¹ Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, 1956; Conjectures and Refutations, London, 1969.

² T.S. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1972. See also S. Amsterdamski, Between Experience and Metaphysics, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub., 1975.

³ Such a theory must, in principle, be possible unless there exist some limitations in reason itself, which are perhaps unknown so far apart from the ones pointed out by Godel. Bohm's idea of "hidden" variables is essentially the same.

⁴ Here a novel claim made by classical Indian philosophers should be noted. They have said that cognition is also possible by non-sensuous experience but only in a certain specific state of consciousness called samadhi or turiya. If so, it has to be admitted that in that kind of cognition, absolute elimination of error is possible.

⁵ Attempts have recently been made to distinguish explanation from under standing. It was said that scientific rationality consists in causal explanations of events and facts. But there can be events, such as in the realm of human actions, which cannot be satisfactorily explained causally. Nevertheless, they can be understood perhaps without using the procedure of explanation through laws. See G.H. Von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, London: Rout ledge & Kegan Paul, 1971; also, J.R. Aronson, "Explanation Without Laws", Jr. Phil, 66, 1969.

⁶ E.B. Wilson, An Introduction to Scientific Research, New York, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1952.

⁷ K. Marx's contribution to epistemology in this direction is quite well known.

⁸ Darsana literally means in-sight and all the well known darsanas as insights in reality are actually comprehensive theories which attempt to understand major aspects of reality.

⁹ V.V. Nalimov, "The Receptivity of Hypotheses", Diogenes, 100, pp. 179-197.

¹⁰ Patanjali's yoga as part of the Brahman trend differs from Baudh, Jain and Saiva yogas. Similarly, Brahman nyaya is different from Baudh, Jain and Saiva nyayas. The reason why these trends have a "religious commitment" to their respective sources is that the "methods" in fact originated there. For some of the sources in yoga in these trends, see S. Swamin, Hathayogapradipika, Madras, Theosophical Pub. House, 1949; N. Thera, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation London, Rider & Co., 1962, B. Bhattacharya, Guhya Samaja Tantra, Baroda, Oriental Inst., 1967; P. Siddhanta Sastri, ed., Sarvartha Siddhi, Calcutta: Bhartiya Jnana Pitha, 1971; I.K. Taimini, The Science of Yoga, Madras: Theos. Pub. House, 1965.

Yoga as a methodological device for Theorisation aims at purification of Reason (buddhi). Reason is impure because of confusions and misunderstandings about the world and the self. These confusions have to be eliminated and washed away so that correct understanding may dawn and the reason be pu rified. The methods that are employed in yoga involve various bodily and me ditative or concentrative practices so that the psychosomatic system as a whole is cleansed. While the emphasis on these practices differs in different darsanas the goal is basically the same. See my Yoga: A Technique of Liberation, Ster ling, New Delhi, 1979. Also, G. Feuerstein, Textbook of Yoga, London, Rider & Co., 1975 and H. Aranya, Patanjali Yoga Darsanam, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas, 1974.

Nyaya as a methodological device for theorisation aims at employment of Reason in analysis of the world and the self at conceptual, linguistic levels. The idea here is to expose the fallacies and errors so as to be able to arrive at the correct conception. See references 11-18.

¹¹ V. Paranjoti, Saiva Siddhanta, London: Luzac & Co., 1954; V. Ponniah, The Saiva Siddhanta Theory of Knowledge, Annamalai, The University, 1952.

¹² G.S. Musalagaonkar, ed., Samkhya Tattva Kaumadi, Varanasi: Chaukhamba Samskrit Series Office, 1971.

¹³ G. Jha, Samkara Vedanta, Allahabad, University Press, 1939.

¹⁴ Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. and II, New York: Dover Pub., 1962.

¹⁵ Contemporary Indian philosophers have generally accepted Lokayat as a darsana, that is, a systematic theoretic construction, and have tended to identify it with materialism. However, Lokayata, it seems, has never been a darsana but rather the classical philosophers used this title to represent the uncritically ac cepted beliefs, through custom, of the common man in the world regarding questions of the philosophical interest. That is why they all began by critically examining such common sense opinions and showing their falsity. In fact, one of the institutional or social aims of darsana has historically been this fight a gainst the all pervading, self-perpetuating and naturally organised false notions concerning questions of philosophical interest. Here it may be noted that modern science has also systematically refuted the uncritically accepted notions which were defended and even pedagogically perpetuated by Christendom at one time. However, its methods of refutation, contrary to the purely critical reasoning of darsanas, have been more powerful and decisive mainly because of the experi mental technique. Its beginnings may, then, be traced to the initial battles against the paradigm of common sense notions.

