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Hegel's Morals
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Extract
Opponents of Hegel's philosophy traditionally support their arguments against his metaphysics and dialectical methodology by implying that the lack of an ethics in his system has unfortunate consequences for personal and political life. In rebuttal, defenders of Hegel then block the ad hominem charges by pointing out examples of sound moral and political behavior in Hegel's own life and by arguing that amoral or immoral conduct is not entailed by Hegel's dialectical reasoning. The success of this defense of the biographical Hegel has not yet been matched, however, by a systematic explanation of the nature of morality based on Hegel's philosophical writings themselves. Instead of supplying an alternative to Kant's conception of morality, Hegel's texts indeed seem to involve the devious strategy of attacking Kantian morality and then abruptly moving on to another topic. The shift of discussion to religion or the state appears to force commentators to conclude either that his philosophy lacks a systematic moral philosophy (Marcuse) or that it surreptitiously preserves an essentially Kantian ethics (Knox). In the former case his system apparently permits immoral conduct (for the sake of historical progress), and in the latter the philosopher merely deceives us with a dialectical sleight of hand. In either case, Hegel's morals are still in doubt.
- Type
- Critical Notices/Études critiques
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1981 , pp. 84 - 102
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1981
References
Notes
* Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND: An Essay in the Real and the Ideal. By Robinson, Jonathan. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1977. Pp. x, 152. $12.50Google Scholar
1 See Marcuse, Herbert, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon, 1968), p. 200: cited by Robinson, p. 8Google Scholar.
2 See Knox, T.M., “Hegel's Attitude to Kant's Ethics”, Kant-Studien 49 (1957–1958); cited by Robinson, p. 14Google Scholar.
3 See the early essays collected in the anthology, Hegel's Political Philosophy, ed. Kaufmann, Walter (New York: Atherton Press, 1970)Google Scholar.
4 See Beck, Lewis White, A Commentary on Kant's CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 242 ffGoogle Scholar.
5 For the distinction between three versions of moral relativism (normative moral relativism, moral judgment relativism, and meta-ethical relativism) see Harman, Gilbert, “What is Moral Relativism?” in Values and Morals, eds. Goldman, A.I. and Kim, J. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp. 143–161CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Antigone is a paradigm case for Harman much as she is for Hegel, : “superficially conflicting moral judgments about that agent (e.g. Antigone) made in relation to different moralities can both be true ifthe agent accepts both moralities relative to which each of the judgments is made” (159)Google Scholar.
6 , Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, trans. Ellington, J. (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), p. 90Google Scholar; this translation of the second part of the The Metaphysics of Morals will be cited hereafter as MM, Part II. Commentators often unfairly fail to notice that in the short piece “Überein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen” Kant is not arguing the stronger thesis that there is a moral obligation never to lie, but only the different thesis that there is no legal right to lie from altruistic motives.
7 MM, Part II, p. 46.
8 Without citing Copi, who implies that they are, Geach, Peter in Reason and Argument (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976)Google Scholar uses Copi's own example to show that they are not (pp. 26 ff.).
9 Robinson's claim that for Hegel the emptiness of the categorical imperative is a consequence and not a premise of his transformation of a morality of duty into hypocrisy does not explain why Hegel himself then argued against such empty moral imperatives in the earlier sections on reason as law-giver and law-tester. Those arguments should be independent of the question at stake here concerning the internal consistency of the postulates.
10 Kant, , Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Beck, Lewis White (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 117Google Scholar.
11 For further discussion see my essay, [Hegel, Taylor-Made”, this journal, vol. XVI (1977), PP. 715–732Google Scholar.
12 On transcendental arguments in ethics, see Watt, A.J., “Transcendental Arguments and Moral Principles”, Philosophical Quarterly 25, pp. 40–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Griffiths, A. Phillips, “Ultimate Moral Principles: Their Justification”, in Edwards, Paul, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York, 1967), vol. VIII, p. 179Google Scholar; Benton, Robert J., Kant's Second Critique and the Problem of Transcendntal Arguments (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977)Google Scholar.
13 Wood, , Kant's Moral Religion, p. 104nGoogle Scholar.
14 Cited by Wood, , Kant's Moral Religion, p. 29Google Scholar.
15 For another example of a criticism of a thin conception of deontological principles see Buchanan's, Allen review of Onora Nell's Acting on Principle in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXV (06 1978), pp. 325–340Google Scholar.
16 MM, Part II, p. 59.
17 MM, Part II, p. 100.
18 MM, Part II, p. 101.
19 Walsh, W.H., Hegelian Ethics (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969), p. 34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
20 Wood, , Kant's Rational Theology, p. 21Google Scholar. See Rawls', discussion of rational plans, and the example of the mathematician who attempts to prove a falsehood, A Theory of Justice, p. 419Google Scholar.
21 Ibid.
22 writes, Kant: “One lies when … by so acknowledging in thought such a Searcher of Hearts, [he] convinces himself that it can do no harm and may even be useful, in order at all events to insinuate himself into such a one's favor” (MM, Part II, pp. 91–92)Google Scholar.
23 In Kant's Moral Religion, pp. 42–43, Wood correctly cautions against accepting the first premise of this argument.
24 See MM, Part II, p. 34.
25 Wood, , Kant's Moral Religion, p. 141Google Scholar.
26 Kant, , Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 123Google Scholar; cited by Wood, , Kant's Rational Theology, p. 24Google Scholar.
27 Wood, Kant's Rational Theology, p. 24.
28 See MM, Part II, p. 103.
29 Walsh, , Hegelian Ethics, p. 33Google Scholar.
30 Walsh, , Hegelian Ethics, pp. 49 ff.Google Scholar; p. 79.
31 See Harman, Gilbert, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 119 ffGoogle Scholar.
32 Bernard Williams' recent lectures and seminars on the nature of morality represent a thorough-going reflection on this strategy.
33 See Rawls, , “The Basic Structure as Subject”, American Philosophical Quarterly XIV: 2 (04 1977) pp. 159–165Google Scholar; also, Hoy, Joyce Beck, “Hegel's Critique of Rawls”, “Clio: Hegel Studies X: 4 (1980–1981)Google Scholar. For a summary of the relation of Habermas to Kant's ethics, see McCarthy, Thomas, The Critical Theory ofJurgen Habermas (London: Hutchinson, 1978), pp. 325–333Google Scholar.
34 See my “Hegel, Taylor-Made”, p. 729 and footnote 28.
35 Hegel's rhetoric may on occasion take him too far, though, as when he suggests that world-historical figures “must trample many an innocent flower underfoot” (Reason in History, trans. H.B. Nisbet; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975; p. 89). The problem with this apparent claim that historical considerations may outweigh moral ones is not its imputedjustification of immorality, but its peculiarly unHegelian view of the power of an individual to judge and determine (rather than indirectly influence) the course of history.