Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T04:41:26.702Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Moral Responsibility for Dreams

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 1965

Harvey Mullane
Harvey Mullane
Affiliation:
University of Cincinnati
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

If someone reports that he had been thinking that he would very much like to seduce his sister, an appropriate comment might be: “Shame on you for having such a nasty idea.” But if one reports that he dreamt he seduced his sister the situation appears quite different, for while we might be repulsed by the dream shaming seems, to say the least, far less appropriate.

We do not ordinarily, if ever, say things like, “It was bad (naughty, immoral, etc.) of you to dream that.” A child may be sent to bed without supper for saying that he hates his father, but not for reporting a dream which clearly expresses hate for his father.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , September 1965 , pp. 224 - 229
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1965

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 That is, correctly interpreted.

2 Freud, Sigmund, “Moral Responsibility for the Content of Dreams,” Collected Papers, Vol. V, p. 156.Google Scholar

3 There are some ticklish questions which could be sorted out here. To mention one, if a person is really blushing must it follow that he is really ashamed or embarrassed? Holding one's breath until one's face becomes flushed or standing on one's head could not, presumably, be cases of blushing, or for that matter, instances of one's pretending to blush. (Can one pretend to cough? See John Austin's “Pretending”, Philosophical Papers, p. 206.)

4 It would not be correct to say that “Approve of x!”, “Love thy neighbor!”, etc., can only refer to one's behavior, or that the “imperative element” in them can only refer to behavior. Of course, one's primary interest in saying to a child, “It is wrong to hate your sister” is very likely an interest in changing the child's behavior. But the feelings count for something over and above their possible behavioral consequences. If a child's hate for his sister makes him miserable, it is sensible to urge him to get rid of such feelings for this reason alone. “Everyone that looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart” emphasizes, in what might be an overbearing way, the importance of feelings.

5 Franz Kafka wrote not altogether paradoxically: “To lift oneself out of a miserable mood, even if you have to do it by a strength of will, should be easy. I force myself out of my chair, stride around the table, exercise my head and neck, make my eyes sparkle, tighten the muscles round them. I defy my feelings….”