1 Dove, Kenley, “Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy,” in Method and Speculation in Hegel's Phenomenology, edited by Westphal, Merold (New Jersey and Sussex: Humanities/Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 28–29, 31–32Google Scholar; Maker, William, “Hegel's Phenomenology as Introduction to Science,” Clio, 10, 4 (Summer, 1981): 381–97Google Scholar; Maker, William, “Does Hegel Have a ‘Dialectical Method’?” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 20 (1982): 80–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Maker, William, “Reason and the Problem of Modernity,” The Philosophical Forum, 18, 4 (Summer 1987): 286–90Google Scholar; Maker, William, “Beginning,” in Essays on Hegel's Logic, edited by di Giovanni, George (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), pp. 27–43, especially 38–39Google Scholar; Maker, William, “Hegel's Blasphemy?” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 9, 1 (January 1992): 71–72Google Scholar; revised versions of these appear in Philosophy without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994)Google Scholar, and Winfield, Richard Dien, Overcoming Foundations: Studies in Systematic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), especially pp. 16–32, 101–105.Google Scholar

2 Stern, David, “The Immanence of Thought: Hegel's Critique of Foundationalism,” The Owl of Minerva, 22, 1 (Fall 1990): 19–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Houlgate, Stephen, “Thought and Being in Kant and Hegel,” The Owl of Minerva, 22, 2 (Spring 1991): 131–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Houlgate, Stephen, “A Reply to Joseph C. Flay's ‘Hegel's Metaphysics,’” The Owl of Minerva, 24, 2 (Spring 1993): 153–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Houlgate, Stephen, “Hegel and Fichte: Recognition, Otherness, and Absolute Knowing,” The Owl of Minerva, 26, 1 (Fall 1994): 3–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Houlgate, Stephen, “Absolute Knowing Revisited,” The Owl of Minerva, 30, 1 (Fall 1998): 51–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Flay, Joseph C., “Hegel's Metaphysics,” The Owl of Minerva, 14, 2 (Spring 1993): 145–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Absolute Knowing and the Absolute Other,” The Owl of Minerva, 30, 1 (Fall 1998): 69–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Burbidge, John, “Absolute Acting,” The Owl of Minerva, 30, 1 (Fall 1998): 103–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Harris, H. S., Hegel's Ladder (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), Vol. 1, pp. 110–14, 151 note 1.Google Scholar

3 Stern, Robert, Hegel, Kant, and the Structure of the Object (London and New York: Routledge, 1990)Google Scholar, and Harris, Errol E., The Spirit of Hegel (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993), chaps. 7–11.Google Scholar

4 Fleischhacker, Louk, “Gibt es etwas Außer der Äußerlichkeit? Über die Bedeutung der Veräußerlichung der Idee,” in Hegel-Jahrbuch 1990, edited by Kimmerle, H., Lefèvre, W., and Meyer, R. W. (Bochum: Germinal, 1990), pp. 35–41.Google Scholar

5 Wandschneider, Dieter and Hösle, Vittorio, “Die Entäußerung der Idee zur Natur und ihre Zeitliche Entfaltung als Geist bei Hegel,” in Hegel-Studien, edited by Nicolin, F. and Pöggeler, O. (Bonn: Herbert Grundmann, 1983), Band 18, pp. 173–99, especially 173–76Google Scholar; Wandschneider, Dieter, “Die Absolutheit des logischen und das Sein der Natur,” in Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 39, 3 (1985–86): 331–51Google Scholar; and Wandschneider, Dieter, “Nature and the Dialectic of Nature in Hegel's Objective Idealism,” Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, 26 (Autumn/Winter 1992): 30–51, especially 30–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also H. Braun, “Zur Interpretation der hegelschen Wendung: Frei entlassen,” in Hegel, l'esprit objectif, l'unité de l'histoire, actes du II^me congres international de l'association pour l'étude de la philosophic de Hegel, Lille 1968, pp. 51–64, and Maker, William, “The Very Idea of the Idea of Nature, or Why Hegel Is Not an Idealist,” in Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature, edited by Houlgate, Stephen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 1–27.Google Scholar

