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Une forme minimale de coopération

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2009

Cédric Paternotte
Cédric Paternotte*
Affiliation:
Bristol University
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Abstract

ABSTRACT : Definitions of cooperative action usually provide sufficient rather than necessary conditions. I here define a minimal form of cooperation, which encompasses mass actions, such as demonstrations. Intentional, epistemic, strategic and teleological aspects, mainly obtained from a weakening of pre-existing concepts, are discussed. I also emphasize the key role played by game theoretic concepts in the definition of joint action. Finally, I claim that rationality is a necessary condition of minimal cooperation, whereas classical analysis merely sees rationality as a possible or desirable characteristic.

RÉSUMÉ : La plupart des nombreuses définitions existantes d’une action coopérative en fournissent des conditions suffisantes plutôt que nécessaires. Nous définissons ici une forme minimale de coopération, correspondant aux actions de masse, telles des manifestations. Nous en détaillons les aspects intentionnel, épistémique, stratégique et téléologique, généralement obtenus par affaiblissement spécifique de concepts classiques. Parallèlement, nous soulignons le rôle crucial de concepts issus de la théorie des jeux pour la définition d’une action coopérative. Enfin, nous soutenons que la rationalité d’une action coopérative minimale est cruciale à sa réalisation et pas seulement possible ou souhaitable comme le soutiennent les analyses habituelles.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , June 2009 , pp. 235 - 267
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2009

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References

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