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Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 April 2009
Abstract
Correspondence theories are frequently charged with being either implausible—metaphysically troubling and overly general—or trivial—collapsing into deflationism's “‘P’ is true iff P.” Philip Kitcher argues for a “modest” correspondence theory, on which reference relations are causal relations, but there is no general theory of denotation. In this article, I start by showing that, understood this way, “modest” theories are open to charges of triviality. I then offer a refinement of modesty, and take the first steps toward articulating a modest correspondence theory, giving a particular account of the relation between predicates, properties, and extensions. Finally, I argue that my account does not collapse into a deflationary one.
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- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , Winter 2008 , pp. 81 - 102
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- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2008