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Strategic Reliabilism and the Replacement Thesis in Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Andrei A. Buckareff
Andrei A. Buckareff
Affiliation:
Marist College
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Abstract

In their recent book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, M. Bishop and J. D. Trout have challenged Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) in all its guises and have endorsed a version of the “replacement thesis”—proponents of which aim at replacing the standard questions of SAE with psychological questions. In this article I argue that Bishop and Trout offer an incomplete epistemology that, as formulated, cannot address many of the core issues that motivate interest in epistemological questions to begin with, and so is not a fit replacement.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 47 , Issue 3-4 , Summer-Fall 2008 , pp. 425 - 437
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2008

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