Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dlnhk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-30T01:08:16.384Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Byeong D. Lee
Byeong D. Lee
Affiliation:
Sogang University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 41 , Issue 2 , Spring 2002 , pp. 279 - 290
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2002

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Gareth, Evans 1982 The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Mark, Johnston 1988 “Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind.” In Perspectives on Self-Deception. Edited by McLaughlin, Brian P. and Rorty, Amelie O.. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 63–91.Google Scholar
Keith, Lehrer 1990 Theory of Knowledge. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Sydney, Shoemaker 1996 “Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge.” In his The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 74–93.Google Scholar