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Neurotic Action*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
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Behaviour which is said to be motivated primarily or exclusively by unconscious desires and beliefs has created especially troublesome problems for action theorists. Those philosophers who have been captivated by the reason-cause, explanation description distinctions have tended to construe “neurotic” behaviour as something very much apart from “normal” behaviour, — something so different that neurotics, on such a theory, seem to be turned from actors or agents who do things into victims who are compelled by “causes” to “act” (to move?) in ways that are unconnected with their conscious mental lives. R. S. Peters argues, for example, that “Freud thought his explanations relevant only to phenomena which can hardly be called actions in that they seem either to have no point or conscious objective or to fall short of standards of correctness.” Peters takes the behaviour of a married man who suddenly makes an advance to a choir boy as illustrative: “It is because things seem to be happening to him that it is appropriate to ask what made, drove, or possessed him to do that. The appropriate answer in such cases is in terms of a causal theory.” So Freud, Peters has it, appeals to unconscious motivation only in cases where the purposive rule-following model breaks down. To behave neurotically, then, is not, on this interpretation, to act at all.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , September 1977 , pp. 411 - 424
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- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1977
References
1 The Concept of Motivation, (Routledge, London, 1958), p. 54Google Scholar.
2 Ibid., p. 10.
3 Free Action, (Routledge, London, 1961)Google Scholar.
4 The Unconscious, (Routledge, London, 1958)Google Scholar.
5 A Theory of Human Action, (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1970)Google Scholar.
6 Goldman argues that he is not committed to the untenable view that every “tiny” act (each of ten steps involved in getting from here to there, for example) is caused by an immediately preceding occurrent want. His account provides that a “basic act-token” (someone's getting from here to there) can be caused by a single occurrent want to get from here to there. “Since S's taking the ten steps was caused by an occurrent want of his, S's taking the third step was caused by that same occurrent want. This satisfles the requirement that all act-tokens be caused by occurrent wants” (p. 89).
7 It might be objected that for the shopper to pick out the desired item he somehow rní4St be “conscious of” or must “perceive” the item. If not. then why didn't he end up with yogurt or milk or nothing at all? As long as one avoids the temptation to identify “he” with a “conscious ego,” the objection is not a telling one. The shopper qua organism had to “distinguish” the right item, but it does not follow that the person was “conscious” of this, that he — as a Cartesian ego — picked it out. (The same argument is relevant not only to “perception” but also. of course, to the problem of thought and action in general.)
8 A Theory of Action, op. cit., Pp. 121–25.
9 Although this is the standard way of putting the matter, it can be less innocent than it sounds, for it tends to distort the issue by exaggerating the difference between conscious and unconscious motivation. Typically, unconscious wants do have phenomenological rnanifestations although they are disguised, distorted, attached to “substitute objects,” etc. To assume, as Goldman seems to, that unconscious wants differ in general from “normal” conscious ones in that the former are literally and totally not conscious, is to overdraw the distinction and leave the way open for the creation of two “kinds” of wanting. For a debate on this issue, cf.Fox, Michael, “On Unconscious Emotions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XXXIV (December, 1973), pp. 151–70, and my reply, “Unconscious and Disguised Emotions,” same Journal. March. 1976. pp. 403–IICrossRefGoogle Scholar.
10 A psychoanalytic account would understand the dissociative state as a “defense” which “allows” the agent to carry out the thievery without experiencing what might otherwise be an intolerable level of anxiety. “Bringing about” such a state would not, in any remotely straight-foward way, be an action since it is not anything that one can set out to accomplish. Yet it is still purposeful and reflects. as it is said, an unconscious intentionality; so, while it would presumably be misleading to say that it is the agents intention, there should be less reason to object to saying that it is the person's intention or, perhaps better, the organism's intention. In the psychoanalytic model, these “strategic ‘mental’ maneuvers” occupy a quasi-intentional middle-ground between conscious agency and purely “mechanistic” activity. In Freudian theory, these “mental acts” would be assigned to the “unconscious ego.” (This and closely related problems are discussed below, especially Pp. 14–18.)
11 Fetishists and other sex offenders characteristically do feel considerable guilt, and are often perfectly willing to accept responsibility even though they may say that they are “driven” to behave as they do by “alien” forces. This does not mean that it would be justified or rational to respond to them as one might respond to a nonneurotic offender, but it surely would not be rational (nor would it be just) to regard the neurotic offender as a mere victim, and thus, as less of a person than he really is. Nor does it mean that it would in all cases be rational for such an offender to accept responsibility. All that needs to be argued here is that it is sometimes rational for a clearly neurotic individual to accept responsibility for something he did neurotically.
12 There are good reasons for thinking that Freud's theory is best construed as a physicalistic theory, and thus as one which holds that unconscious processes are “real” and not mere explanatory “fictions.” It seems beyond serious doubt that Freud never gave up his belief that a “scientific psychology” based upon neurophysiology could, in time, be established. Solomon, R. C. in “Freud's NeuroIogical Theory of Mind,” in Freud: A Collection ofCritical Essays, Edited by Wollheim, R. (Anchor, New York, 1974), pp. 25–52, argues convincingly for this interpretation. He also defends the view that the language that stems from Freud's earliest attempt to work out a model of the mind (the Project for a Scientific Psychology) — roughly the “hydraulic” model and terms like “psychic energy,” “cathexis,” “discharge,” “resistance,” — can be seen to bridge the gap between purpose and mechanism, between psychology and neurophysiology. Finally, he suggests that the language of the model provides the beginnings of a solution to the underlying metaphysical problem since it approximates, at least in a rudimentary way, the “topic-neutrality” which is a requisite for mind-body materialists like J.J.C. Smart and othersGoogle Scholar.
