Among the ancients, ethics was resolved largely through the treatment of virtues. Suffice it to recall Aristotle's Etica Nicomachea, which was for many centuries a prescribed text. In our times such a treatment has almost disappeared. Today moral philosophers discuss values and choices, on both analytical and propositional levels, and their major or minor rationality, as well as discussing rules or norms and consequently rights and duties. One of the last significant writings devoted to the classic subject of virtue was the second part of Kant's Metaphysics of Morals (Die Metaphysik der Sitten), titled The Theory of Virtue (Die Tugendlehre), the first part of which discusses the Theory of Law (Die Rechtlehre). However, Kant's ethics is especially one of duty, and more specifically of inward as distinguished from outward duty, with which the theory of law is concerned. In the former, virtue is defined as the necessary willpower to accomplish one's duty, as the moral strength required by man to fight those defects which prevent or become an obstacle to the accomplishment of duty. Kant's theory of virtue is an integral part of the ethics of duty and, as explicitly and repeatedly declared, has nothing to do with Aristotelian ethics.

Two essays have been placed under this title. The first is written in the spirit of continental European moral and political philosophy. Its emphasis is on the tensions and paradoxes inherent in the idea of tolerance. The first paradox: the possibility of tolerance, far from being based on the renunciation of the absolute nature of the conviction, depends on the contrary on the capacity for absolute engagement which itself gives rise to an unconditional right towards respect. Another paradox: while, in the case of scientific truth (rational or empirical), understanding and consent coincide, in the case of belief (moral, religious, or aesthetic), there is a striking divergence between the contestable nature of the affirmation and the risky nature of the attachment; but such is the cost of the unconditional. An extreme paradox: it is at the very heart of the idea of truth that a split between possessing and sharing must be operated; and it is then in the realm of dispossession and nonknowledge that the art of mimicking an opposed conviction within oneself - ultimate bulwark against the temptation to impose one's own portion of truth on others - can be learned. The spirit of Karl Jaspers permeates this lucid meditation.

Tolerance is not, as is often thought, an attribute of urbanity that can be equated with other similar values, such as politeness. Nor is it - or at least it should not be - considered the oil that facilitates the smooth functioning of the engine of human desires, in spite of their differences of opinion. Rather, true tolerance takes root in the same soil as human rights. And this root is at the same time shared by liberty and truth. It is an untamed, barely diplomatic, root, burrowing deep in the soil of an absolute demand.

There is something obscure about the nature of toleration, at least when it is regarded as an attitude or a personal principle. Indeed, the problem about the nature of toleration is severe enough for us to raise the question whether, in a strict sense, it is possible at all. Perhaps, rather, it contains some contradiction or paradox which means that practices of toleration, when they exist, must rest on something other than the attitude of toleration as that has been classically described by liberal theory.

Tolerance cannot not be concerned with the law, once it takes up in its concept the relationship between truth and justice. And there are several reasons for this. To begin with, the word right enters into many definitions of tolerance: the right to difference, to liberty, to those fundamental public freedoms that constitute human rights. Moreover, law, as opposed to morality, is the public instance where obligation is coupled with legitimate coercion. Finally, juridical institutions offer an excellent vantage point from which to observe the transformations of the idea of tolerance and scan the history of the struggles carried out in its name.

The meanings of tolerance nowadays form a complex and ambiguous maze that far exceeds the scope of this essay. To clarify the following pages, however, we propose a preliminary distinction between original tolerance and modern tolerance.

The history of the idea of tolerance is marked by a rift between its original meaning and its modern one. At first tolerance was understood as the effort made to put up with certain reprehensible acts or lapses with regard to society's values, since rules can never be respected at all times without life becoming unbearable. Conceived originally as a discretion on the part of authority, it progressively acquired the meaning of a “right to differ.” “The idea that a free space must obligatorily be assured to each member of the community,” writes Ghislain Waterlot, “is a relatively new idea that is fundamentally very modern.”

Public international law is entirely a product of consensualism. The State, which is both the legislator and subject of the world juridical order, only agrees to comply with exterior norms to the extent that it approves of their content. Any treaty, in its contractual nature; any custom, in its consensual nature; any decision of an international organization, in its ability to be en forced, expresses the agreement of the concerned States, whether on a case by case or global basis. National sovereignty is in this way safeguarded. Nothing can be imposed on those who govern without their consent. Indeed, until the middle of the twentieth century, States had succeeded in juridically protecting their free will; or more precisely, their free willfulness. International law required no behavioral norms, and no obligation of tolerance, in regard to a State's own nationals.

