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L’éthique de la vertu et le critère de l’action correcte

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2011

Martin Gibert  and
Mauro Rossi
Martin Gibert
Affiliation:
Université de Montréal
Mauro Rossi
Affiliation:
Université du Québec à Montréal
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Abstract

ABSTRACT : According to the most popular version of virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 1991; Zagzebsk,i 1996), the right action in a given situation is the action that a fully virtuous agent would do given the circumstances. However, this criterion raises two objections: in some situations, it does not determine the right action correctly, and in other situations, it does not determine any right action at all. In this article, we argue that these objections stem from either simple imaginative resistance or a question-begging stance. We propose thereby to modify the criterion in such a way as to exclude the character of the non-virtuous agent from the morally relevant circumstances. Finally, we examine the implications of our proposal for the issue of moral development.

RÉSUMÉ : Selon la version de l’éthique de la vertu la plus répandue (Hursthouse, 1991; Zagzebski, 1996), l’action moralement correcte dans des circonstances données est celle que ferait un agent pleinement vertueux dans ces circonstances. Ce critère soulève toutefois deux objections. Dans certaines situations, il donne des indications erronées, et dans d’autres situations, il ne donne pas d’indication du tout. Nous soutenons que ces objections sont en réalité le résultat soit d’une simple résistance imaginative, soit d’une pétition de principe. Nous proposons alors de modifier le critère en excluant le caractère de l’agent non vertueux des circonstances moralement pertinentes. Nous envisageons enfin les implications pour la question du développement moral.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 50 , Issue 2: Special Issue / Numéro spécial: Normativity: Epistemic, Mental and Moral Aspects / La Normativite : aspects epistemiques, mentaux et moraux , June 2011 , pp. 367 - 390
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2011

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References

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