Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T07:42:50.624Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Gruner on Berkeley on General Ideas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1971

Kenneth Barber
Kenneth Barber
Affiliation:
State University of Mew York at Buffalo
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Notes—Discussion
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , June 1971 , pp. 337 - 341
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1971

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Gruner, Rolf, “Berkeley on General Ideas”, Dialogue, Vol. VIII (1969), 481–485.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 In discussing Berkeley's attack on Locke I shall ignore the crucial issues of whether or not Locke took abstract general ideas to be images, whether or not Berkeley conceives of his doctrine solely as an attack on the image model and whether or not Berkeley conceives his own doctrine of general ideas in terms of images. Dismissing these questions is permissible in the context since Gruner is willing to accept the thesis that Berkeley's general ideas were images on the grounds that his argument is successful even under this assumption. (Gruner, p. 483).

3 it is at this point that the question of Berkeley's psychologism becomes crucial, for the extension of the principle to cover thought would seem to rest on treating thought in terms of images.

4 For a discussion of this point see Weinberg, Julius R., Abstraction, Relation and Induction (Madison, 1965), 5–32Google Scholar. See also Wilson, Fred, ”Weinberg's Refutation ofNominalism”, Dialogue, Vol. VIII (1969) 460–474CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Gruner, p. 482.

6 Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, Sect