Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T06:10:28.909Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Risk Communication and Crisis Communication in Infectious Disease Outbreaks in Germany: What Is Being Done, and What Needs to be Done

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2014

Petra Dickmann ,
Nadine Biedenkopf ,
Sam Keeping ,
Markus Eickmann  and
Stephan Becker
Petra Dickmann*
Affiliation:
dickmann risk communication drc, London, United Kingdom London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Health, London, United Kingdom
Nadine Biedenkopf
Affiliation:
Philipps University Marburg, Institute of Virology and Germany Centre for Infection Research (DZIF), partner site Gießen-Marburg-Langen, Marburg, Germany
Sam Keeping
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Health, London, United Kingdom
Markus Eickmann
Affiliation:
Philipps University Marburg, Institute of Virology and Germany Centre for Infection Research (DZIF), partner site Gießen-Marburg-Langen, Marburg, Germany
Stephan Becker
Affiliation:
Philipps University Marburg, Institute of Virology and Germany Centre for Infection Research (DZIF), partner site Gießen-Marburg-Langen, Marburg, Germany
*
Address correspondence and reprint requests to Petra Dickmann MA, MD, PhD, dickmann risk communication drc, 21 Lancaster Grove, London NW3 4EX, United Kingdom (e-mail:[email protected].
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Objective

Risk communication plays a central role in the management of infectious disease. The World Health Organization's 2005 International Health Regulations have highlighted the need for countries to strengthen their capacities in this area to ensure effective responses to public health emergencies. We surveyed laboratories, hospitals, and public health institutions in Germany to detail the current situation regarding risk communication and crisis management and to identify which areas require further development.

Methods

A mixed methods approach was adopted. An initial questionnaire was distributed to relevant persons in laboratories and hospitals, and semistructured interviews were conducted with selected participants. Representatives from state public health authorities, federal agencies, and media also were interviewed to add additional contextual information to the questionnaire responses.

Results

Based on the responses received, the universal sense among key stakeholders was that risk communication and crisis communication measures must be improved. Collaborative working was a consistent theme, with participants suggesting that a partnering strategy could help to improve performance. This approach could be achieved through better coordination between groups, for example, through a knowledge-sharing policy.

Conclusions

More research is needed on how such collaboration might be implemented, along with a general conceptual framework for risk communication to underpin the overall strategy. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2014;0:1-6)

Keywords

infection researchinfectious diseases outbreakrisk communication
Type
Original Research
Information
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , June 2014 , pp. 206 - 211
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Disaster Medicine and Public Health, Inc. 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1.Gupta, AG, Moyer, CA, Stern, DT. The economic impact of quarantine: SARS in Toronto as a case study. J Infect. 2005;50(5):386-393.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2.Mackey, TK, Liang, BA. Lessons from SARS and H1N1/A: employing a WHO-WTO forum to promote optimal economic-public health pandemic response. J Public Health Policy. 2012;33(1):119-130.Google Scholar
3.Dickmann, P, Keith, K, Comer, C, Abraham, G, Gopal, R, Marui, E. Report of the International Conference on Risk Communication Strategies for BSL-4 laboratories, Tokyo, October 3-5, 2007. Biosecur Bioterr. 2009;7(2):227-233.Google Scholar
4.Inglesby, TV, Cicero, A, Henderson, DA. The risk of engineering a highly transmissible H5N1 virus. Biosecur Bioterr. 2012;10(1):151-152.Google Scholar
5.Cohen, J. Avian influenza. WHO group: H5N1 papers should be published in full. Science. 201224;335(6071):899-900.Google Scholar
6.Kawaoka, Y. H5N1: flu transmission work is urgent. Nature. 2012;482(7384):155.Google Scholar
7.Fouchier, RA, Herfst, S, Osterhaus, AD. Public health and biosecurity: restricted data on influenza H5N1 virus transmission. Science. 2012;335(6069):662-663.Google Scholar
8.Herfst, S, Osterhaus, AD, Fouchier, RA. The future of research and publication on altered H5N1 viruses. J Infect Dis. 2012;205(11):1628-1631.Google Scholar
9.Dickmann, P, Rubin, GJ, Gaber, W, etal. New influenza A/H1N1 (“swine flu”): information needs of airport passengers and staff. Influenza Other Respir Viruses. 2011;5(1):39-46.Google Scholar
10.Rubin, GJ, Dickmann, P. How to reduce the impact of “low-risk patients” following a bioterrorist incident: lessons from SARS, anthrax, and pneumonic plague. Biosecur Bioterr. 2010;8(1):37-43.Google Scholar
11.Rubin, GJ, Page, L, Morgan, O, etal. Public information needs after the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko with polonium-210 in London: cross sectional telephone survey and qualitative analysis. BMJ. 2007;335(7630):1143.Google Scholar