Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t8hqh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T11:46:30.308Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

La théorie représentationnelle de la conscience phénoménale et le problème des apparences visuelles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2013

PAUL BERNIER
PAUL BERNIER*
Affiliation:
Université de Moncton
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

According to a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness (RTPC), the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is completely exhausted by its representational content. Some considerations suggested by Christopher Peacocke raise an important problem for the RTPC. In his recent book Consciousness, where he defends a version of the RTPC, Christopher Hill argues that to solve Peacocke’s problem, visual qualia must be identified with “visual appearances” understood as relational properties of external objects. I raise two problems for Hill’s solution and I suggest an alternative way of understanding visual qualia as visual appearances.

Selon la théorie représentationnelle de la conscience phénoménale (TRCP), le caractère phénoménal d’une expérience consciente serait épuisé par son contenu représentationnel. Certaines remarques de Christopher Peacocke soulèvent un problème majeur pour la TRCP. Dans son livre Consciousness, où il défend une version de la TRCP, Christopher Hill propose une solution à ce problème, selon laquelle les qualia visuels seraient des «apparences visuelles» conçues comme des propriétés relationnelles d’objets externes. Je soulève deux problèmes auxquels la solution de Hill doit faire face. Pour surmonter ces problèmes, je suggère une interprétation différente de l’idée selon laquelle les qualia visuels sont des apparences visuelles.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 1 - 23
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Références bibliographiques

Baldwin, Thomas 1992 «The Projective Theory of Sensory Content», dans Crane, Tim, dir., The Contents of Experience, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 177–195.Google Scholar
Boghossian, Paul et David Velleman, J. 1989 «Colour as a Secondary-Quality», Mind, vol. 98, p. 81–103.Google Scholar
Brentano, Franz 1973 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint [1874], trad. Rancurello, A. C., Terrell, D. B. et McAlister, L. L., Londres, Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Carruthers, Peter 2000 Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carruthers, Peter 2005 Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, David 1996 The Conscious Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dennett, Daniel C. 1991 Consciousness Explained, Boston (MA), Little, Brown & Co.Google Scholar
Dennett, Daniel C. 2005 Sweet Dreams. A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.Google Scholar
Dennett, Daniel C. 2008 De beaux rêves, trad. Pichevin, Claude, Paris, Éditions de l’éclat.Google Scholar
Dretske, Fred 1981 Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.Google Scholar
Dretske, Fred 1995 Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.Google Scholar
Dretske, Fred 2003 «Experience as Representation», Philosophical Issues, vol. 13, p. 67–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ducasse, C. J. 1942 «Moore’s ‘The Refutation of Idealism’», dans Arthur Schlipp, Paul, dir., The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Lasalle (IL), Open Court Publishing Co., p. 225–251.Google Scholar
Fodor, Jerry 1992 A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.Google Scholar
Godfrey-Smith, Peter 1994 «A Modern History Theory of Functions», Noûs, vol. 28, p. 344–362.Google Scholar
Harman, Gilbert 1997 «The Intrinsic Quality of Experience» [1990], dans Block, Ned, Flanagan, Owen J. et Güzeldere, Güven, dir., The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, p. 663–675.Google Scholar
Hill, Christopher 1991 Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hill, Christopher 2009 Consciousness, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Horgan, Terence, Tienson, John et Graham, George 2006 «Internal-world Skepticism and the Self-presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness», dans Kriegel, Uriah et Williford, Kenneth, dir., Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, p. 41–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, Frank 1982 «Epiphenomenal Qualia», Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 32, p. 127–136.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, Jaegwon 2006 Philosophy of Mind, 2ème édition, Cambridge (MA), Westview Press.Google Scholar
Kriegel, Uriah 2009 Subjective Consciousness, Oxford, Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, Saul 1977 «Identity and Necessity», dans Schwartz, Stephen P., dir., Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Ithaca (NY), Cornell University Press, p. 66–101.Google Scholar
Levine, Joseph 1983 «Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap», Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 64, p. 354–361.Google Scholar
Lycan, William 1996 Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.Google Scholar
McDowell, John 1982 «Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge», Proceedings of the British Academy, p. 455–479.Google Scholar
McGinn, Colin 1991 The Problem of Consciousness, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
McGinn, Colin 2004 Consciousness and Its Objects, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McLaughlin, Brian 2003 «Colour, Consciousness, and Colour Consciousness», dans Smith, Quentin et Jokic, Aleksandar, dir., Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 97–156.Google Scholar
McLaughlin, Brian 2007 «Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness», dans Velmans, Max et Schneider, Susan, dir., The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 431–444.Google Scholar
Millikan, Ruth 1984 Language, Thought, and Other Bilogical Categories, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.Google Scholar
Nagel, Thomas 1974 «What is it Like to Be a Bat?», Philosophical Review, vol. 83, p. 435–450.Google Scholar
Papineau, David 1987 Reality and Representation, Oxford, Blackwell.Google Scholar
Peacocke, Christopher 1983 Sense and Content, Oxford, The Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Peacocke, Christopher 1997 Sense and Content [réédition partielle], dans Block, Ned, Flanagan, Owen J. et Güzeldere, Güven, dir., The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, p. 341–354.Google Scholar
Rosenthal, David 1997 «A Theory of Consciousness», dans Block, Ned, Flanagan, Owen J. et Güzeldere, Güven, dir., The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, p. 729–754.Google Scholar
Rosenthal, David 2005 Consciousness and Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rowlands, Mark 2001 The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand 1912 The Problems of Philosophy, Londres, Williams and Norgate.Google Scholar
Seager, William 1999 Theories of Consciousness, Londres, Routledge.Google Scholar
Seager, William et Bourget, David 2007 «Representationalism about Consciousness», dans Velmans, Max et Schneider, Susan, dir., The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 261–276.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, Sydney 1975 «Functionalism and Qualia», Philosophical Studies, vol. 27, p. 291–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, Sydney 1990 «Qualities and Qualia: What’s in the Mind?», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 1, supplément, p. 109–131.Google Scholar
Smart, J. J. C. 1959 «Sensations and Brain Processes», Philosophical Review, vol. 68, p. 141–156.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, Robert 1984 Inquiry, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.Google Scholar
Stampe, Dennis 1977 «Towards a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation», Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 42–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tye, Michael 1995 Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.Google Scholar
Tye, Michael 2000 Consciousness, Color and Content, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.Google Scholar
Robert, Van Gullick 2006 «Mirror Mirror — Is that All?», dans Kriegel, Uriah et Williford, Kenneth, dir., Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, p. 11–39.Google Scholar
Wright, Wayne 2003 «Projectivist Representationalism and Color», Philosophical Psychology, vol. 16, p. 515–533.CrossRefGoogle Scholar