Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-m6dg7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-09T13:33:45.624Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Taking Reflective Equilibrium Seriously

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

W.E. Cooper
Affiliation:
The University of Alberta

Extract

In the essay “Justice and Rights” of his book Taking Rights Seriously Ronald Dworkin puts forward an account of reflective equilibrium which has become an orthodoxy in interpreting John Rawls' theory of justice. My purpose here is to challenge this account, on the grounds that it presupposes an untenable view of the relation between belief and choice.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1981

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

NOTES

1 In what follows I assume that the reader has read Rawls', A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1971).Google Scholar

2 Rawls, J., “The Independence of Moral Theory”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 19741975, volume XLVIII, pp. 522.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 160.Google Scholar

4 TRS, p. 165.

5 TRS, p. 162.

6 TJ, p. 50.

7 TJ, p. 20.

8 TJ, p. 20.

9 TJ, p. 49.

10 Nagel, T., “Rawls on Justice”, in Reading Rawls, ed. Daniels, Norman (New York: Basic Books), p. 2.Google Scholar

11 Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), especially pp. 204213.Google Scholar

12 Hare, R., “Rawls' Theory of Justice”, in Reading Rawls, ed. Daniels, N. (New York: Basic Books).Google Scholar