Tolerance has its arguments, both in morality and in law. It also has its sources, not only in the sense of the origins from which it springs, but also in the sense of that which actuates it and gives it life, that which encourages it and sanctions it - profoundly. Religions take part of these sources, but also take part of this reflexive aspect of ethics that puts into play the final legitimation, the ultimate justification of the norms of our public and private actions. It is with respect to this recourse to the ultimate that religion and ethics intersect without becoming one. Yet it is also in this recourse to the ultimate that one and the other greatly face the danger of temptation. This is particularly the case with religion. It is indeed not enough to simply say that it is the political use of religion that is to blame, and not religion as such, in the long and unfinished history of religious intolerance. We must trace the source of the temptation of intolerance to the very heart of the certainty of religious faith. Any belief, as soon as it defines itself in relation - a relation of any kind, whether of distance or proximity, of alterity or fusion - to an absolute, must be on guard against its own penchant for intolerance. It is not enough, in an opposite sense of the preceding warning, to rely on the critical resources borrowed from sources outside of religion: it is at that same heart of certainty of all religious faith that we must seek the reason for the conviction that it is unjust to look to impose on adherents of other religions, on agnostics and atheists, the truth as it is admitted in good faith by the community of believers of one or another religious confession.

Mahatma Gandhi was one of those rare human beings who was simultaneously a theoretician and practitioner of tolerance. Gandhi was possessed of an inner conviction that tolerance was not only one of the key words of his own century but of centuries still to come. It is in this sense that his ideas on non-violence and tolerance transcend the context of India itself, even though these ideas were initially conceived in relation to India's independence and future. Nevertheless, in spite of what may seem obvious, it is no mere truism to state that Gandhi would not have been Gandhi had he not been born Indian. We say this in order to underscore that Gandhi's concept of tolerance was rooted in Indian culture.

Why does one hear so much about tolerance today, when as little as a few decades ago it was considered an obsolete virtue, anachronistic and outstripped by the progress of our civilization? When a virtue is lacking we remember it most! Must we conclude from the emphasis placed on tolerance these last few years that we have entered an era of generalized mutual incomprehension? The conquests of the intellect; local, national and international juridical practices; education open to global issues; the intermixing of humanity that has never before “moved” so much under the combined effect of emigration; tourism and the developments in transportation and vast information exchanges served by efficient techniques that make communication one of the greatest benefits of our culture; all this could have led mankind into a surplus of exchanges on all levels, and better mutual appreciation leading to more tolerance.

A theologian would be ill-advised if he tried to teach pedagogy to the pedagogues. And indeed it is not my aim to proclaim some way of teaching - even less so after a period of pedagogical experimentation that produced one new model after the other. Rather I would like to buttress the efforts of pedagogues and educators from the viewpoint of ethics at a time when many people talk about an educational crisis.

We have presented tolerance, right from the foreword upon which the present study opens, as the difficult course of a crested road between intolerance and the intolerable. Intolerance constitutes the obstacle never surmounted, the intolerable, the limit opposed to the abuses of a tolerance that has slid to indifference.

Two main but discrepant tendencies characterize the intellectual climate of our world at the turn of the century. We promote, on the one hand, “respect for human rights,” i.e. for certain universal norms, but on the other hand, equally promote “respect to all cultures,”which are differentiated among themselves by their different world-views and their parochial norms. Not rarely do we see that the demands that such parochial norms bring are contradictory to those of human rights.

How define tolerance? Tolerance consists in abstaining from intervening in the actions and opinions of other persons when these opinions or actions appear disagreeable, frankly unpleasant or morally reprehensible to us. But each will feel that there exists a real difference between that which is disagreeable or unpleasant and that which is morally repugnant. To respect this intuition, I would propose to distinguish between a narrow sense of tolerance - I tolerate that which appears displeasing or disagreeable to me, but I do not tolerate that which I judge to be morally wrong - and a broad sense in which I tolerate even that which I disapprove of morally. If we adopt the narrow sense, we have at our disposal a first answer to the question of knowing how far to tolerate: I tolerate that which relates to displeasure or to annoyance, but not that which I believe to be wrong.