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Wolfson on Spinoza's Use of the More Geometrico

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2010

John De Lucca
John De Lucca
Affiliation:
University of VictoriaVictoria, B.C.
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Extract

In Chapter II of his work The Philosophy of Spinoza, Wolfson accepts Descartes' distinction between the geometrical method of philosophizing and the geometrical form of literary exposition. The geometrical method of philosophizing is a method of demonstration and is essentially identical with “valid syllogistic reasoning as practised throughout the history of philosophy.” The geometrical form of literary exposition is one modelled after the literary form of Euclid's Elements. Wolfson proceeds to present two theses which serve as the premises of a conclusion respecting the relation between form and content in Spinoza's Ethics. The first thesis is that as a consequence of Spinoza's “mathematical way of looking at things” the geometrical method “is adopted by Spinoza and used consistently in his discussions of metaphysical matters throughout his chief philosophic work.” The second thesis is to the effect that there is no logical connection between the geometrical method of philosophizing and the geometrical literary form of exposition, i.e., a geometrizing philosopher, e.g., Descartes, need not employ the geometrical literary form. From these theses, serving as premises, Wolfson concludes that “there is no logical connection between the substance of Spinoza's philosophy and the form in which it is written” and, hence, “his choice of the Euclidian geometrical form is to be explained on other grounds.” Wolfson proceeds to present four possible reasons which, either individually or conjointly, may lie behind Spinoza's employment of the geometrical literary form: (1) on pedagogical grounds, (2) in reaction against certain literary forms which had developed since the Renaissance, (3) to avoid arguing against his opponents, and (4) for the sake of novelty.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , June 1967 , pp. 89 - 102
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1967

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References

1 Wolfson, H. A., The Philosophy of Spinoza, New York, Meridian Books, 1960, (first ed., 1934), p. 45Google Scholar.

2 Ibid., p. 44.

3 Ibid., p. 54.

4 Ibid., p. 55.

5 Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. II, tr. Haldane, F. S. and Ross, G. R. T., New York, Dover Publications, 1955, (republication of 1934 edition, Cambridge University Press), p. 29Google Scholar.

6 Ibid., p. 48.

7 Ibid., p. 49.

8 Ibid.

9 Spinoza, B., The Principles of Descartes' Philosophy, tr. and introd. Britan, H. H., La Salle, Ill., The Open Court Publ. Co., 1961, (first published, 1905), p. 7Google Scholar.

10 “Introduction,” Spinoza, B., Earlier Philosophical Writings, tr. Hayes, F. A., Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963, p. xivGoogle Scholar.

11 A few instances of this tendency to so characterize Spinoza will document this point. John Caird alleged that “What Spinoza aimed at was a system of knowledge in which everything should follow by strict necessity of thought from the first principle with which it starts.” (Spinoza, Edinburgh, Blackwood & Sons, 1903, p. 113) Richard Falckenberg contended that the chief thought which captivated Spinoza was “the rationalistic belief in the power of the human spirit to possess itself of the truth by pure thought, together with confidence in the omnipotence of the mathematical method.” (History of Modern Philosophy, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1897, p. 119Google Scholar) Halbert H. Britan, in a lengthy discussion of Spinoza's use of the more geometrico, presented essentially the same argument of pedagogic utility given by Wolfson and considered Spinoza as infatuated by deduction. “Instead of accepting the conclusions of Descartes as the starting point, viz., his cogito ergo sum, and his proof of God's veracity, by which empirical knowledge is made credible, and employing the method of Bacon to build this foundation already laid, Spinoza turns back a step and begins anew the impossible task of deducing the world in thought. … Individual facts of human experience were not data on which conclusions could be based, but phenomena to be explained by deducing them from some primary, and fundamental principle.” (“Introduction,” B. Spinoza, The Principles of Descartes' Philosophy, La Salle, Ill., Open Court Publ. Co., 1961, p. xivGoogle Scholar) Finally, Stuart Hampshire has written: “If therefore Descartes was a rationalist, in the sense that he advocated the solution of all problems of natural knowledge by the application of the mathematical method of pure reasoning, Spinoza was doubly a rationalist in this sense; in fact no other philosopher has ever insisted more uncompromisingly that all problems, whether metaphysical, moral or scientific, must be formulated and solved as purely intellectual problems, as if they were theorems in geometry. Principally for this reason he wrote both his early exposition of Descartes' philosophy and his own great definitive work, the Ethics, in the geometrical manner, as a succession of propositions with supporting proofs, lemmas, and corollaries.” (Spinoza, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1951, pp. 24–5Google Scholar) A somewhat different position is taken by Joachim (Joachim, H. H., A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, New York, Russell & Russell, 1964, pp. 9–13Google Scholar) and by Pollock (Pollock, Frederick, Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy, London, Duckworth, 2nd ed., 1899, P. 201Google Scholar). Hallett (Hallett, H. F., Benedict De Spinoza, The Elements of His Philosophy, London, The Athlone Press, 1957Google Scholar) is practically silent on this issue.

12 Wolfson, op. cit., p. 58.

13 Ibid., pp. 46 and 50.

14 McKeon, R., “Philosophy and Method”, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 48, No. 22, Oct. 25, 1951, pp. 653–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Wolfson, op. cit., p. 55.

16 Ibid., pp. 23–34.