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Is Charles Taylor (Still) a Weak Ontologist?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2017

MICHIEL MEIJER*
Affiliation:
University of Antwerp

Abstract

In this paper, I critically discuss Charles Taylor’s employment of the concept of ontology by shining a spotlight on a shift in emphasis from an anthropocentric to a non-anthropocentric viewpoint in his more recent writings on ontology. I also argue that Stephen White’s characterization of Taylor’s ‘weak’ ontology, while revealing, only partly explains Taylor’s position, as White’s interpretation leaves no room for the metaphysical thrust in Taylor’s thought. Drawing attention to a Taylor left out of White’s Taylor, I ultimately seek to show why Taylor’s distinctive mode of argumentation is not consonant with White’s weak-ontological approach.

Dans cet article, j’aborde la question de la notion d’ontologie chez Charles Taylor. Je constate, dans un premier temps, l’abandon par Taylor du point de vue anthropocentrique, ainsi que l’adoption d’une perspective non-anthropocentrique. Je remets ensuite en question l’interprétation de Stephen White, en insistant sur le fait qu’elle ne parvient pas à mettre en valeur l’inspiration métaphysique de la pensée de Taylor. J’estime, en conclusion, que Taylor s’appuie fondamentalement sur un mode d’argumentation métaphysique qui est sous-estimé lorsqu’on le présente comme un «ontologiste “faible”».

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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