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À la rescousse du platonisme moral*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Christine Tappolet
Christine Tappolet
Affiliation:
Université de Montréal
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Abstract

Moral platonism, the claim that moral entities are both objective and prescriptive, is generally thought to be a dead end. In an attempt to defend a moderate form of moral platonism or more precisely platonism about values, I first argue that several of the many versions of this doctrine are not committed to ontological extravagances. I then discuss an important objection due to John McDowell and developed by Michael Smith, according to which moral platonism is incoherent. I argue that objectivism is compatible with the claim that certain ways of being aware of values, namely those involving emotions, are motivating.

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Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 39 , Issue 3 , Summer 2000 , pp. 531 - 556
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2000

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