La méditation sur la mort au début du XVIe siècle se développe à la mesure des exigences humanistes qui viennent équilibrer par la raison la hantise médiévale du péché, de la repentance et de la miséricorde.

Au moment de l'exil d'Holbein en Angleterre, les représentations de la mort suscitent encore la frayeur qu'accompagne une douloureuse tristesse en face de la fragilité de la vie. Simulachres et historiees faces de la mart (1526), en plus de compatir à la souffrance humaine et de dénoncer l'injustice et l'oppression, font surgir la mort au œeur de l'activité humaine et ainsi accentuent la conscience du temps présent, la fulgurance de l'instant.

Depuis plus de quarante ans, l'activité intellectuelle d'Henri Lefebvre a toujours été débordante et féconde, mais elle semble s'enrichir par l'ampleur et la variété des sujets abordés et surtout par l'originalité de l'approche à mesure qu'il se libère de la problématique et de l'épistémologie que lui imposait la fidélité à l'orthodoxie communiste et à un marxisme dogmatique (Voir Le Monde, 29 Janvier 1971, p. 16). Ce n'est pas qu'il abandonne le marxisme, mais en l'approfondissant, il en rejette d'abord les malfaçons idéologiques, résultats des contraintes institutionnelles et politiques commandées par les luttes du parti, puis il en marque les limites. Ses cinq derniers ouvrages, publiés en moins de deux ans, illustrent et confirment cette évolution commencée explicitement en 1958 avec Problèmes actuels du marxisme (Ces ouvrages sont: La fin de l'histoire, Collection Arguments, Minuit, Paris, 1970; Le manifeste différentialiste, Collection Idées, Gallimard, Paris, 1970; La révolution urbaine, Collection Idées, Gallimard, Paris, 1970; Du rural à l'urbain, Anthropos, Paris, 1970; Au-delà du structuralism, Anthropos, Paris, 1971. Les trois premiers sont inédits, les deux derniers rassemblent des articles et des textes de conférences. Pour les citer, nous emploierons dans l'ordre les sigles suivants: F.H., M.D., R.U., D.R.U., A.S.).

It is a great pleasure to be asked to describe to philosophers the papers of Bertrand Russell. Russell's papers were acquired by McMaster University in the spring of 1968. Professor William Ready, the University Librarian, who is almost solely responsible for their acquisition, has created a special department for them in the library with ample funds for their expansion and scholarly exploitation. Before their arrival in Canada, I had had the privilege of working on the papers for a year while they were being catalogued in London. After their sale to McMaster, Professor Ready hired me as someone who knew his way in the dozens of cabinet drawers and trunks. Although my interests in the papers are primarily bibliographical and personal, I shall try to outline what philosophers, especially those with an historical interest, could find of importance in them. In doing so, I shall mention some topics of possible inquiry and suggest specific manuscripts to study in connection with them, but I shall not attempt to trace in detail the development of any of Russell's ideas. That is for philosophers to do.

L'astrologie, affirme Francis Bacon, «est tellement infectée de superstitions qu'on a peine à y trouver quelque chose de sain». A la différence de l'astronomie, qui est «assez bien fondée sur les phénomènes; mais [qui] s'élève peu, et manque tout à fait de solidité», Bacon estime que l'astrologie «en bien des choses … manque même de fondement». Tout en soulignant que certaines parties doivent en être retenues et épurées, Bacon en rejette l'essentiel comme «extravagances astrologiques». Mais comment au juste l'astronomie se différencie-t-elle de l'essentiel de l'astrologie? Que veut dire Bacon lorsqu'il affirme que l'astrologie est sans fondement et remplie de superstition? Le problème philosophique tient à ce que, en dépit de la vraisemblance des remarques de Bacon, il ne semble y avoir aucun moyen satisfaisant pour distinguer des parodies de science de la science authentique. Science et pseudoscience diffèrent en espèce, pense-t-on, mais la réflexion philosophique semble révéler qu'au mieux elles diffèrent en degrés.

