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Alternative Models of Scientific Rationality: Theorisation in Classical Indian Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2024

Virendra Shekhawat*
Affiliation:
University of Rajasthan
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The roots of scientific epistemology have generally been recognized in the Greeks, Aristotle and Euclid,—the former representing an empiricist trend whereas the latter representing a rationalist trend. Very little is known about classical Indian scientific epistemologies which are generally considered at least two centuries earlier than Aristotle. Inspired by the Aristotelian and Euclidean models of scientific rationality, various new models have flourished in contemporary Western thought, the prominent ones being the logical-empiricist-inductivist model (Reichenbach), the hypothet-ico-deductivist-falsificationist model (Popper), conventionalist-rationalist model (Pioncaré, Duhem), dialectical-historicist model (Kuhn), and rationalist-historicist model (Lakatos, Feyerabend). While the researches in and debates about these models are still going on, it may be profitable to examine the models of scientific rationality that are presupposed in the most prominent classical Indian sciences such as Yoga, Vyākarana, Jyotisa Siddhānt, and Ayurvijñan. All these sciences have enjoyed an uninterrupted continuity ever since their origin although their evolution has suffered generally after 1200 A.D. (save Yoga) due to cultural-historical vicissitudes.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)

References

1 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, W.D. Ross (ed. & tr.), The Works of Aristotle, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1963.

2 Euclid, The Elements, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 11, London, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952.

3 See for a discussion on some of these, V. Shekhawat, Diogenes, N. 128 (1984), pp. 77-102.

4 I. Lakatos, "History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions", in C. Howson (ed.), Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 1976.

5 H. Aranya, Patanjal Yoga Darśan, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas, 1974.

6 Panini, Astādhyāyī, M.P. Misra (ed.), Varanasi, Chowkhamba Vidya Bhawan, 1967.

7 M.P. Srivastava (comm.), Surya Siddhanta, Allahabad, Ratnakumari Swadhyaya Samsthan, 1982.

8 Charak Samhita, Jamnagar, Gulabkunwarba Ayurvedic Society, 1949.

9 Galileo Galilei, Two New Sciences, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 28, London, Ency. Brit., Inc., 1952.

10 V. Shekhawat, "Model of Scientific Rationality in Charak Samhita", paper presented at the International Seminar on Development of Theory in Humanities, American Studies Research Centre, Hyderabad, 1988.

11 There cannot be a better example of "informal" logical method of theory construction than the geometry of Euclid. It proceeds with common notions or axioms and not intuitions. Common notions are rational simples and for that reason do not need any reasons. Even the definitions cannot be said to be intuited but are more like simple rational descriptions of the essence of the object of reason. Thus, the entire geometrical theory of Euclid is free from intuition as well as experience and is strictly informal-logical in character.

12 It is this cultivated intuition which is always true knowledge, that has been accepted as testimony, or Śabda pramāna in some of the classical Indian epistemologies. Śabda, however, has only third place in the epistemological order, first being perception, and second being inference.

13 Gautam, Nyaya Sutra, Arya Muni (Tr.), Rohtak, Jhajjar Gurukula, Haryana Sahitya Samsthan, 1980.

14 Panchasikha, Samkhya Sutra, R. Bhattacharya (Tr.), Varanasi, Bhartiya Vidya Prakasan, 1964.

15 This feature, of seeking consistency with a ground metaphysic, is an important feature of classical Indian scientific epistemology and is quite explicit in at least three sciences, namely Yoga, Ayurveda, and Dharmaśāstra.

16 Patanjali, Yoga Sutra, op. cit., sutra 1-5 to 1-12.

17 op. cit., sutra 2-3 to 2-14.

18 op. cit., sutra 1-17 to 1-20 and 2-41 to 2-51.

19 op. cit., sutra 2-1, 2; 2-26 to 2-55; 3-1 to 3-8.

20 Kanad, Vaiśesika Sutra, S.N. Misra (Tr.), Varanasi, Chowkhamba Samskrta Samsthan, 1980.

21 See V. Shekhawat, Ind. Jr. Hist. Sc., 21 (2), 1986, pp. 99-112.

22 Yoga Sutra, sutra 2-5 to 2-9.

23 op. cit., sutra 2-12 to 2-15.

24 op. cit., sutra 1-7 to 1-12.

25 Smrti differs from samskara in being "provisional" in the sense that it is retained for comparatively shorter duration in a given life; the samskaras are deeper and are carried or "inherited" from one life to another. Smrti means one knows that one had retained, samskara means one has retained but does not know that one has.

26 op. cit., sutra 1-17 to 1-20; 2-41 to 2-44.

27 op. cit. sutra, 2-51.

28 op. cit., sutra 2-46; 2-17, 18, 19.

29 op. cit., sutra 2-30 to 2-45.

30 op. cit., sutra 2-46 to 2-55 and 3-1,2,3.

31 op. cit., sutra 3-13.

32 op. cit., sutra 3-4.

33 op. cit., sutra 3-5.

34 See V. Shekhawat, "The Art of Theory Construction on Charak Samhita", Ind. Jr. Hist. Sc., 21(2), 1986, pp. 99-112.

35 op. cit., Appendix II, p. 109.

36 op. cit., p. 109.

37 Charak Samhita, op. cit., p. 1089, sutra 59.

38 op. cit., p. 13, sutra 59-61.

39 op. cit., p. 14, sutra 64-66.

40 op. cit., p. 331, sutra 57; p. 12, sutra 54; p. 331, sutra 5.

41 V. Shekhawat, "Standards of Scientific Investigation", Ind. Jr. Hist. Sc., 19(3), 1984, pp. 224-52.

42 This can be partly understood by a study of intellectual history of India which begins with an Age of Discovery around 1500 BC-1000 BC when Vedic and Upanisadic creativity spread, develops into an age of Consolidation and systematisation during 1000 BC to 400 BC when Samhitas were written in diverse areas of knowledge, crystallises further into an Age of Theorisation during ca. 400 BC - 400 AD when logical, critically appraised theories were built and written in sutra form. From 400 AD to 1000 AD is, however, the Age of Debates when Buddhist and Upanisadic thoughts debated over principles and evolved by means of criticism. This age was followed by an Age of Crisis, from 1000 AD to 1900 marked by intellectual confusion, loss of political freedom, interaction with Arabic and European cultures and loss of creativity. It is this last age in which illusionist, occultist and mystical tendencies were embraced. However, because of intercalation with foreign thought in this age, one can notice a tendency for assimilation and synthesis and criticism of this thought which points to a possible dawning of a new phase of creativity and onset of an Age of Synthesis.

43 G. Sarton, A History of Science, vol. I & II, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959.

44 J. Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. 1 to 5, Cambridge University Press, 1956.