¹⁶ G. Jha, Plurva Mimansa and Its Sources, Benares, Hindu University, 1942.

* Nyaya in the Brahmanical trend may be considered as the logic of the Vaisesikas.

¹⁷ D.D. Sastri, (ed. & tr.), Nyayadarsanam, Varanasi: Bhartiya Vidya Pra kasana, 1966: A.B. Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism, New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1977.

¹⁸ D. Bhargava, Jain Tarka Bhasa, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1973; K.C. Sastri, Jain Nyaya, Calcutta, Bhartiya Jnana Pitha, 1966.

¹⁹ The positions taken by various darsanas regarding truth and falsity can be derived from an analysis of unreal knowledge (asat jnana) and real knowledge. Empirical knowledge is unreal because it has in it the possibility of doubt and error. Only Siva Jnana is real because it involves no doubt, no error. However, unreal knowledge can be said to be true (yatha-artha) or false (ayathartha) in a significant sense. When the cognition is as the object cognized, it is true; when it is not as the object cognized, it is false. But what is the artha in siva jnana? There is no artha because it is objectless knowledge; therefore, we cannot ask whether it is true or false. Therefore, we have two mutually exclusive cognitions: one which is unreal and yet true or false; the other which is real but neither true nor false. Now the question is whether we can say that any specific unreal cognition is absolutely true? Certainly, such assertions are possible for some basic observation statements. Next, can we ask about a whole set of cognitions (theories) conjointly whether these are true? Indeed, it must be possible if we specify in advance the scope (the range of objects cognized) of such cognitions. But can clear limits of this scope be laid down?

Now, as it obtains, at the micro-level we cannot even claim that a specific unreal cognition is absolutely true even for basic observation statements. That means, at the micro-level, even for unreal cognition, we cannot ascertain whether it is true or false. [Is this a limitation of the chitisakti itself or a limitation arising due to the indispensability of the sense-apparatus? This question cannot be answered unless we admit that cognition bypassing the senses is at least possible]. Therefore, the only difference between unreal cognition and real cogni tion is that while for the former we can ask whether it is true or false (although we may not be able to categorically answer it), for the latter even such a question is absurd. When, therefore, we cannot ascertain truth or falsity clearly, we have the following choices for expressing this situation:

1. 1)

   1) Unreal cognitions are neither true nor false (Vaisasika Nyaya).

2. 2)

   2) Unreal cognitions are both true and false (Jain Nyaya).

3. 3)

   3) Since we cannot ascertain their truth, unreal cognitions must be accepted as false [Saiva, Baudha (Nagarjuna)-Nyaya.]

4. 4)

   4) Since we cannot ascertain their falsity, they must be accepted as true (Mi mansaka nyaya).

²⁰ Yogic experience is indeed provoked experience for it can be had only by methodical operations on one's own psychosomatic system. II differs from the provoked experience of modern science in the fact that in modern science the psychosomatic receptor system is treated as constant and left untempered. The notion of experience can be analysed so as to make clear how it is treated in yoga. For this we may think of three degrees of experience. The experience of first degree is predominantly the controlled or uncontrolled, provoked or unpro voked stimulation of the receptors. In the experience of second degree we may imagine that the stimulation of receptors is ideally eliminated but controlled or uncontrolled, provoked or unprovoked stimulation of the "mind" persists. Example: A man sitting in a sound-proof, smell-less room with eyes closed having dreams or thoughts or drug experience. In the experience of third degree there is complete absence of any stimulation of receptors or of the "inner sense" (or "mind"). This may be called the experience of self-absorption or samadhi.

²¹ Ideology is unlike "religion" which is predominantly (or even primarily) a belief system. Ideologies, on the contrary, are partly belief systems but pri marily rational systems.

^* Dharma is hollow without vijnan and vijnan hollow without the backing dharma.