6 According to Hegel, introductions have only “historical” value. Because the author has been through the whole development of the subject matter, he is in a position to state in advance the results of this development. Introductions give the reader a preliminary view of where the demonstration is going. But results cannot be truly philosophical unless they are known philosophically. Philosophical knowing involves knowing results as necessitated or proved. Because introductions anticipate this development and present results without the procedure that justifies them, introductory statements have no philosophical status. See Hegel, G. W. F., Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Werke (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), Vol. 8, §19 (Remark)Google Scholar. (Hereafter, the parts of the Enzyklopädie are cited as follows: the first part, “die Wissenschaft der Logik” [Werke, Vol. 8] as EL; the second part, “die Naturphilosophie” [Werke, Vol. 9] as EN. Citations refer to section numbers [§] common to all editions and English translations; Remarks are indicated by R, Addenda by A following the section number); Hegel, G. W. F., Wissenschaft der Logik. Die Lehre vom Sein (1832), edited by Gawoll, Hans-Jürgen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990)Google Scholar, according to the text of Gesammelte Werke, Band 21, edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke (1985), 27/25–26; 38–39/39; 44/45; Miller, A. V., trans., Hegel's Science of Logic (London: Allen and Unwin and New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 43, 54–55, 59Google Scholar. Hereafter, citations of the Wissenschaft der Logik. Die Lehre vom Sein (1832) have the following form: WL (1832) 27/25–26 (M/43); 38–39/39 (M/54–55); 44/45 (M/59). Citations refer first to the numerical ordering carried over from Gesammelte Werke, Band 21, followed by the page numbers of the Gawoll edition, followed in parentheses by pages in the Miller translation preceded by ML.

7 EL §5–7. See also §24.

8 EL §1, 7R, 9, 12R. German terminology appears in §12R. See also G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, edited by Hans-Friedrich Wessels and Heinrich Clairmont, according to the text of Gesammelte Werke, Band 9, edited by Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede (1980), 93–94/106–108; Miller, A. V., trans., Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), §152–53Google Scholar. Hereafter, citations of the Phänomenologie des Geistes have the following form: PhG 93–94/106–108 (M §152–53). Citations refer first to the numerical ordering carried over from Gesammelte Werke, Band 9, followed by the page numbers of the Wessels and Clairmont edition, followed in parentheses by section numbers from the Miller translation preceded by M.

9 EL §12, 19. See also WL (1832) 41–43/42–44 (M/57–59).

10 EL §3, 6, 9, 12, 20. See also EN§246R.

11 WL (1832) 27/25–26 (MAO); 35–38/36–38 (M/52–53); 58/60 (M/71).EL,§1, 17, 25R. See also Hegel, G. W. F., Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, edited by Hoffmeister, Johannes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955), §2, 3 RemarkGoogle Scholar. Hereafter, citations of the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts have the following form: PhR §2, 3R, referring to section numbers (§) common to all editions and English translations, Remarks indicated by R, Addenda by A following the section number.

12 PhG 13/8 (M §8); 22–23/19–21 (M §26); 61–62/68 (M §88–89); 429–30/525 (M §802). See also EL §6, 7, 12. According to Hegel, “whatever is in consciousness is experienced; this is even a tautological proposition” (EL §8, translation mine). Thus, even such non-sensuous contents as freedom, spirit, God can be immediately present to consciousness, felt in our sense of ourselves. We feel ourselves being conscious of these contents (§8R).

13 WL (1832) 13–18/13–19 (M/35–40); 27–30/25–28 (M/43–46); 32–34/32–34 (M/48–50); 44/45–46 (M/60); 53–56/55–59 (M/67–70); PhG 15–16/11–12 (M §13–14); 22–24/19–22 (M §26–27); 53–56/57–60 (M §73–76); 58–59/64 (M §82). See also EL §24, 25, especially the Remark.

14 WL (1832) 7–9/6–7 (M/27–28); 36–38/37–39 (M/53–54); 57–58/59–60 (M/71); PhG 61–62/68 (M §88).

15 M/54, WL (1832) 38/38–39.

16 WL (1832) 57–58/59–61 (M/71–72). See also PhG 193–194/234 (M §348); 429–30/525 (M §802); EL §17; PhR §141R.

17 PhG 56–58/62–63 (M §80); 58–59/64 (M §82). See also WL (1832) 32–34/32–33 (M/48–49); 37–38/37–39 (M/53–54); 57–58/59–60 (M/71).

18 PhG 29–30/28 (M §36); 61–62/68 (M §88); WL (1832) 54–55/57 (M/69).

19 PhG 58–62/63–68 (M §81–88).

20 PhG 63–64/70 (M §93); 64–65/71 (M §96); 65–66/72 (M §98–99); 66–69/72–76 (M §101–108).

21 PhG 71–74/79–75 (M §111–17).

22 PhG 77–80/87–90 (M §123–31). Note especially the following: “the object is in one and the same respect the opposite of itself: it is for itself, so far as it is for another, and it is for another, so far as it is for itself” (PhG 78/89 [M §128]).

