1 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 20.Google Scholar

2 Ibid., p. 19.

3 Ibid., p. 47.

4 Ibid.

5 Rawls, John, “The Independence of Moral Theory,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48 (1974–75): 8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47–48.

7 Ibid., p. 20.

8 Ibid., pp. 20–21, emphasis added.

9 Ibid., p. 21.

10 Phrases such as “the justification of moral beliefs” or “justified belief” are ambiguous with respect to the distinction between knowledge and belief. There is a difference between showing that one is justified in believing in something—which just tells us something about our belief—and showing that we have moral knowledge—that is, that what one is justified in believing is true. There is no shortage of moral beliefs; they are a dime a dozen. Unfortunately, few are self-evidently true. Hence, if a moral theory or methodology is to be anything more than an empty intellectual exercise, it must enable us to distinguish between our true and false moral beliefs. But this is exactly; what Rawls's model does not enable us to do. Indeed, as he himself admits, I “the most we can do,” following his methodology, “is to study the … [moral theories] known to us through the tradition of moral philosophy” (ibid., p. 49). But such a study only reconfirms what we already know, namely, that these traditional moral theories, each in their own way, fail to provide an adequate account of the moral knowledge we have. Studying failure, moreover, is, in itself, insufficient to overcome it. More is needed, and Rawls's model does not supply it.

11 One wishes moral theorists would be as impressed with success as they are with failure. Seeing nothing but failure, they conclude that success is impossible, forgetting that our successes are what make it possible to recognize failure when it occurs. Had they been so inclined, they might have recognized that moral scepticism is only intelligible against the background of moral knowledge; that while our moral fallibility raises the spectre of scepticism, it is our moral knowledge that makes it possible; and, more important, that the scepticism it makes possible is not the wholesale scepticism that Rawls's model entails but a moderate scepticism that reflects and compliments our knowledge instead of denying it (cf. note 18 below). For sceptical arguments to the contrary, and discussions thereof, see Pojman, Louis P., The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1993)Google Scholar, and Lehrer, Keith, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).Google Scholar

12 Rawls, “The Independence of Moral Theory,” p. 9.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., pp. 9–10.

15 Ibid., p. 8.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 10.

18 No doubt a thoroughgoing sceptic would embrace the sceptical consequences of Rawls's model as confirmation of his scepticism, and be unmoved by my rejection of his systemic scepticism. But then, this is neither surprising nor worrisome, for nothing would suffice to do the trick, for “there is no way of refuting the committed sceptic who is determined to follow the implications of his doctrine ‘to the bitter end’” (Rescher, Nicholas, Scepticism: A Critical Appraisal [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980], p. 8Google Scholar. See also note 20 below). Although different, the arguments of Moore and Wittgenstein are pointed reminders of the irrational pitfalls involved in succumbing to this kind of indiscriminate scepticism (see Moore, G. E., “A Defence of Common Sense,” in Contemporary British Philosophy, edited by Muirhead, J. H., 2nd series [London: Allen and Unwin, 1925], pp. 193–223Google Scholar, and Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, edited by Anscomb, G. E. M. and von Wright, G. H., translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscomb [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969], Section 74 and, more generally, Sections 80, 110, and 204)Google Scholar. My critical stance in the text reflects their general orientation, and is directed toward furthering the view that “scepticism incurs grave sanctions on both the cognitive and practical side, exacting a price that is too high to pay” (Rescher, Scepticism, p. 9).

19 There is a difference between solving an issue and getting those who find themselves on the wrong side of an issue to accept the fallaciousness of their belief. The continuing refusal on the part of some to acknowledge the untenability of their beliefs is not a warrant for scepticism about the point at issue, but proof of the existence of fanatics and others who are beyond the pale of rational discourse and in need of non-cognitive therapy. Proof is not persuasion, nor is persuasion proof, as witness those who have succumbed to the persuasive rhetoric of various forms of fanaticism.

