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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Relative Identity contains a sustained attack on the classical or absolute theory of identity and a defense of a non-classical or relative theory of identity. According to the absolute theory of identity each thing is identical with itself and with nothing other than itself. The fundamental principle of this theory is Leibniz' Law:
From (LL) a variety of characteristic principles about identity can be derived, including The Indiscernibility of Identicals, The Identity of Indiscernibles, and the symmetry, reflexivity, and transitivity of identity.
1 Typically, the ordered pair(i, 2) would be defined as a set of sets, e.g., as {(I),(I, 2)}. Given this, i and 2 are not, strictly speaking, members of the ordered pair〈 1, 2〉. I will overlook this point here since it seems irrelevant to Griffin's point and because he probably could define ‘member’ in a special way according to which I and 2 are members of 〈I,a〉.
2 See Fred Feldman, “Sortal Predicates”, Noûs 7,1973, 268–282.