Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T07:52:25.330Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Formal Arguments in Support of the Coherence Theory of the Nature of Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2010

J. R. A. Mayer
Affiliation:
Brock University

Abstract

Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Notes—Discussions
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1965

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Cf. Quine, W. V., Mathematical Logic, Harvard UP, Cambridge, 1955, p. 209214Google Scholar.

2 It might be interesting to note that we have not insisted here on the internality of the relevance relation. Absolute idealists claim that all relations are internal. However, if the modifier “internal” is universally applicable to all relations, then it loses its meaning, for it makes relations and internal relations extensively identical. It seems more profitable to treat “internal” not as a simple property of a relation, but rather as a second order binary relation, whose subject term is itself a relation. Thus whether a relation is internal or not must be decided with respect to something else. A specific relation may simultaneously be both internal and external, with respect to different entities.

3 The paradoxes of confirmation are fully discussed in Scheffler, I., The Anatomy of Inquiry, Random House, Toronto, 1963, p. 236 ffGoogle Scholar.