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Reply to Ripstein

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Jan Narveson
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo

Extract

One reason for professing sympathy for such an unpopular view as libertarianism is that one acquires such worthy opponents. Arthur Ripstein's notice was a pleasure to read and, as I would expect, gives one plenty to think about. In this very brief reply, though, I can only identify some points on which I think he may have misstated my view, or on which I can offer a quick rebuttal.

Type
Critical Notices/Études critiques
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1990

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References

Notes

1 I later composed a paper on some further arguments against property than the many considered in the book, and presented it at the Ontario Philosophical Society meetings in October 1989. There I ran into a veritable barrage of objections launched by many acute philosophers, including Arthur Ripstein. That occasion made it clear that there is more homework to do, but did not persuade me that my task was hopeless. It also persuaded me that I was quite right in sensing a general predilection to misconstrue the thesis being defended.

2 In my writings on animal rights and on nuclear war, the emphasis on Hobbesian equality of power is much clearer. See “Animal Rights Revisited,” in Miller, H. and Williams, W., Ethics and Animals (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1983), p. 4560CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; and “At Arms' Length: Violence and Nuclear War,” in Regan, Tom, Matters of Life and Death, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1986), esp. p. 129137.Google Scholar

3 See note 1 above.