20 Noble, Cheryl, “Normative Ethical Theories,” in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, edited by Clarke, Stanley G. and Simpson, Evan (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 61.Google Scholar

21 On whether there are irresolvable disputes, and, if so, whether this discredits ethical absolutism and confirms some form of ethical relativism, see DeCrew, Judith Wagner, “Moral Conflicts and Ethical Relativism,” Ethics, 101, 1 (October 1990): 27–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22 Quine, W. V., From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed., rev. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 43.Google Scholar

23 The question of whether consistency functions as an objective test of a theory's adequacy in comparison to its competitors, and, if not, whether the choice between competing theories is ultimately a matter of subjective individual preferences has been staple fare among philosophers of science ever since Kuhn propounded his theory of the structure of scientific revolutions. For a brief overview of attempts by Lakatos, Laudan, and others to circumvent the alleged relativistic and sceptical implication of Kuhn's theory see Riggs, Peter J., Whys & Ways of Science (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

24 An anonymous referee does not think it obvious that Rawls is arguing: “Any moral judgement may be defeasible and, hence, be mistaken. Therefore, every moral judgement may be defeasible and, hence, be mistaken.” If Rawls is not arguing this way—if, instead, he is interpreted as acknowledging that, even though every moral judgement may be defeasible, and hence be mistaken, not every moral judgement is mistaken, thereby conceding that some moral judgements are known to be true, as distinct from being believed to be true—then the rationale for starting with “considered judgements” rather than with known moral truths is undercut. Why begin the process of reflective equilibrium with “considered judgements”—i.e., with judgements that we believe but do not know to be true—when we already have at our disposal moral judgements which we know to be true? The absurdity involved in denying the latter—as Singer, for one, suggests we do—is illustrated in the text below.

25 Nielsen, Kai, “Relativism and Wide Equilibrium,” The Monist, 76, 3 (July 1993): 327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 Ibid., p. 322.

27 Ibid., pp. 317–18.

28 Ibid., p. 326.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., emphasis added.

32 Holmgren, Margaret, “The Wide and Narrow of Reflective Equilibrium,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19, 1 (March 1989): 43–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33 Ibid., p. 53.

34 Ibid., p. 54.

35 Jonathan Dancy attempts to circumvent the moral scepticism that haunts the accounts of Rawls and Nielsen by encapsulating the give-and-take of the process of reflective equilibrium within the framework of internally consistent and coherent moral narratives (Dancy, Jonathan, Moral Reasons [Oxford: Blackwell, 1993], pp. 112–13, 161–63)Google Scholar. But, as others have pointed out, there is nothing in the account Dancy gives that enables one to distinguish between true and false narratives and avoid moral scepticism (see, for example, Tannsjo, Torbjorn, “In Defence of Moral Theory,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25, 4 [December 1995]: 584–86)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I agree with Dancy that the justification of our moral judgements in particular cases is, in the last analysis, epistemically independent of moral principles—particularism—in contrast to generalists who think, like Rawls, Nielsen, and Tannsjo above, that moral principles, as traditionally conceived, are a necessary epistemic ingredient in the search for, and in the acquisition of, moral knowledge.

I disagree with Dancy's version of particularism insofar as he shares with Rawls and Nielsen their refusal to acknowledge the moral knowledge we have, on the grounds that if we are to make sense of common-sense morality, we have to begin at the beginning with a blank slate. But, as I argue in the text, one can no more generate moral knowledge out of the moral ignorance that lies at the heart of Rawls's model than one can squeeze blood out of a stone.

36 Rawls, “The Independence of Moral Theory,” p. 7.

37 But this overestimates the impartiality of ignorance, feigned or otherwise. Ignorance is, indeed, bliss for those who are blissfully ignorant, but this makes them no more unbiased than it makes them wise.

38 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 136–42.

39 See R. W. Krutzen, “A Caring Theory of Justice” (unpublished manuscript), in which I expound and defend a practicable caring ethics of justice that gives the lie to the claim that we have to choose between two allegedly irreconcilable and competing ethical theories, namely, an ethics of justice or an ethics of care (cf. Kittay, Eva Feder and Meyers, Diana T., eds., Women and Moral Theory [Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987])Google Scholar. In the course of doing so, I argue no moral theory is more reasonable than the morality of common sense with its variant integration of thought and emotion.

40 The unwelcome discomfiture that accompanies attempts to circumvent the judgement of our emotions is illustrated in the text below in the discussion of J. J. C. Smart's rejection of a common counterexample to utilitarianism.

