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Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Greg Janzen
Greg Janzen
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
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Abstract

This article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves selfconsciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some suitable way, conscious of being in it. Though neither of these theses is novel, there is a dearth of direct arguments for them in the scholarly literature and the relationship between them has so far gone underrecognized. This article attempts to remedy this lack, advancing the claim that if all conscious states have phenomenal character, then all state consciousness involves self-consciousness.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 4 , Fall 2005 , pp. 707 - 733
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005

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