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La conception disjonctive de l’expérience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2009

Patrice Philie
Patrice Philie*
Affiliation:
Université d’Ottawa
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: The traditional conception of experience — also known as the causal conception — has been criticised in the last thirty years or so by proponents of the disjunctive conception. This article examines an argument recently put forward by John McDowell in support of disjunctivism. Broadly speaking, his argument can be seen as an attempt to show that, unlike the disjunctive conception, the traditional conception cannot account for a crucial aspect of experience. I aim here to show that McDowell’s argument — which is of a transcendental kind — does not have sufficient resources to achieve its intended goal.

RÉSUMÉ : La conception traditionnelle de l’expérience — aussi nommée conception causale de l’expérience — a vu sa prédominance menacée depuis une trentaine d’année avec l’arrivée de la conception disjonctive de l’expérience. Le présent article porte sur un argument récemment proposé par John McDowell en faveur du disjonctivisme. De façon très générale, son argument peut être caractérisé comme une tentative de montrer que la conception traditionnelle est incapable de rendre compte d’un certain aspect de l’expérience, contrairement à la conception disjonctive. J’aimerais dans cet article suggérer que l’argument de McDowell — de facture transcendantale — n’a pas les ressources suffisantes pour atteindre son but.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 48 , Issue 3 , September 2009 , pp. 539 - 556
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2009

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References

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