41 Rawls, “The Independence of Moral Theory,” p. 7.

42 Ibid., p. 10.

43 Nielsen, , “Relativism and Wide Reflective Equilibrium,” The Monist, 76, 3 (July 1993): 327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

44 An anonymous referee questioned whether even acts of incestuous rape or the torturing of babies for fun can be rightfully categorically condemned, given that “with only a little ingenuity and a touch of consequentialism, one can describe scenarios in which both of these normally wrong actions are, at least arguably, right.” Certainly, this can be done, but whether it is to the point is, to put it mildly, questionable. Suffice it to say, Quine's observation, noted above (note 22), is, with a slight emendation, equally to the point in the present context, namely, that any moral judgement can be held to be false, “come what may, if we make drastic enough changes elsewhere in the system.” Moreover, doing so creates more problems than it solves, for, as Wittgenstein pointed out, “if you imagine certain facts otherwise, describe them otherwise, than the way they are, then you can no longer imagine the application of certain concepts, because the rules for their application have no analogue in the new circumstances” (Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Zettel, 2nd ed., translated by Anscombe, G. E. M. [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981], Section 350, p. 63).Google Scholar

45 Nielsen, Kai, “Methods of Ethics: Wide Reflective Equilibrium and a Kind of Consequentialism,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 25, 2 (Fall 1994): 58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

46 Ibid., p. 57.

47 Ibid.

48 Singer, Peter, “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” The Monist, 58, 3 (July 1974): 516.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

49 Singer, Peter, “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 9, 4 (Fall 1980): 327.Google Scholar

50 Ibid., p. 326.

51 Singer, , “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” p. 517.Google Scholar

52 Ibid., p. 516.

53 Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1981), p. 373.Google Scholar

54 Ibid., p. 379.

55 Ibid., p. 380.

56 Ibid., pp. 378–79.

57 Ibid., p. 379, emphasis added.

58 Ibid., p. 380.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., pp. 378–79.

61 Ibid., p. 380.

62 The traditional view has not been without critics. For an unduly ignored but incisive critique see Schneewind, J. B., “Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles,” in Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy, edited by Hauerwas, Stanley and MacIntyre, Alasdair (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 113–26Google Scholar. For recent variations of Schneewind's critique in the context of bioethics, see Green, Ronald M., “Method in Bioethics: A Troubled Assessment,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 15, 2 (April 1990): 179–98CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed, and K. Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert, “A Critique of Principlism,” in ibid., pp. 219–36.

63 Slippery-slope arguments are notoriously slippery arguments, never more so than when they are used to rhetorically persuade us of the necessity of exceptionless principles on the grounds that we do not have the needed moral smarts to distinguish among cases. They mistake fallibility for incompetence. Slipperyslope arguments to this effect are strewn with abandon throughout the abortion and euthanasia literature.

64 Some have attempted to defuse the import of proffered exceptions by writing them off as signifying nothing more than that an error of reasoning has occurred, or that the scope, domain, or content of the principle has been misunderstood or misinterpreted. See, for example, O'Neill, Onora, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

65 Ibid., p. 379. O'Neill, a contemporary member of this long line of moralists, argues that, contrary to what critics have claimed, “universal principles are not empty; they do not prescribe rigidly uniform action or neglect of differences between cases; they do not dominate those who act on them; they do not undercut the importance of judgement” (ibid., p. 4). Her argument, however, is a book-length red herring. She confuses the moral axioms that define the moral point of view, that define the practice of morality, that give it its framework, with substantive moral principles within the practice. She defends the former against criticisms that critics have levelled against the latter—a classic case of arguing at cross-purposes.

Critics of the principled approach to the acquisition of moral knowledge are not disputing the fact that “the moral point of view” is a prerequisite for moral knowledge, that it is “the framework both for judgements of appraisal and for productive judgements” (ibid., p. 181), nor are they disputing the truth or falsity of the moral truism, “Do good and avoid evil.” What they are disputing is the widely held view that what is good and what is evil is a matter of principle. In opposition to the critics, O'Neill argues that their claim that such principles “take on independent life and then use or control us” is an “aberrant fantasy” (p. 82). Apparently, the papal encyclicals with their principled categorical condemnation of contraception, abortion, sterilization, and euthanasia are not on her reading list.

O'Neill's thesis that practical moral reasoning is dependent upon “the moral point of view is trivial in the same sense in which the thesis that being rational depends upon being able to think is trivial. It is a truism that, to be rational, one has to be capable of thought, but this does not help to determine when one is or is not thinking rationally. Disputes about rational thought are about the latter problem, not the former. Similarly, it is a truism that, to reason morally, one has to be capable of taking a moral point of view, but this does not help to determine when one's moral reasoning is correct or not. Moral disputes are about the latter, not the former.

What is neither trivial nor fantasy is the control moral theorists in the grip of their theories wish to exercise over moral practice.

