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Experience and Dialectic: A Study in Dialectical Interplay

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

Extract

In the intellectual history of the West and the East the words “experience” and “dialectic” have been used in various senses. Their respective roles in knowledge have been differently conceived—depending invariably on the meanings given to the words “knowledge” and “experience.” The problem of the mutual relationship between experience and dialectic is at bottom that of the relation between experience and reason. Reason can be understood in a static sense and a dynamic sense. It may stand for that human capacity which apprehends formal logical relations between certain propositions and deduces conclusions from given premises. Or it may refer to that dynamic effort of the human mind to articulate, to grapple with and render intelligible the immediately felt experience. In this latter sense reason is involved in a dialectical and dramatic process which aims at recapturing, as it were, the felt unity and totality of experience. That is why underlying the diverse uses of “dialectic” one can discern in the concept a common flavor which is a unique combination of the rational and the dramatic, the intellectual and the imaginative, the discursive and the non-discursive. Failure to understand the proper relation between experience and dialectic has given rise either to “insoluble paradoxes” or to grandiose, “metaphysical,” over-all solutions which are hardly convincing. In this paper I intend to bring out, what seems to me, the proper way of understanding their relation through a critical consideration of the dialectics of the famous Mādhyamika dialectician Nāgārjuna, of ancient India, interspersed with incidental remarks on some Western dialecticians.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1967 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)

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References

1 M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 221.

2 S. Radhakrishna, Indian Philosophy, vol. I, pp. 663-6.

3 T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Allen & Unwin, Lon don, 1955.

4 On this point see Dr. Daya Krishna's "Three Myths about Indian Philos ophy," Diogenes, No. 55, Fall 1966.

5 T.R.V. Murti, op. cit., p. 86. The italics are mine.

6 Satkari Mookerjee, ed., The Nava-Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publica tion, Patna, 1957, vol. I, p. 17. The italics are mine.

7 Op. cit., pp. 56-7. The italics are mine.

8 T.R.V. Murti, op. cit., p. 218.

9 Ibid., pp. 219-20. Italics mine.

10 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigg's Ed., Appendix, pp. 635-6.

11 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 21.

12 Op. cit., p. 40.

13 For further elaboration of this point see the author's "The Persistent Problem of Appearance and Reality. A Reappraisal," The Philosophical Quarterly, Amalner (India), April 1965.