 2 years ago (5 [31%]), and longer than 2 years ago (2 [13%]).

Twenty-one (57%) states reported having mutual aid agreements for radiation emergency response with other states. Twenty-two (60%) reported having these agreements with other state agencies; 16 (73%) of the 22 reported having drilled with their mutual aid partners. Thirty-seven (97%) states reported having an on-call duty officer system that provides around-the-clock coverage and prompt response to a radiation emergency incident.

DISCUSSION

Although the results of the assessment are based on a response rate of 76% of state public health departments, findings can be generalized to the entire United States. Responding states were representative of the nation as a whole, given that respondents included geographically large and small states, all regions, dense and sparse populations, and states with presence and absence of nuclear power plants.

The results of this assessment indicate that in many measures of public health capacity and capability, the nation remains poorly prepared to respond adequately to a major radiation emergency incident. Capabilities are insufficient or inadequate throughout the functions assessing planning in state health departments, resources in the state health department and other state agencies, and relationships with federal and other partners. For some measures, as many as 85% of responding states reported insufficient capability to respond to a radiation incident.

The most fundamental step of preparedness, development of response plans (outside of response plans for nuclear power plant emergencies), was not reported as occurring in 45% of states. Without a comprehensive plan, states in which a radiation emergency occurs are likely to mount inefficient, ineffective, inappropriate, or tardy responses that could result in (preventable) loss of life. With nearly half of the responding states not having a response plan, a large portion of the US population is at increased risk should a radiological event occur within the country's borders.

Gaps were also evident related to specific aspects of public health preparedness. Few states reported having written protocols for epidemiologic or exposure data collection or for coordinated guidance. Without such guidance, the collection of information may be uncoordinated and important comparisons may be lost because critical information failed to be collected and analyzed. Delays in collection may affect data quality.

Despite long-standing awareness of the threat of unintentional releases of radioactivity within our communities, in general, less than half of the states reported having a written plan or detailed plan of operations for responding to releases, with the exception of plans for releases associated with roadway incidents. Preparedness was even less developed with regard to intentional releases. The exception to this gap in operations planning was for response to a radioactive dispersal device, for which nearly half of the states have written or detailed operations plans. The large number of states reporting a plan in response to a radioactive dispersal device may reflect the interest and support of federal funding for terrorism that included dispersal devices as the prototypic radiation threat in US communities.

The results of this survey suggested that public health agency staffing to respond to a radiation emergency incident would rely heavily on redirecting state staff from their regular assignments to radiation emergency response activities. Although this survey did not inquire about the training of such surge staff, this finding suggests that states should attend to the training needs of these personnel.

The lack of a sizable cadre of radiation emergency workers is further highlighted when the states with and without nuclear power plants are separated. States with nuclear power plants estimate having 4 times as many staff available to them, either directly or through redirection, than do states without such plants. This capacity may result from long-term direction and assistance from state and federal agencies that regulate nuclear power plants. Even though having a nuclear power plant within a state increases the risk for a radiation emergency and thus the need for response capacity, radiation emergencies not involving power plants are possible everywhere, and the lack of adequate response personnel in many states is of concern.

The limitations of this survey include an incomplete response rate (76%) and incomplete data provided on some questions. In addition, states used a range and variety of individuals to complete the survey, and some states may not have reached out to all of the appropriate individuals, resulting in responses that may not have been correct. A number of states were not sure of partnerships or agreements that were in place, indicating that not all of the questions were answered by the most knowledgeable staff member. Also, some survey questions may have been interpreted differently among the states.

Nevertheless, acknowledging these limitations, the results from this assessment highlight the many aspects of radiation emergency response for which states are not adequately prepared. In addition, they support the findings of earlier assessments, including the 2003 CSTE survey1 and the 2010 public health laboratory capabilities assessment.2 The CDC has undertaken a number of activities to improve on this situation, including the development of training materials3 and the formation of NARR, which is an important step toward improved coordination of public health's role in radiation emergency response. Based on the findings of this report, a number of recommendations are appropriate, including the following activities:

• • Collect and disseminate best practices in state-based radiation response plans (excluding nuclear power plant plans) in coordination with CSTE's “disaster epidemiology”4 workgroup in the development of plans for radiation exposure public health surveillance.

• • Explore with CDC how best to incorporate radiation preparedness as a priority under the new all-hazards guidance and appropriate capabilities development.

• • Substantially increase training in radiation emergency response for public health personnel, especially personnel without related expertise who would be called upon to provide services during a widespread radiation emergency.

• • Conduct strategic planning for activities that will increase collaboration between state public health personnel in CDC-funded preparedness and radiation protection personnel, including health physicists, radiation equipment licensing, and inspection personnel, who are often in the regulatory, rather than the public health, area of health departments or who may not be part of the health department at all.

• • Develop exercise templates for radiation release scenarios (non–nuclear power plant related) that would apply at the state and local health department levels (ie, not huge but still with a large impact).

• • Coordinate with the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) at its funded state health department programs and the federal level on aspects of radiation preparedness at the state and local levels that involve medical treatment, hospital surge, and so forth.

• • Encourage local and state health departments to establish collaborations and connections with state, regional, and federal response partners who are versed in responding to incidents involving radiation (eg, the Civil Support Team of the state National Guard, regional response teams, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Department of Energy radiation response teams).