13 That is, a model in which psychic events or processes cover the continuum from the deeply repressed to the fully and clearly conscious, where “most” of what is psychic is nonconscious, and where relevant consciousness is not a necessary condition for intentionality.
14 The commitment leads philosophers to conclude that Freud's notion of the unconscious results in consequences ranging from logical contradiction, unintel ligibility, or meaninglessness, to the more restrained notion that psychoanalytic concepts involve “linguistically deviant” or “stretched” uses of motive language. Sartre takes the hard line: “…the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person which means that I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived. Better yet I must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more care-fully — and this not at two different moments, which at a pinch would allow us to reestablish a semblance of duality — but in the unitary structure of a single project.” (Being and Nothingness, tr. by Barnes, Hazel, Philosophical Library, New York, 1956, p. 49.)Google Scholar Herbert Fingarette's apparently softened doctrine (Self-Deception, Routledge, London, 1969)Google Scholar suffers, in an interesting way, from a milder form of Cartesianism. According to Fingarette, what is “unconscious” is some-how really in consciousness but not, to use his metaphor, “spelled out”. The notion of spelling out is not a useless one, but it simply cannot adequately elucidate a variety of cases, especially those in which behaviour is motivated by deepiy repressed wishes and beliefs. (A person having doubts about this claim might try to analyze cases of reaction-formation using Fingarette's scheme.) Some other recent works which deal with psychoanalysis and which, in varing degrees, suffer from an identification of the self with a conscious ego are: Irving Thalberg, “Freud's Anatomies of the Self,” in Freud, : A CoÜecÜon of Critical Essays, Edited by Woolheim, R., op. cit., pp. 147–71;Google ScholarSiegler, F., “Unconscious Intentions,” inquiry, 10, No. 3, 1967, pp. 251–67;CrossRefGoogle ScholarShope, R., “Wish-Fulfilment and Meaning,” lnquiry, 10, No. 4, 1967, pp. 421–38;Google ScholarCioffi, F., “Wishes, Symp-toms and Action,” Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XLVIII, 1974, pp. 97–118;CrossRefGoogle ScholarFlew, A., “Motives and the Unconscious,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I, 1956, pp. 155–73;Google ScholarFox, M., “On Unconscious Emotions,” op. cit., pp. 151–70;Google ScholarAlexander, P., “Rational Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation,” Mind, 283, 1962, pp. 326–41Google Scholar.
15 The idea that behaviour that is really intentional must be accompanied by “relevant” consciousness, may be all the more difficult to fathom when it is pointed out that quite ordinary (“nonpsychoanalytic”) situations of intentional action needn`t involve the “occurence” of appropriate conscious wants and beliefs. The actions of those engaged in athletic contests may provide the most striking illustrations of the point. In a basketball game, player A, whose team leads by two points in the last seconds, intentionally fouls opponent B as the latter is driving for an open layup. A fouls B hard enough so that B cannot make the field goal, but not so grossly as to be called for an intentional foul. Such a call would result in B being awarded three chances to make two free throws. B is given two freethrowsand makes one of them. Time runs out and A's team wins by a point. Why did A act as he did? A knows that avoiding a foul will almost certainly result in a tie; fouling in such a way as to give B a reasonable chanceto make the goal will probably result in a tie (or a loss if a foul is called and B converts a “three-point play”). A also knows that B is only an average free throw shooter, and less than average in critical situations. Additionally, A knows that the referee closest to the play seldom calls intentional fouls, and almost never does so in touchy situations, especially in front of a hostile home crowd that has already demonstrated its unhappiness with his performance. A is parti-cularly interested in avoiding an overtime period, because two of the best defensive players on his team are on the verge of fouling out. As a result, they will have to play too cautiously in an extra period to be effective. A also knows that none of the players on B's team is in foul trouble. And so on! A's action was precisely the right one, but what occurred in his “consciousness”? Not much of anything, presumably. But A's action was fully intentional.
16 For a defense of Freud's notion of the “unconscious ego” and a discussion of the “intentionality” of the psychoanalytic conception of symptom formation, see my “Unconscious Cleverness: The Unconscious Ego,” Scienta, July-August, 1966, pp. 329–38, and “Psychoanalytic Explanation and Rationality,”Google Scholar“The Jourrnal of Phiiosophy,” Vol. LXVIII, No. 14, July, 1971, pp. 413–26Google Scholar.
17 “Moral Responsibility for the Content of Dreams,” Collected Papers, Vol. 5, 1959 (1925). pp. 154–57. Freud says: Must one assume responsibility for the content of one's dreams?…Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of one`s dreams. In what other way can one deal with them? unless the content of the dream… is inspired by alien spirits, it is a part of my own being. if I seek to classify the impulses that are present in me according to social standards into good and bad, I must assume responsibility for both sorts; and if, in defense. I say that what is repressed in me is not my ‘ego’, then I shall not be basing my position upon psychoanalysis, I shall not have accepted its conclusions and I shall perhaps be taught better by the criticisms of my fellowmen, by the disturbances in my actions and the confusion of my feelings. I shall perhaps learn that what I am repudiating not only ‘is’ in me but sometimes ‘acts’ from out of me as well (p. 156)Google Scholar.
18 Strawson, P. F., “Freedom and Resentment,” in Strawson's Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968, p. 96. Strawson's reference is to the “panicky metaphysics of libertarianism.”Google Scholar