66 These insights of common moral sense are at the heart of John Wisdom's comment that “examples are the food of thought,” and that “at the bar of reason, always the final appeal is to cases” (Wisdom, John, Paradox and Discovery [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965], p. 102, emphasis added).Google Scholar

67 A particularly striking illustration of the unfortunate consequences of the predominance of principled arguments that lack both intellectual merit and genuine compassion surfaced recently in the Canadian debate over nonvoluntary active euthanasia involving Robert Latimer and his twelve-year-old daughter, Tracy, who suffered from a severe case of cerebral palsy. See Krutzen, R. W., “The Case of Robert and Tracy Latimer,” in Ethical Issues: Perspectives for Canadians, 2nd ed., edited by Soifer, Eldon (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 1997), pp. 454–66.Google Scholar

68 McCloskey, H. J., “A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment,” Inquiry, 8 (1965): 256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

69 Singer's use of this line of argument is critically discussed below.

70 Sprigge, T. L. S., “A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey,” Inquiry, 8 (1965): 270.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

71 Palmer, Richard D. Jr., and Lucey, Kenneth G., “Misguided Criticism of Utilitarianism,” Teaching Philosophy, 15, 1 (March 1992): 63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

72 Ibid., p. 65.

73 Ibid. The same point was made by Sprigge, “A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey,” p. 274.

74 If, in the unlikely case it should happen that there is a conflict between a nonutilitarian moral judgement and a moral judgement that a utilitarian would make, this would not necessarily mean that the former judgement was correct and the latter false, nor would it mean that the opposite was the case. Instead, it might indicate that there are cases in which conflicting judgements were equally morally justified, and that, contrary to what one might think, there is no one and only one correct answer, utilitarian or otherwise. See DeCrew, “Moral Conflicts and Ethical Relativism,” p. 41.

75 Singer, for one, has an answer, and his answer, along with his wholesale rejection of our ordinary moral judgements in favour of utilitarian-based moral judgements, is critically discussed below.

76 Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, Bernard, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 71CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As Smart sees it, we are faced with a dilemma: we can either choose to unjustly punish an innocent Negro and thereby stop the riots and lynchings, or we can choose to do no such thing, in which case the riots and lynchings will continue and the lives of possibly hundreds of people will come to a brutal end. For Smart, the former is the lesser of two evils and, hence, the morally preferred choice.

The dilemma, however, is a false one, for it rests on a questionable notion of moral accountability. The plausibility of Smart's choice rests on the implicit supposition that, if we do not punish the innocent Negro, then we are morally responsible for all those who would die if the riots continue. But this is, to say the least, a strained interpretation of moral responsibility. If a person deliberately executes another whom he knows to be innocent, then, clearly, he is morally responsible for the latter's death. There is, however, no similar hands-on sense in which a visitor to a racially strife-torn area can be said to be “the cause of,” and, hence, be held morally accountable for, the suffering and deaths of innocent Negroes in riots instigated by white supremacists. The notion that an outsider is responsible for the evil acts of the white supremacists, that the extent to which he fails to stop their murdering rampage, that to that extent he is as guilty as they are for their morally reprehensible actions, is as ludicrous as the religious idiocy that all of humanity deserves to be punished for the sins of a mythical Adam and Eve.

77 Smart is not alone in attempting to salvage utilitarianism from common sense in this way. Sprigge, for example, maintains that, “even if in theory utilitarianism can dictate the rightness of punishing an innocent man, it would not have to describe it as just” (Sprigge, “A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey,” p. 270). His answer to the query, “Why not?” is that a utilitarian can always claim that the terms “just” and “unjust” “sometimes [conveniently!] have a less than utilitarian character in ordinary usage” (ibid., p. 269). In ordinary parlance, what this translates into is that sometimes [conveniently!] what is just is really unjust, that sometimes it really is all right to do wrong, and that refutations of utilitarianism are, thus, not refutations of utilitarianism at all, but a demonstration that some people are not utilitarians.

78 Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, p. 42.

79 Ibid., p. 68.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., pp. 68–69.

82 Ibid., p. 69.

83 Ibid.

84 Smart, J. J. C., “Integrity and Squeamishness,” in Utilitarianism and Its Critics, edited by Glover, Jonathan (New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 172, emphasis added.Google Scholar

85 The vaunted impartiality that supposedly lies at the heart of the sentiment of generalized benevolence, and that allegedly frees it from the fears of dogmatism that generalists invariably associate with specific moral judgements in virtue of their specificity, is overrated. One need only reflect on the generalized benevolence characteristic of the bureaucratic mindset of all those who are prepared to sacrifice persons for principle, employees for efficiency, citizens for the state, workers for the economy, individuals for the market, and so on. What their disdain for the particular ignores is that it is persons who bleed, not humanity; it is employees who suffer, not efficiency; it is citizens who die, not the state; it is individuals who starve, not markets. The blood of humanity, the death of the state, starving markets, and a suffering efficiency are a misleading deification of abstractions that falsely serve to humanize lifeless concepts in a delusory attempt to justify our inhumanity to one another.

