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Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 July 2015

ISHTIYAQUE HAJI
ISHTIYAQUE HAJI*
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

Many have thought that libertarian accounts of free action succumb to a problem about luck. Recently, it has been proposed that compatibilist accounts, which unlike libertarian ones, maintain that free action and determinism are compatible, are also vulnerable to a problem about luck. In this paper, I argue that the problem of compatibilist luck is not novel insofar as it is one manifestation of a more general concern to which compatibilists and libertarians have responded. Furthermore, these responses are not effective responses to the problem of libertarian luck.

Plusieurs ont soutenu par le passé que les descriptions libertariennes de l’action libre achoppent sur le problème de la chance. Il a récemment été proposé que les descriptions compatibilistes, selon lesquelles l’action libre et le déterminisme sont compatibles, sont affaiblies par un problème similaire. Dans cet article, je soutiens que le problème de la chance compatibiliste n’est pas nouveau, dans la mesure où il s’agit d’une manifestation d’une question plus générale à laquelle les compatibilistes et les libertariens ont répondu. En outre, j’avance que ces réponses ne constituent pas des solutions efficaces au problème de la chance envisagé du point de vue libertarien.

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Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 54 , Issue 4 , December 2015 , pp. 611 - 631
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Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2015 

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