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Names and Indefinite Descriptions in Ontological Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Jordan Howard Sobel
Jordan Howard Sobel
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Extract

So begins a recent ontological argument. But what if there are no most perfect beings? Letting God be one, that is, letting “God” name one at the very beginning seems premature. Clearly it is best to leave “God” out of the argument until one is in a position to introduce him by existential instantiation, or, by further argumentation, to identify him with a most perfect being: clearly it is best to leave “God” out of the argument until it has been established that there is a most perfect being.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , June 1983 , pp. 195 - 202
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1983

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