86 Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, p. 69.

87 Smart, “Integrity and Squeamishness,” p. 172.

88 Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, p. 69.

89 Ibid., p. 68.

90 Ibid., p. 58.

91 Ibid., p. 56.

92 Bernard Williams has argued, in cases such as the one under consideration, that the utilitarian's unswerving commitment to the principle of utility reflects a “lack of integrity” (ibid., pp. 97–104). Smart argues just the opposite: it is precisely when the utilitarian acts in accordance with the principle of utility, come what may, that he is acting with genuine integrity. As he puts it, “To be solicitous for one's own integrity when it conflicts with the general good would be thought by the utilitarian to be too self-regarding” (Smart, “Integrity and Squeamishness,” p. 172). Smart's mistake, as I argue in the text, is the common one of thinking that a person of integrity is necessarily a person of principle. Hence, the one-sided refrain: “to be moral is to be rational, and to be rational is to be a person of principle.”

I do not wish to deny that there are cases—so-called “hard cases”—in which it is difficult to balance the good of an individual with that of society. What I dispute is the claim that some general moral principle of the sort favoured by generalists is needed to solve hard cases. Moral principles, for reasons mentioned above, are either too general (and, hence, axiomatic) or, alternatively, too specific to solve such cases. Reliance on either kind of principle serves only to make hard cases harder than they need be. For an unprincipled critique and resolution of a misguided principled condemnation of an act of involuntary, active euthanasia, see Krutzen, “The Case of Robert and Tracy Latimer.”

93 Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, p. 71.

94 Smart, “Integrity and Squeamishness,” p. 172.

95 I have elsewhere (see note 39 above) criticized the view that underlies much of moral philosophy, and which Smart, to his credit, makes explicit, namely, that from a theoretical point of view, feelings are a liability, a weakness, not a strength, and that they ought to discounted, not valued; repressed, not acknowledged; shunned, not embraced; ignored, not lauded. See also notes 67 and 92 above.

96 Singer, “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” p. 507.

97 Ibid., p. 517.

98 The worry about begging the question only arises if there is a question to be begged, but there is no question to be begged if one begins with the moral knowledge we actually have instead of the blank slate these theorists pretend is all we have.

99 Ibid., p. 516.

100 Ibid., p. 507.

101 Sprigge, for example, notes with approval Sidgwick's admission that “the utilitarian cannot altogether scoff at moral intuitions, since the principle of utility can only be defended as one” (Sprigge, “A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey,” p. 270). Singer makes a similar acknowledgement, but denies (mistakenly, I argue below) that this undermines the claims made by utilitarians on behalf of their theory (Singer, “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” pp. 514–15).

102 Ibid., p. 514.

103 Ibid., pp. 493 and 494, respectively.

104 Ibid., p. 494.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid. Without some further detailed explanation on Singer's part about what he means by “objective validity,” his complaint about the lack thereof rings hollow.

107 Ibid., pp. 494–95. No doubt if the world and the beings in it were different, the facts would be different, and morality, if there still were such a thing, might well be sufficiently different to be beyond recognition, but that is not the world we live in. See note 44.

108 Ibid., p. 516.

109 Gass, William H., “The Case of the Obliging Stranger,” The Philosophical Review, 68 (1957): 193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid., p. 197, emphasis added.

112 Ibid., p. 198.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Singer, “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” p. 508.

116 Ibid., p. 516, emphasis added.

117 Ibid.

118 Smart's and Singer's attitude toward common-sense morality is like that of the art collector who, rather than admit that he has been hoodwinked and left with a forged painting, steadfastly maintains that the forgery in his possession is better than the original. Unwilling to part with the forgery, he rejects the genuine article on the grounds that it does not match the forgery. The fact that, in the art world, the collector would be dismissed as an incompetent but harmless eccentric, while in moral philosophy his counterpart is taken seriously, explains in large part why much of moral philosophy is generally ignored by those in the moral trenches. For two telling examples see the letters by Paulshock, Bernadine Z., M.D., , and Clements, Collen D., in The Hastings Centre Report, 13, 1 (February 1983): 34–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar