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Reasons and the First-Person: Explanatory Exclusion and Explanatory Pluralism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 May 2013

NEIL CAMPBELL
NEIL CAMPBELL*
Affiliation:
Wilfrid Laurier University
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Abstract

In two recent papers, Jaegwon Kim offers an account of action explanation that is agent-centered and reasons-based. I argue that, despite his claims to the contrary, Kim’s proposal points the way to a pluralist view of explanation that might resolve the problem of explanatory exclusion and provide a way for nonreductive physicalists to escape the supervenience/exclusion argument.

Dans deux articles récents, Jaegwon Kim aborde le problème de l’explication de l’action d’une façon qui est centrée sur l’agent et fondée sur les raisons. Je soutiens que, bien qu’il prétende le contraire, la proposition de Kim ouvre la voie à une vision pluraliste de l’explication qui pourrait résoudre le problème de l’exclusion explicative et fournir un moyen permettant au physicalisme non réductionniste de se soustraire à l’argument de la survenance, aussi appelé argument de l’exclusion.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 25 - 42
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013 

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