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Queries on Truth-Conditions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Hugues Leblanc
Hugues Leblanc
Affiliation:
Temple University
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Extract

Studying some familiar truth-conditions, I shall detail the role they play in elementary logic and inquire into our grounds for holding them true. I shall discharge the first of these assignments with a good deal of assurance, but the second with far less; to my mind, (1) below mirrors our use of ‘and’, (6) our use of ‘every’, (8) our use of ‘necessarily’, etc. pretty accurately, but little evidence to that effect has ever been supplied, and — disturbingly enough — many take exception to the conditions under study.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , September 1975 , pp. 410 - 419
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1975

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References

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