Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-29T18:17:27.305Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Pragmatic Scruples and the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 November 2010

Richard Kenneth Atkins
Richard Kenneth Atkins *
Affiliation:
Fordham University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Cheryl Misak has offered a pragmatic argument against a position she calls “scientific transcendentalism.” Scientific transcendentalists hold that truth is something different from what would be believed at the end of inquiry; more specifically, they adhere to a correspondence theory of truth. Misak thinks scientific transcendentalists thereby undermine the connection between truth and inquiry, for (a) pragmatically speaking, it adds nothing to truth and inquiry to ask whether what would be the results of sufficiently rigorous inquiry are really true and (b) they can only accept it as an article of faith that inquiry leads us to truth. I defend “scientific transcendentalism” against Misak’s objections.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , September 2010 , pp. 365 - 380
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Almeder, Robert 1980 The Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce. Totowa NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Almeder, Robert 1985 “Peirce’s Thirteen Theories of Truth.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 21: 77–94.Google Scholar
De Waal, Cornelis 1999 “Eleven Challenges to the Pragmatic Theory of Truth.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35, no. 4: 749–66.Google Scholar
Greco, John 2000 Putting Skeptics in Their Place. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hookway, Christopher 2002 Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hookway, Christopher 2004 “Truth, Reality, and Convergence.” In The Cambridge Companion to Peirce. Ed. Misak, C. . Cambridge U.K: Cambridge University Press: 127–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marino, Patricia 2006 “What Should a Correspondence Theory of Truth Be and Do?” Philosophical Studies 127: 415–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDermid, Douglas 1998 “Pragmatism and Truth: The Comparison Objection to Correspondence.” Review of Metaphysics 51, no. 4: 775–811.Google Scholar
Migotti, Mark 1999 “Peirce’s Double-Aspect Theory of Truth.” In Pragmatism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume. Ed. Misak, C. . Calgary: University of Calgary Press.Google Scholar
Misak, Cheryl 1991/2004 Truth and the End of Inquiry. 2nded.Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nolt, John 2008 “Truth as an Epistemic Ideal.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 37: 203–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peirce, Charles Sanders 1931–58 The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. 8 vols. Ed. Hartshorne, C., Weiss, P., and Burks, A.. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Peirce, Charles Sanders 1986 Writings of Charles S. Peirce. Vol. 3. Ed. Peirce Edition Project . Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
Peirce, Charles Sanders 1998 The Essential Peirce. Vol. 2. Ed. Peirce Edition Project . Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
Wiggins, David 2002 “An Indefinibilist cum Normative View of Truth and the Marks of Truth.” In What is Truth? Ed. Schantz, Richard . Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.Google Scholar
Wiggins, David 2004 “Reflections on Truth and Inquiry Arising from Peirce’s Method for the Fixation of Belief.” In The Cambridge Companion to Peirce. Ed. Misak, C. . Cambridge U.K: Cambridge University Press: 87–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, Crispin 2004 “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free?).” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 78: 167–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar