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Why There Are No Epistemic Duties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Chase B. Wrenn
Chase B. Wrenn
Affiliation:
University of Alabama
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Abstract

Epistemic duties would be duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, and they would be grounded in purely evidential considerations. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people may have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. Rather, allegedly epistemic duties are a species of moral duty.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 46 , Issue 1 , Winter 2007 , pp. 115 - 136
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2007

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