1 Ethics: Report of the Consultative Group on Ethics (Ottawa: The Canada Council, 1977)Google Scholar. Hereafter, Ethics.

2 Ibid., iv.

3 Ibid., v, my emphasis.

4 Letter of Inglis to David Bartlett, July 6, 1978. The brief is titled “Response of the Canadian Psychological Association (Committee on Scientific Affairs) to the Report of the Consultative Group on Ethics in Research Involving Human Subjects” (unpublished manuscript, 1978).

5 Ethics, 6.Google Scholar

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 9.

8 Ibid., 9–10

9 Ibid., 10.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Here are the strictures spelled out:

1) that deception never be permitted when there is any risk of harm to the subject or when debriefing is not possible;

2) that if deception is claimed to be indispensable to the methodology, the researcher be required to show that no other methodology would suffice and evidence be shown that significant scientific advance could result from the research before the deception is considered justifiable;

3) that if deception is to be used, the researcher be able to show that nothing had been withheld from the subject which might, if divulged, have caused him to refuse to participate;

4) that when deception is employed, debriefing take place as soon as possible (Ethics, 11).Google Scholar

13 The literature is enormous. For three recent ingenious attempts to see if deception can get on without a feud with some form of subject consent see Veatch, Robert, “Ethical Principles in Medical Experimentation”, in Ethical and Legal Issues of Social Experimentation, ed. Rivlin, A. and Timpane, P. (Washington: Brookings, 1975)Google Scholar; Milgram, S., “Subject Reaction: The Neglected Factor in the Ethics of Experimentation”, Hastings Center Report 7/5 (08 1977)Google Scholar: and Soble, Alan, “Deception in Social Science Research: Is Informed Consent Possible?” Hastings Center Report 8/5 (08 1978)Google Scholar. See my “The Case That Milgram Makes”, Philosophical Review 86 (07 1977), 350–364CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a critique of Stanley Milgram's attempt to justify elaborate deception by appeal to subjects' attitudes.

14 For a clear statement of how the ethical problems of deception can arise only with prior recognition that this technique is somehow necessary, see Soble, , “Deception in Social Science Research”.Google Scholar

15 Aronson, E. and Carlsmith, J. M., “Experimentation in Social Psychology”, in The Handbook of Social Psychology, vol. 2, ed. G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (2nd ed.; Reading, MA.: Addison Wesley, 1968–1969), 29Google Scholar. For similar remarks see 34 and 35 as well. And note this confident line from the CPA brief: “Unless the researcher is … allowed to measure some kinds of behavior without the subject's consent, or even awareness, little valid research could be carried out ….” (2).

It might be the case that certain research psychologists do not intend the logic of the experiment argument to be a claim of logical entailment as it is represented here. Nonetheless, or so I would contend, it is clear that they either base their case on some looser sort of a priori reflection that is captured by the criticism of the logic of the experiment case put forward here, or they mean to appeal to a supposed lack of realism in subjects' behaviour. I deal with the question of realism below.

16 Ibid., 30.

17 Soble, , “Deception in Social Science Research”, 40.Google Scholar

18 Westland, Gordon, Current Crises of Psychology (London: Heinemann, 1978), 109.Google Scholar

19 To be sure, I have in mind Daniel M. Geller's recent “Involvement in Role-Playing Simulations: A Demonstration with Studies on Obedience”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36/3 (03 1978), 219–234Google Scholar, but all would acknowledge that Don Mixon has fathered thorough and thoughtful role-playing work in this area. See, for example, “Instead of Deception,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 2 (1972), 145–177CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “If You Won't Deceive, What Can You Do?” in Armistead, N., ed., Reconstructing Social Psychology (London: Penguin, 1974)Google Scholar. Willis, R. H. and Willis, Y. A., “Role Playing Versus Deception: An Experimental Comparison”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 16/3 (1970), 212–211Google Scholar, put forward a conformity experiment which makes use of role-playing. H. Tristram Engelhart, Jr. seems confident that the “pygmalian” experiments of Rosenthal could not have been performed successfully without deception. I know of no similar experiments founded on role-playing or some other alternative, but the key point is that Engelhardt does not provide an analysis which shows that deception is logically necessary in this or any other case. See “Basic Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Biomedical and Behavioral Research Involving Human Subjects”, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, DHEW Publication No. (OS) 78–0013 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), Appendix, vol. 1, 8–44, note 47.

20 The requirement that the experiment require deception in a non trivial way is needed to avoid cases where a description is pieced together so that deception is conveniently made analytic. E.g., from Soble, “Deception in Social Science Research”. 41: “the effect of LSD-25 on the behavior of a group of unsuspecting enlisted men” (my emphasis).

21 Milgram, , “Subject Reaction”, 22–23Google Scholar, quoted by Soble, “Deception in Social Science Research”, 46, note 20. The phrase in brackets is Soble's.

22 This charge of inconsistent conflation applies to certain commentators. It certainly fits Soble (Ibid.) and might well be tied to Milgram as well (Ibid.), although one cannot be completely certain in the latter case.

23 Milgram, , “Subject Reaction”, 23Google Scholar, my emphasis.

24 Aronson and Carlsrnith, “Experimentation in Social Psychology”, 22.

25 Ibid., 27.

26 Geller, “Involvement in Role-Playing Simulations”, 231–232.Google Scholar

27 Zimbardo, Philip, “The Mind is a Formidable Jailer: A Pirandellian Prison,” The New York Times Magazine, 04 8, 1973.Google Scholar

28 Curiously one research psychologist who is a critic of the use of role-playing experiments on the ground of lack of realism, points out that role-playing experiments can have ethical problems similar to those connected with deception experiments because of the high degree of “real emotions” which can be produced. But how can one have it both ways? How can one question a set of experiments on the genuineness of the subjects' involvement and then fault them once again because the subjects are too highly engaged? See Milgram, , “Subject Reaction”, 22–23.Google Scholar

29 See, for example, Geller's tabulation of role-playing results in obedience studies, “Involvement in Role-Playing Simulations”, 227.Google Scholar

30 Soble, , “Deception in Social Science Research”, 41.Google Scholar

31 Aronson, and Carlsmith, , “Experimentation in Social Psychology”, 32.Google Scholar

32 In this respect the fears and responses in developing the U.S. Public Health Service guidelines in application to the behavioral sciences have a certain antiquarian charm. See Frankel, Mark S., “The Development of Policy Guidelines Governing Human Experimentation in the United States: A Case of Public Policy-Making for Science and Technology”, Ethics in Science and Medicine 1 (Spring 1975), esp. 52–53.Google Scholar

33 I hope that I will not be misunderstood. This paper should not be viewed as a defence of role-playing or any other alternative methodology. Instances of role-playing have been cited as part of a case against a pair of a priori arguments in favour of the indispensability of deception in social psychology. By itself, this use is not sufficient to justify role-playing over alternative methodologies. Also I have not argued that deception experiments should be stopped without further ado. Rather, I have suggested that they should be halted if a justifying case cannot be produced that is better than those surveyed in this paper.

I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for assistance. I have enjoyed discussing some of the issues covered in this essay with Hugh Spencer. My thanks to Tom Murray, Diana Baumrind and Barry Allen for critical comments. Versions of this paper were read at the University of Prince Edward Island (May, 1981) and at The Fourteenth Trans-Disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine: An International Congress on the Use of Human Beings in Research, Tel Aviv University (September, 1982).