23 PhG 75–76/84–86 (M §119–20); 80–81/90–92 (M §131); 82–83/94 (M §134).

24 M/54, WL (1832) 38/38–39.

25 Dieter Wandschneider's rational reconstruction of Hegel's dialectic makes the same general point that I am making here. He, too, insists that nothing external to the dialectic can determine the new category. He also claims that the new category from the beginning is determined as the sameness of opposites. See Wandschneider, Dieter, “Dialektik als Antinomische Logik,” in Hegel-Jahrbuch 1991, edited by Kimmerle, Heinz and Lefèvre, Wolfgang (Fernwald [Annerod]: Germinal, 1991), pp. 227–42Google Scholar, and “Nature and the Dialectic of Nature in Hegel's Objective Idealism,” pp. 37–41.

26 PhG 56–57/62 (M §79); 82–85/94–96 (M §134–36).

27 PhG 87–88/100 (M §142); 89–90/102–103 (M §146–48).

28 PhG 90–93/103–108 (M §148–52).

29 P/JG 91–95/105–109 (M §150–54).

30 PhG 95–97/109–111 (M §155–56).

31 PhG 91–92/104–106 (M §149–50); 95–101/109–16 (M §155–62). I have developed a more careful explanation of these texts in “Contradiction and Relations: Hegel and the Tradition,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 4 (Autumn 1990): 533–38.Google Scholar

32 PhG 89–90/102–103 (M §146–47); 94–96/108–10 (M §154–55). See also PAG 75–76/84–86 (M §119–20); 80–81/90–92 (M §131); 82–83/94 (M §134).

33 In the “Philosophy of Nature,” Hegel explicitly refers to this same kind of contradiction as an unresolved contradiction (der unaufgelöste Widerspruch) (EN 248R. See also §247–48, 250–51).

34 PhG 100–101/115–16 (M §162).

35 PhG 103–106/120–23 (M §166–69); 107–108/125–26 (M §172–75).

36 PhG 109–16/127–36 (M §178–96).

37 PhG, 116–18/136–40 (M §197–99).

38 PhG 118/139–40 (M §200–201).

39 PhG 118–23/140–46 (M §202–10); 131–32/155–57 (M §230–31).

40 PhG 134–35/160 (M §235).

41 PhG 134–37/160–63 (M §235–38).

42 “Whether the Thing is called an [alien] (fremder) impulse, or an empirical or sensuous entity, or the Thing-in-itself, it still remains in principle the same, i.e. [something foreign] (Fremde) to that unity” (PhG [M §238] 136–37/163).

43 PhG 150/180 (M §265); 154/185 (M §274–75).

44 PhG 154/185 (M §275).

45 PhG 165–67/199–201 (M §295–98); 192–98/233–39 (M §347–59); 238–40/288–90 (M §438–41).

46 PhG 329–30/401–403 (M §606–10); 331–32/404–405 (M §614–15); 337–39/411–14 (M §626–30).

47 Note the following statements in which Hegel explicitly refers to the distinction formula: “since the distinction on which [the moral view of the world] rests … becomes a distinction which no longer exists even in words…. The consciousness which makes this distinction that is no distinction … expresses in one and the same breath the thoughts which it previously separated, and itself proclaims that it is not in earnest about this determination and separation…” (PhG 339–40/414–15 [M §631]). See also 353–54/430–31 (M §656).

48 PhG 340–45/415–21 (M §632–40).

49 PhG 354–57/431–36 (M §657–63).

50 PhG 328–29/400–401 (M §605–606); 337–38/411–12 (M §626–27); 338–39/413–14 (M §630); 342–43/417–19 (M §635–37); 346–50/422–26 (M §643–47); 352–53/430 (M §655); 354–55/433–34 (M §659). For an interesting description of Augustine's moral dilemma, see Garry Wills, Saint Augustine (New York: Penguin, 1999), pp. 66–67.

51 PhG{M §611)330–31/403.

52 PhG 363/443 (M §672).

53 PhG 363–65/443–45 (M §672–78).

54 PhG 404–407/494–97 (M §758–61); 409–411/500–502 (M §769–71).

55 PhG 410–11/501–502 (M §770–72).

56 PhG 411–12/502–503 (M §772–74).

57 PhG 411–12/503–504 (M §773–75); 414/505–506 (M §777); 414–17/507–509 (M §780); 417–18/510–11 (M §782–83).

58 See Section 6.

59 PAG 423–26/518–20 (M §792–94).

60 God becomes a human being existing in the natural world and identified with its conditions—an individual among others, living at a particular time in a particular place, subject to the negativity of natural death. This same divine spirit overcomes these divisions by rising to live again as the universal spirit of the believing community (PhG410–11/501–502 [M §771]; 411–21/503–15 [M §774–87]).

