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Two Gauthiers?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Duncan MacIntosh
Duncan MacIntosh
Affiliation:
Dalhousie University
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Extract

In outline, at least, the major argument of David Gauthier's, Morals By Agreement is quite clear: it is rational to acquire a disposition to moral behaviour with those similarly disposed because having it gives one the highest practically attainable utility in interactions with them. Once one has acquired such a disposition, a disposition which constrains one's individual maximization of the satisfaction of one's preferences (i.e., a Constrained Maximizer or “CM” disposition), it is rational to act morally towards similar agents. He thus takes himself to have constructed from instrumental rationality alone, a justification of voluntary compliance with moral principles. He appears to have shown that it is instrumentally rational for free and uncoerced agents to perform moral actions.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , Winter 1989 , pp. 43 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1989

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