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Williamson and the Argument from Luminosity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

P. X. Monaghan
P. X. Monaghan
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
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Abstract

Many of the results of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits depend upon his argument that many, if not all, of our mental states fail to be luminous in the sense that if we are in them, then we are in a position to know that we are in them. The purpose of this article is to show that his argument is unsound. I conclude by distinguishing between partial and total luminosity, and by arguing that even if mental states are not totally luminous, they are at least partially so.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 47 , Issue 3-4 , Summer-Fall 2008 , pp. 619 - 632
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2008

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References

Goodman, Nelson 1977 The Structure of Appearance. With an introduction by Hellman, G.. 3rd ed.Dordrecht: R. Reidel Publishing.Google Scholar
Neta, R., and Rohrbaugh, G. 2004 “Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85: 396–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy 2000 Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar