Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rdxmf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-29T17:13:53.163Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Knowledge and Reflexivity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Douglas Odegard
Douglas Odegard
Affiliation:
University of Guelph
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

On First view there seem to be many possible instances of knowers who lack knowledge of their knowledge. A self-deceiver seems capable of knowing his own faults without knowing that he knows them. A philosopher seems capable of knowing that there are physical objects around him without knowing that he has such knowledge. Deep-rooted insecurity seems capable of preventing a mathematician from knowing that he has just made a genuine discovery. A child seems capable of acquiring knowledge before acquiring the concept ‘knowledge’ and hence before being able to know that he knows.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , June 1976 , pp. 226 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1976

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Radford, Colin, “Knowledge — by examples”, Analysis 27 (1966–7), 1–11Google Scholar; Arthur C. Danto, “On knowing that we know”, and Lemmon, E. J., “If I know, do I know that I know?”, in Epistemology (ed.) Stroll, Avrum (New York, Harper & Row: 1967)Google Scholar; Annis, David, “A note on Lehrer's proof that knowledge entails belief”, Analysis 29 (1968–9), 207–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 See David Rynin, “Knowledge, sensation and certainty”, in Epistemology.

3 See Lehrer, , Knowledge (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1974), pp. 69–71.Google Scholar

4 See Lehrer, Knowledge, pp. 71–2. I've altered the case from one in which the philosopher denies knowledge to one in which he simply disclaims knowing that he knows without disclaiming that he knows. The case Lehrer considers is easier for him to cope with, but he has to come to grips with the one I describe as well.

5 See Lehrer, Knowledge, pp. 61–9, 72–4.

6 See Lehrer, Knowledge, pp. 231–2. Other principles in the book which, if correct, would support the reflexivity of knowledge depend for their support on the arguments I've considered here. See his doxastic and justification iteration principles on pp. 229–30.

7 See Hilpinen, , “Knowing that one knows and the classical definition of knowledge”, Synthese, 21 (1970), 109–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 See Ginet, , “What must be added to knowing to obtain knowing that one knows?”, Synthese, 21 (1970), 163–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 See Ginet, op. cit., pp. 171–80.

10 See Hintikka, , “‘Knowing that one knows’ reviewed”, Synthese 21 (1970), 141–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also his earlier Knowledge and Belief (Ithaca, Cornell UP: 1962), pp. 103–25.Google Scholar

11 Popper, Compare Karl, Objective Knowledge (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1972), pp. 79–80, 97.Google Scholar

12 Malcolm, , “Knowledge and belief”, in his Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall: 1963), pp. 67–8Google Scholar; originally in Mind, 61 (1952).