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The Modest Account of Truth Reconsidered: With a Postscript on Metaphysical Categories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Wolfgang Künne
Wolfgang Künne*
Affiliation:
University of Hamburg
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Type
Book Symposium/Tribune du livre
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , Summer 2005 , pp. 563 - 596
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005

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