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Holisme et homophonie*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Madeleine Arseneault  and
Robert Stainton
Madeleine Arseneault
Affiliation:
Carleton University
Robert Stainton
Affiliation:
Carleton University
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Abstract

We believe that, granting radical holism, a homophonie (or disquotational) definition of truth for a language achieves no progress towards guaranteeing the material equivalence of the left- and right-hand-side sentences for T-sentences. In order to avoid paradoxes such as the antinomy of the liar, Tarski requires that the metalanguage be semantically richer than the object language. For a radical holist, the difference in semantic powers of the meta- and object languages means that homophony is no guarantee of synonymy; therefore, worries about the indeterminacy of translation still apply.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 39 , Issue 1 , Winter 2000 , pp. 123 - 128
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2000

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References

Notes

1 Fodor, Jerry et Lepore, Ernest, Holism : A Shopper's Guide, Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 1992. Voir surtout le chapitre 1.Google Scholar

2 Tarski, Alfred, «The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics», dans Heimir Geirsson et Michael Losonsky, dir., Readings in Language and Mind, Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 1996, p. 36–64.Google Scholar

3 Nous ne sommes pas les premiers à noter que le pouvoir expressif supplémentaire de la métalangue soulève des problèmes pour Davidson. Voir, par exemple, Bar-On, Dorit, «Conceptual Relativism and Translation», dans Gerhard Preyer et al., dir., Language, Mind and Epistemology : On Donald Davidson's Philosophy, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers (Synthese Library, vol. 241), 1994, p. 161–162Google Scholar. Nous désirons remercier un lecteur anonyme de Dialogue d'avoir porté ce passage à notre attention.