61 See also PhG 429–30/525 (M §802).

62 PhG 432–33/529–30 (M §806–807). See also 422–23/516–17 (M §788); 425–27/520–22 (M §795–96); 427–28/523 (M §798–99); 430–432/527–28 (M §804). The limits of my project here make it impossible to develop a full interpretation of what Hegel means by absolute knowing. Since the project focuses on the relation between pure thought and nature, I have addressed only the way the otherness of nature persists in absolute knowing. For a fuller discussion of absolute knowing, see my “Absolute Knowing Revisited.”

63 PhG 429–30/525–26 (M §802). See also 422–24/517–19 (M §789–92).

64 WL (1832) 57–58/59–60 (M/71). See also PhG 432–33/528–29 (M §805).

65 WL (1832) 55–56/58 (M/69); PhG 431–32/528–29 (M §805). According to William Maker and Richard Dien Winfield, the collapse of knowing into a unity without distinctions shows that the Phenomenology proves only what knowing is not. It is not knowing related to an other that legitimates it (William Maker, “Beginning,” in Essays on Hegel's Logic, edited by George di Giovanni, pp. 38–39; Philosophy without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel, pp. 92–93; and Winfield, Overcoming Foundations: Studies in Systematic Philosophy, pp. 24–32). According to Stephen Houlgate, the collapse of knowing into unity shows that otherness does not persist in absolute knowing (Houlgate, “Hegel and Fichte: Recognition, Otherness, and Absolute Knowing,” pp. 13–16, and Houlgate, “Absolute Knowing Revisited,” p. 62). All three authors emphasize Hegel's statement that in logic the differences characteristic of knowing in the Phenomenology have been overcome (WL [1832] 32–33/32–33 [M/49]; 44–45/46 [M/60]). But, according to the demands of Hegel's scientific procedure, articulated in the same introductory texts, overcoming does not do away with otherness and opposition. Rather, it acknowledges the necessary connection between the opposites. This justifies thinking the relation between the opposites as determined by a common ground or principle that governs the whole dynamic (WL [1832] 37–38/38 [M/54]).

66 WL 55–56/58 (M/69).

67 WL (1832) 54–56/57–59 (M/68–70); PhG 431–32/528–29 (M §805). See also WL (1832) 17–18/19 (M/39); 32–34/32–33 (M/48–49).

68 Logic ends with the category Hegel calls “absolute idea,” which is the concept actualized, pure thought giving itself reality. In two places, Hegel describes this distinction between concept and reality as thought completely transparent to itself. He calls this transparency a difference (Unterschied) that is not yet otherness (Anderssein). He represents this difference as “the original word” which, in being spoken, immediately vanishes as outer. This repeats the same idioms used in the Phenomenology to describe the tranquil fellowship of the divine spirit. The Logic reinforces the similarity thus: “the Idea is still logical, it is enclosed within pure thought, and is the science only of the divine (göttlichen) [concept].” See Hegel, G. W. F., Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), translated by Miller, A. V., edited by Gawoll, Hans-Jürgen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992)Google Scholar, according to the text of Gesammelte Werke, Band 12, edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke (1981), 39–40/41. Hereafter, citations of the Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816) will have the following form: WL (1816) 252–53/305 (M/843). Citations refer first to the numerical ordering carried over from Gesammelte Werke, Band 12, followed by the page numbers of the Gawoll edition, followed in parentheses by the page numbers of the Miller translation preceded by ML Moreover, the Logic uses the rhetoric of dismissal, letting go, sending away (entlassen), to describe the move from logic to nature. The absolute idea lets go, sends away, the idea itself in the form of spatio-temporal externality or nature. Although absolute idea is absolutely free in itself, secure and at rest in itself, this very freedom makes it determinate, and the “form of its determinacy” is an externality that is free in the same way (ebenso), purely and simply (schlechthin) free, absolutely for itself, a free existence (WL [1816] 235–37/283–85 [M/824–25]; 252–53/304–306 [M/842–44]). See also EN §247–48, 249R, 250–51.

69 See PhR §146R, 214R.

70 EL §18.

71 Hegel's Science of Logic, p. 608; WL (1816) 39–40/41.

72 WL (1816) 39–40/40–41 (M/607–608). Hegel suggests in several places that, without this radical otherness, absolute being or thought could not be a self, and, hence, could not become spirit (PhG 411–12/503 [M §774]; EL§18). Spirit requires an other that stands free, that does not conform, that never completely surrenders its otherness. Only then can essence speak the Word to another, and not just to itself.

73 EL §6, 7R, 9, 12. See also EN §246R.

74 EL §6, 12, 19. See also WL (1832) 41–43/42–44 (M/57–59); EN §246R.