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Les propositions invérifiables ont-elles un sens? Probabilité, action et signification chez Hans Reichenbach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Alexis Bienvenu
Alexis Bienvenu
Affiliation:
Université Paris I – Panthéon Sorbonne
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Abstract

Hans Reichenbach argued in Experience and Prediction (1938) that the theory of meaning defended by Logical Positivism, i.e., “strict verificationism,” failed to give a relevant criterion for cognitive meaningfulness. He replaces it with a wholly probabilistic criterion that allows us to establish a pragmatic connection between language and action. But serious difficulties arise in the justification of his theory. The aim of this article is to assess some of these difficulties and to indicate a way to solve them in a “reichenbachian” way.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , Winter 2006 , pp. 45 - 67
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2006

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References

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