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The Problem of Criteria of Pain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1965

Joseph Margolis
Joseph Margolis
Affiliation:
University of Cincinnati
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Extract

It is readily conceded that “pain” is a term in a public language. But the concession leads us at once to speak of a criterion or criteria for its proper ascription; and the concept of a criterion of pain is a particularly difficult concept to lay bare. The issue has its classic source in Wittgenstein, where it extends far beyond the boundaries of mental entities. It is hard to say what Wittgenstein's view actually is regarding criteria; and it may be more profitable to canvass certain untenable possibilities, with an eye to the problem, than to settle what can only be a question of a sort of archaeology.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , June 1965 , pp. 62 - 71
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1965

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References

1 See, for example, the bewildering variety of views in the following: Malcolm, Norman, ”Knowledge of Other Minds”, Journal of Philosophy, LV (1958), 969–978CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Albritton, Rogers, ”On Wittgenstein's Use of the Term ‘Criterion’”, Journal of Philosophy, LVI (1959), 845–857CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scriven, Michael, ”The Logic of Criteria,” Journal of Philosophy, LVI (1959), 857–868CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wellman, Carl, ”Wittgenstein's Conception of a Criterion,” Philosophical Review, LXXI (1962), 433–447CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Garver, Newton, ”Wittgenstein on Criteria,” in Rollins, C. D. (ed.), Knowledge and Experience (Pittsburgh, 1962)Google Scholar.

2 Albritton, op. cit., 848.

3 Ibid., 849. Cf. also, , Wittgenstein, The Blue & Brown Books (Oxford, 1958), pp. 2–5Google Scholar.

4 Albritton, op. cit., 856.

5 Ibid., 849.

6 , Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, G. E. M. (Oxford, 1953)Google Scholar, Pt. I, sec. 303.

7 I intend this to be taken compatibly with Newton Garver's useful distinction between a criterion's being a grammatical rule rather than a test for determining what is the case; cf. Garver, op. cit., pp. 58–59. Contrast here Norman Malcolm's view that a criterion is “something that settles a question with certainty,” Dreaming (London, 1959), p. 60 (cited by Garver). Garver's distinction I do not believe is intended to deny that criteria may and do serve as tests but only that this is not the “focus” of the concept (p. 60) and that symptoms may serve as tests without being criteria (pp. 59–60). Cf. also, Carl Ginet's comments on Garver, in Rollins, op. cit., pp. 75–76.

8 Albritton, op. cit., 856.

9 Ibid., 857.

10 Scriven, op.cit., 863.

11 Ibid., 863.

12 Ibid., 867–868.

13 Wellman, op. cit., 436.

14 Ibid., 437.

15 Ibid., 445–447.

16 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Pt. I, sees. 289–290.

17 Cf. Ibid., Pt. I, sec. 244.

18 Cf. Ibid., Pt. I, sec. 258. Compare also, Malcolm, Norman, ”Knowledge of Other Minds,” journal of Philosophy, LV (1958), 969–978CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Garver, op. cit., p. 64.

20 Wellman, op. cit., 447.

21 Cf. the interesting comments on Garver by Paul Ziff, in Rollins, op. cit., pp. 81–85.

22 Strawson, P. F., Individuals (London, 1959), p. 134CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Ibid., pp. 105.

24 Ibid., p. 134.