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Death, Contingency and the Genesis of Self-Awareness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2024

Adrian Mirvish
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The exact nature of self-consciousness is a problem that has occupied a central position in contemporary philosophical thought. Despite a wide variety of approaches, however, a common assumption in almost all theories is that adult consciousness functions as the norm and appropriate starting point for an investigation in this area. Indeed, in general, philosophers have made the presupposition that they can deal with issues in their field - whether, for example, this involves emotions, knowledge, or perception - purely as these are manifest in an adult form.

Type
Research Article
Information
Diogenes , Volume 41 , Issue 161 , March 1993 , pp. 67 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)

References

Notes

1. It would clearly be unreasonable to suggest that, based on a theoretical versus clinical distinction, there is an absolute, or black-and-white, dichotomy between philosophical theories concerning the nature of consciousness as opposed to psy chological ones. This difference does however suffice for present purposes in that the task at hand is to establish what, within the tradition, a philosophical inquiry as such can tell us about the genesis of self-awareness. I have discussed some of the contrasts between Sartre, the philosopher, and Freud, the psychologist, on aspects of the nature of adult consciousness in an article entitled “Freud contra Sartre: Repression or Self Deception?” in The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 21, no. 3 (October 1990).

2. André Gide, Si le grain ne meurt (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1945). Also, If I Die: An Autobiography, translated by Dorothy Bussy (New York: Random House, 1935). The book first appeared in 1920. I have kept to the translation except where I felt that changes were absolutely necessary.

3. Ibid., p. 134. (Ibid., p. 108.)

4. Ibid. (Ibid.)

5. Ibid., p. 135. (Ibid., p. 109.)

6. Ibid., p. 133. (Ibid., p. 108.)

7. Ibid., p. 134. (Ibid.)

8. Ibid. (Ibid.)

9. Ibid. (Ibid.)

10. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, translated by E.F. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), p. 325. Henceforth WWR.

11. Ibid., p. 229.

12. Ibid., p. 325.

13. Ibid., p. 324.

14. Ibid., p. 275.

15. Ibid., p. 325.

16. Ibid., p. 499.

17. Ibid., p. 573.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 574.

20. Ibid., p. 573.

21. Ibid., p. 466.

22. Ibid., p. 311.

23. Ibid., p. 498. If the will is eternal why does it then fear death? Because, says Schopenhauer, it is only aware of existence in phenomenal form, in fact obtaining this apprehension via the intellect. (See WWR, p. 498.)

24. WWR, pp. 393-394.

25. Ibid., p. 394.

26. Ibid., p. 395.

27. Ibid. Schopenhauer gives what he takes to be biological evidence that this same phenomenon also occurs in nonhuman species. See WWR, p. 396ff.

28. WWR, p. 277.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edwin Robinson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 353.

32. Ibid., p. 308.

33. Ibid., pp. 441-42.

34. Jean-Paul Sartre, Baudelaire (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1967). Also Baudelaire, translated by Martin Turnell (New York: New Directions Publishing, 1950). I have kept to the translation except where I felt that changes were absolutely necessary. I have discussed the issue of the genesis of subjectivity in Sartre's view in more detail in an article entitled “Childhood, Subjectivity and Hodological Space: A Reconstruction of Sartre's View of Existential Psychoanalysis,” in The Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, forthcoming.

35. Ibid., p. 19. (Ibid. pp. 16-17.)

36. Ibid., p. 20. (Ibid. p. 17.)

37. Ibid., p. 22. (Ibid. p. 19.)

38. The Other in this case is usually a parent. I have discussed this earlier stage of development in a paper entitled “Sartre and Guillaume: Conflict Child and Other,” which was presented to the Sartre Society meeting in New York, October 1985.

39. The dependence relation in question is obviously a very complex one. For the clearer the child's awareness of separation becomes, the greater becomes his sense of being vulnerable, and hence a growing sense of dependence results. On the other hand, and at the same time, an increasing ability to deal with his environment will tend to at least somewhat undermine the apparent powers of the parent or Absolute.

40. Sartre, Baudelaire, p. 22. (Ibid. p. 19.)

41. Jean-Paul Sartre, L'être et le néant: essai d'ontologie phénoménologique (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1943), pp. 615-16. Henceforth EN. Also Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, translated by Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 532-33. Henceforth BN. BN is cited before EN in what follows. Sartre's criticism is obviously concerned with adult experience, but will be seen to be applicable to the childhood issue at hand as well.

42. BN, p. 533. (EN, p. 616.)

43. Ibid., p. 534. (Ibid., p. 617.)

44. Ibid., p. 532. (Ibid., p. 616.)

45. Ibid., p. 533. (Ibid., p. 617.)

46. I have dealt fully with this issue in an article, “Sartre on Perception and the World,” in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 14, no. 2, (May 1983).

47. BN, p. 533. (EN, p. 617.)

48. Reference is made to the same text, which however appeared under a differ ent title. Thus see Richard Hughes, The Innocent Voyage (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1929).

49. Ibid., pp. 261-62.

50. WWR, pp. 139-40.

51. Ibid., p. 139.

52. Ibid., p. 329.