In a recent article in this journal, Bernard Carnois has given us a valuable comparative study of desire in the Stoa and in Spinoza (‘Le desir selon les Stoïciens et selon Spinoza’, Dialogue 19 [1980], 255–277). I am in no position to judge what he says about Spinoza, but his generally accurate account of ⋯ρμή in Stoic doctrine is marred by one or two misconceptions which ought to be set right. These criticisms do not, it should be said, detract from the value of the overall comparison he wishes to make.

“What is phenomenology? It may seem strange that this question has still to be asked half a century after the first works of Husserl. The fact remains that it has by no means been answered.” Merleau-Ponty made this observation in 1945. It is still substantially correct, except that it is now three-quarters of a century after the first works of Husserl.

Lawrence Haworth's book, Autonomy, discusses “Autonomy as a Psychological Idea”, and “Autonomy as a Normative Idea”. Part 1 discusses autonomy in relation to rationality, agency, and responsibility, defends it against Skinnerian sceptics, and outlines a theory of autonomous decision-making and the autonomous task environment. Haworth's conception of autonomy integrates and builds on the concepts of S. I. Benn, G. Dworkin, H. Frankfurt, and R. W. White. Part 2 centres on social/political theory, and not, despite the book's subtitle, on ethics as such. Haworth argues that only autonomy, and not liberty or happiness, is an intrinsic (non-moral) value, and fundamental right. His “autonomist” theory of liberty rights, a form of revisionary liberalism derived from the later idealists, is opposed to the classical liberal/libertarian theory. The arguments prompt a re-examination of the role of autonomy in the arguments for liberty (and happiness), but do not, in my view, make a persuasive case for “autonomism” against classical liberalism (hereafter liberalism). The book is chiefly noteworthy for its success in covering many important topics connected with autonomy, in an impressively short space, and in an always clear and often very insightful way.

Is a policy of economic growth compatible with the neutrality of the State? Some liberals (Rawls, Dworkin, Ackerman, Larmore, Kymlicka) think so. I do not. I begin by explaining and discussing the different meanings of the neutrality thesis, then I show that, whatever meaning we give to the idea of neutrality, it is very difficult to argue convincingly that a policy of economic growth does not favour some conceptions of the good.

One cannot determine whether a book is a work of political philosophy merely by glancing at its contents. Heidegger's Being and Time is a case in point. It offers no discussion of the topics which are commonly thought to constitute political philosophy—the state, the nature of law, human rights, and so on. But particular themes such as these reflect in large part the actual conditions which prevailed at certain times and places, fourth-century Athens and seventeenth-century England, for example, so they must not be thought to constitute an outline of the eternal problems of political philosophy. When a philosopher embarks upon a new line of thought at a different time and under novel circumstances, he may find himself instituting a new vocabulary for the problems of the human community.

Voluntary Abortion involves the preventable destruction of an unformed or partly formed human organism. It is disagreement about the moral significance of this fact which sustains the controversy over abortion. This disagreement derives from a dispute about the sanctity, or morally protected position, of the destroyed organism, which in turn results from conflicting opinions about the basis or criterion of sanctity rather than any uncertainty over how they may apply. The thesis of this paper is that this last disagreement about the criterion of moral sanctity cannot be settled by rational, i.e. non-circular, argument; and hence, that there is no rational method of resolving the controversy over the morality of abortion.

One of the central features of Kant's moral theory is the sharp distinction he draws between the moral Tightness (legality) of actions and their moral worth or goodness (morality). As we know from the first pages of the Groundwork, the rightness of an action is determined by the conformity of the agent's maxim to the categorical imperative; the moral goodness or worth of an action is determined by the agent's motives, by whether the agent acted from the motive of duty or from some other (non-moral) empirical motive. Morally good actions must be morally right, according to Kant, whereas morally right actions are not necessarily morally good.