Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T14:46:00.118Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Réduction «rôle-occupant», réduction «micro-macro» et explication réductrice a priori

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Max Kistler
Max Kistler
Affiliation:
Université Paris X–Nanterre et Institut Jean Nicod
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

It has been argued that most truths about macroscopic states of affairs are entailed by a (hypothetical) complete description P of the world in microscopic terms. In principle, micro-reductive explanations of non-microphysical truths could be constructed a priori. Against this claim, I show that reductive explanation requires knowledge about the phenomena to be reduced which cannot be a priori extracted from microphysical information alone. Such reductions proceed in two steps: a “reductionR0” (“role-occupant”) establishes that a macroproperty M plays a certain causal role (specified in macro-terms), while a “reductionMM ” (“micro-macro”) establishes that some microproperty gives rise to M.

Résumé

Selon une thèse importante, il est en principe possible de déduire de manière a priori la plupart des vérités macroscopiques d'une (hypothétique) description complète du monde en termes microphysiques P et done de construire des explications réductrices a priori. Contre cette thèse, je montre que l'explication réductrice requiert des informations sur les phénomènes à réduire qui nepeuventpas être extraites a priori des seules informations microphysiques. De telles réductions ont deux parties : une «réductionRO » («rôle-occupant») établit qu'une macropropriété M.joue un rôle causal spécifié en termes macroscopiques, alors qu'une «réductionMM» («micro-macro») montre qu'une micropropriété donne lieu à M.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , Spring 2005 , pp. 225 - 248
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Références bibliographique

Block, N. et Stalnaker, R. 1999 «Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap», Philosophical Review, vol. 108, p. 1–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Byrne, A. 1999 «Cosmic Hermeneutics», dans Philosophical Perspectives vol. 13 : Epistemology, p. 347–383.Google Scholar
Carnot, S. 1824 Réflexions sur la puissance motrice du feu et sur les machines propres à développer cette puissance, Paris, Bachelier.Google Scholar
Caro, P. 1995 De l'eau, coll. Questions de science, Paris, Hachette.Google Scholar
Chalmers, D. 1996 The Conscious Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Chalmers, D. 2004 «The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”, à paraître dans Two-Dimensional Semantics : Foundations and Applications (sous la dir. de J. Garcia-Carpintero et J. Macia), Oxford, Oxford University Press (http://www.consc.net/papers/foundations.html).Google Scholar
Chalmers, D. et Jackson, F. 2001 «Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanations» Philosophical Review, vol. 110, p. 315–360.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gold, I. et Stoljar, D. 1999 «A Neuron Doctrine in the Philosophy of Neuroscience», Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 22, no5, p. 585–642.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Haas-Spohn, U. 1995 Versteckte Indexikalitdt und subjektive Bedeutung, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haas-Spohn, U. 1997 «The Context Dependency of Natural Kind Terms», Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes (sous la dir. De W. Kunne, A. Newen et M. Anduschus), Stanford, CSLI Publications, p. 333–349.Google Scholar
Holland, J. H. 1998 Emergence : From Chaos to Order, Oxford, Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horgan, T. 1984 «Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics», Southern Journal of Philosophy, numéro spécial sous la dir. de T. Horgan : Spindel Conference Supplement: The Concept of Supervenience in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 19–38.Google Scholar
Horgan, T. 1993 «From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World», Mind, vol. 102, p. 555–586.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, F. 1994 «Armchair Metaphysics», dans Philosophy in Mind (sous la dir. de J. O'Leary-Hawthorne et M. Michael), Dordrecht, Kluwer, p. 23–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, F. 1998 From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford, Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 1993 Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. 1998 Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.Google Scholar
Kincaid, H. 1990 «Molecular Biology and the Unity of Science», Philosophy of Science, vol. 57, p. 575–593.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kirk, R. 1996 «Strict Implication, Supervenience and Physicalism», Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 74, p. 244–257.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kirk, R. 2001 «Non-Reductive Physicalism and Strict Implication», Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79, p. 545–553.Google Scholar
Kistler, M. 1999 «Multiple Realization, Reduction, and Mental Properties», International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 13, p. 135–149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kistler, M. 2004 «Matérialisme et réduction de l'esprit», dans Les Matérialismes (et lews détracteurs) (sous la dir. de J. Dubessy, G. Lecointre et M. Silberstein, Paris, Syllepse, 2004, p. 309–339.Google Scholar
Kitcher, P. 1984 «1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences», The Philosophical Review, vol. 93, p. 335–373.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kripke, S. A. 1972 «Naming and Necessity», dans Semantics of Natural Language (sous la dir. de D. Davidson et G. Harman), Dordrecht, Reidel, p. 253–355 et 763–769; Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1980; trad, franç.: La Logique des noms propres, Paris, Éditions de Minuit.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1973 Counterfactuals, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1980 «Index, Content and Context», dans Philosophy and Grammar (sous la dir. de S. Kanger et S. Öhman), Dordrecht, Reidel, p. 79–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mellor, D. H. 2000 «The Semantics and Ontology of Dispositions», Mind, vol. 109, p. 757–780.Google Scholar
Morange, M. 1998 La Part des gènes, Paris, Odile Jacob.Google Scholar
Mumford, S. 1998 Dispositions, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Nimtz, C. 2004 Two-Dimensional and Natural Kind Terms, Synthese, vol. 138, p. 125–148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. 1975 «The Meaning of “Meaning”», dans Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 215–271.Google Scholar
Rosenberg, A. 1985 The Structure of Biological Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schaffner, K. F. 1993 Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Shoemaker, S. 1980 «Causality and Properties», dans Identity, Cause and Mind, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 206–233.Google Scholar
Sklar, L. 1993 Physics and Chance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stalnaker, R. 1978 «Assertion», dans Syntax and Semantics (sous la dir. de P. Cole), vol. 9, New York, Academic Press, p. 315–332.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, R. 1993 «Twin Earth Revisited», Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 93, p. 297–311.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yablo, S. 1992 «Mental Causation», Philosophical Review, vol. 101, p. 245–280.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yablo, S. 1997 «Wide Causation», dans Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 11 : Mind, Cause and World, p. 251–281.Google Scholar